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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., and Idaho 
Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS 
ASSOCIA TlON, INC., and Idaho Corporation. 
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, and Idaho 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 




I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Sunnyside Utilities, Inc. (Sunnyside) and Printcraft Press. Inc. (Printcraft) have 
been involved in an ongoing dispute involving the availability and proper usage of a 
sewer system that had previously been connected to the property of \vhich Printcrafl is 
the current lessee. Smmyside alleges that after Printcraft first began occupying the 
property in January of 2006, it discharged hazardous materials and excessive amounts of 
water into Sunnyside's sevver system. Count 1 of Sunnyside' s counterclaim makes the 
following allegation: 
Plaintiff breached the contract by discharging \vater softener brine. 
hazardous chemicals, substances that are harmful to Defendant's sewer 
facilities, inks, and excessive flow of discharges. 
Answer to Amended Complaint, Amended Counterclaims, ,r 33. 
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Sunnyside now seeks summary jUdgment on Count 1 of its Counterclaim 
primarily relying upon an exchange of letters between the Patiies. On September 20. 
2006, counsel for Sunnyside sent a letter to cow1sel for Printcraft that states in relevant 
part: 
Sunnyside Park Utilities will continue to accept sewer water, but vvill not accept 
process wastewater. Sunnyside Park Utilities will not participate in violation of 
Idaho law. Therefore, Printcraft Press must cease any flows of process water into 
the system by 5 :00 p.m. September 22, 2006. If Printcraft does not cease 
injecting excess wastewater and process wastewater. absent a court order. 
Sunnyside Utilities vvill be forced to physically disconnect all flows from 
Printcraft Press, and will seek to recover all damages which result from Printcraft 
Press's actions. These issues are not negotiable. 
Beck Aff. Ex. A. 
On September 25, 2006, representatives from Printcraft and Sunnyside met with 
counsel for Sunnyside to discuss how to remedy the dispute. The following day. counsel 
for Printcraft sent a letter to Sunnyside's counsel, which states in relevant part: 
In following up to our meeting, Travis Waters has informed me that he 
had an additional conversation with Doyle Beck yesterday evening about 7:00 
p.m. Travis agreed with Doyle that Printcraft Press will no longer be putting the 
RO water into the sewer system. Additionally, Travis agreed to make 
arrangements to collect and dispose of what you classify as "processed waste." 
Beck Aff. Ex B. 
Sunnyside has moved for summary jUdgment on its breach of contract 
counterclaim primarily arguing that the September 20, 2006 letter constituted an offer by 
Smmyside which was accepted through the September 26,2006 letter. Sunnyside further 
argues that Printcraft breached that contract when it continued to discharge water softener 
brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater into the 
sewer system and that as a result of those discharges Sunnyside suffered damages in the 
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amount of $2,648.64 when it was forced to physically sever the sewer connection to 
Printcraft's property. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving paJiy is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), LR.C.P.; Orfhman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 
600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). Upon considering a motion for summary jUdgment, all 
controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Friel v. Boise 
City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29 (1994). Where a jury will 
decide the facts at triaL the court must draw all reasonable factual inferences and 
conclusions in favor of the non-moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc., 126 
Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). In ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve 
controverted factual issues. Bybee v. Clark, 118 Idaho 254, 257, 796 P.2d 131. 134 
(1990). 
The party moving for summary judgment always bears the burden of proving that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists on an element of the non-moving party's case. If 
the moving pmiy fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift 
to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with 
supporting evidence. Orfhman v. Idaho Power Co., at 600,944 P.2d at 1363. 
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If the moving party has met its burden by either an affirmative showing of the 
moving party's evidence or by a review ofthe non-moving party's evidence, the burden 
shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue for trial does exist. Id.: 
Navarrette 1'. CityofCa/dwell, 130 Idaho 849, 851, 949 P.2d 597, 599 (1997). To 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough 
to create a genuine issue. Nelson, A.1.A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117,118 
(1990); Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of A merica, lnc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 
(1996). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Sunnyside claims that the September 20,2006 and September 26,2006 letters 
formed a valid contract between Sunnyside and Printcraft setting forth the terms under 
which Printcraft was permitted to utilize Sunnyside's sewer system. Initially, the Court 
will consider whether the alleged contract is sufficiently definite in its terms to allow 
enforcement. 
Case law has held that a contract is unenforceable if it is not "complete, definite 
and certain in all its material terms, or contain[ s] provisions which are capable in 
themselves of being reduced to certainty." General Auto Parts Co., lnc, v. Genuine Parts 
Co" 132 Idaho 849, 857, 979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (1999) (quoting Giacobbi Square v, PEK 
Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983». Although absolute certainty is not 
required relative to every detail of the contract, "the agreement must be sufficiently 
definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what acts 
are to be performed and when performance is complete". Bajrektarevic v, Lighthouse 
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Home Loans. Inc., 143 Idaho 890. 155 P.3d 691, 693 (2007). "[W]here a phrase of 
contract ... is reasonably capable of different interpretations ... there is no contract." 
Konic Int'! COlp. v. Spokane Computer Services. Inc., 109 Idaho 527, 529, 708 P.2d 932, 
934 (Ct. App. 1985) (quoting 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 95 (3d ed. 1957)). 
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve." 
Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702, 779 P.2d 15, 16 (1989). "In a dispute 
over contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct and common 
understanding between the parties." Id. at 703, 779 P.2d at 17. 
While the September 20, 2006 and September 26, 2006 letters could conceivably 
constitute an offer and acceptance, there is a genuine issue of material fact of whether the 
terms of that alleged contract are sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable. 
Instructive is the case Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat '1 Bank. 
119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). In Black Canyon Racquetball Club. the plaintiff 
claimed that a contract existed in which Idaho First National Bank agreed to issue a loan 
to the plaintiff in order to expand and remodel its health club as soon as the plaintill had 
sold 150 memberships. Id. at 172. 804 P.2d at 901. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the district court's findings that the terms of the alleged contract \vere not sufficiently 
definite to be legally enforceable. Id. at 173, 804 P.2d at 902. Specifically. the cOUli 
found that the contract term specifying the principal amount to be borrowed was an 
indefinite term since that amount was subject to increase or decrease. Jd at 174. 804 P.2d 
at 903. In addition, the provision specifying the interest rate as the "market rate" was an 
indefinite term since it was subject to various meanings, such as "mortgage rate," or 
"prime rate" and did not specify which market it attached to. Id. Also, the term 
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specifying that the loan was to be issued when 150 memberships were sold was indefinite 
because it didn't specify the type of memberships to be sold, such as "full-family 
lifetime," "fitness-only:' or "student" memberships. ld 
The September 20, 2006 and September 26, 2006 letters are vague and incomplete 
regarding what exact discharges into the sewer system are permissible by Printcraft. 
Furthermore, the term "processed waste," like the term "market rate" in Black CanJ>(JI1 
Racquetball Club, was not fully defined in the letters and does not have a clear meaning 
for purposes of this motion. Where the parties to the alleged agreement claim to attach 
different meanings to the term, it is impossible for the Court to rule as a matter of law on 
whether such a contract has been breached. 
There is also controverted evidence and a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the significance of the September 25, 2006 meeting between Printcraft and Sunnyside. 
Printcraft claims that at that meeting it demonstrated each process it was performing at its 
printing facility and that Sunnyside made several suggestions to either eliminate certain 
discharges or change the location of those discharges. Printcraft asserts that the 
September 26, 2006 letter relates to the discussions of the previous day rather than a 
direct response to the September 20, 2006 letter. "A prerequisite to the valid formation of 
a contract is a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to 
contract". Bajrektarevic. supra, at 693. The testimony of Travis Waters at the time of his 
deposition creates a factual issue as to the discussions and possible agreements made on 
September 25,2006, to which the September 26,2006 letter may have been referring. 
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Construing all controverted facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, a genuine issue of material fact has been raised as to whether a contract 
was formed as a result of the September 20, and September 26. 2006 letters. 
As an aside, the analysis of the September 25.2006 meeting does not violate the 
strictures of the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule precludes extrinsic evidence 
as to a clear and unambiguous contract. However, when considering whether a contract 
has even been formed, the rule does not apply. }vfitchell v. Barendregl. 120 Idaho 837. 
820 P.2d 707, 120 Idaho 837 (CLApp. 1991); International Engineering Co .. Inc. ]I. 
Dawn Industries. Inc .. 102 Idaho 363 630 P.2d 155 (Idaho 1981). Additionally. as 
previously indicated, ambiguous contracts are also not subject to the parol evidence rule. 
Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P .3d 20, 24 (2000). 
However. a ruling that the September 20 and September 26 letters did not as a matter of 
law. create a contract does not however end the inquiry as to whether there was a breach of 
contract. While this issue was not directly before the Court when it entered its August 31. 2007 
Memorandum Decision and Order, many of the findings and rulings nevertheless apply. 
When considering the course of conduct between the Pm1ies. there was at least an 
implied in fact contract whereby Sunnyside would provide services to Printcraft by receiving 
waste. 
"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the 
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party 
and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances 
attending the performance." }'arnworth v. Fen1iing, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 
1378,1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d810, 
815 (1965». The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement 
and tacit understanding. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026. 
1029 (1997). "The general rule is that where the conduct of the pmiies allows the 
dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting 
party promised payment, then the comi may find a contract implied in fact." 
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Homes by Bell-Fli, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989. 991 (1986) 
(citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810. 815 (1965); 
Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 325, 563 P.2d 48, 49 (1977»). 
Fox v. A10untain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848. 853 (2002). 
For purposes of considering Sunnyside's motion and Count 1 of the Counterclaim. it is 
not critical or necessary to determine what was said at various discussions, or whether the Parties 
had a mutual understanding of the term "processed waste". At a minimum. the implied in fact 
contract precluded a discharge of waste which would be unlavvful. 
Existing law becomes part of a contract. just as though the contract 
contains an express provision to that effect, unless a contrary intent is disclosed. 
Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263. 596 P.2d 436 (1979). 
PrimCllY Health NetlVork, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmil1.. 137 Idaho 663. 52 P.3d 307, 310 
(2002). 
The Court followed this rule in Long 1'. Owen. 21 Idaho 243.121 
P. 99 (1912) in stating: 
Where one contracts to do a piece of work and there is at the time an 
existing law prescribing the specifications for that kind of work and 
requiring that all such work be done in accordance with the statute or 
ordinance. as the case may be, the statute or ordinance becomes a part of 
the contract, and the one who undertakes to do such work impliedly agree 
to do it in such a manner as to meet the requirements of law. 
Id. at 245,121 P. at 100. 
Star Phoenix j\1in. Co. v. Hecla A1in. Co .. 130 Idaho 223, 230, 231. 939 P.2d 542. 549. 
550 (1997). 
This Court has held that "it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and 
made a part of every written contract." Fideli(v Ihlsf Co. v. Stale, 72 
Idaho 137,237P.2d 1058(1951). See also Longv. Owen. 21 Idaho 243, 
121 P. 99 (1912). It appears to be the law in almost every state. if not alL 
that existing law becomes part of a contract, just as though the contract 
contains an express provision to that effect (unless a contrary intent is 
disclosed). 
Robinson v. Joint School Dist. No. 150, 100 Idaho 263,265, 596 P.2d 436,438 (1979). 
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As a corollary to the foregoing, and as previously noted by the Court the Parties 
could not enter into an agreement which would allow an unlawful discharge of \vaste. 
VvThere this Court has previously held that Printcraft: was discharging waste in 
violation oflaw (specifically, IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03) and as such Sunnyside was 
justified in terminating the septic service, it logically follows and the Court concludes 
that Printcraft breached the implied in fact contract by discharging such waste. 
As to damages arising from the breach, Sunnyside filed the Affidavit of Doyle 
Beck wherein Beck testified that the cost of renting a backhoe and performing the 
disconnection cost $1,228.64. (Affidavit of Doyle Beck, '1 6). Paragraph 7 of said 
Affidavit also identified costs of $1 ,420 for supervision and inspection of the disconnect. 
While the Court previously denied Printcraft's motion to strike these paragraphs of the 
affidavit, upon further review the Court finds that Paragraph 7 of the Affidavit is without 
sufficient foundation to support an award of damages. The Court does find that 
Sunnyside is entitled to recover the cost of the backhoe rental in the amount of $1.228.64. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Sunnyside's motion as to Count 1 of the Counterclaim is 
granted. Sunnyside is further entitled to recover $1,228.64 on that claim. 
DATED this -'---""-- day of April, 2008. 
~~~~~n-~ 
~OE~E. TINGEY ~ 
lJl~ICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2008, I did send a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document upon the parties listed belo\v by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox: or by 
causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Daniel R. Beck 
FULLER & CARR 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-9035 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Lance 1. Shuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404-7495 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County. Idaho 




Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Lance J. Schuster, ISB No. 5404 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attomey for Plaintiff 
, . 
t :, 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 




SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
O\VNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND TO 
ALLEGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc., through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair 
Gaffhey P A, respectfully moves this COUli pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-1604(2) for 
an order allowing it to amend its complaint to include a claim for punitive damages 
against the defendants. This motion is supported by a memorandum of law and affidavits 
submitted concurrently herewith. Oral argument is requested. 
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/.' c //Vi~ 
Micha~ y -"'------
Lance J. ~chuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
Beard st. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April 24, 2008, I 
served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive 
Damages on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Bryan Smith 
McGrath & Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 529-1300 
~/ 
MichieV D. a ney 
LancH Schuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Lance 1. Schuster, ISB No. 5404 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK 'WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSlDERA TION 
(RULE 1l(A)(2)(B» 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully submits the following memorandum in suppoli of its 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 31, 2007, Judge st. Clair granted Sunnyside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Judge St. Clair dismissed Printcraft's claim for breach of contract against 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in SuppolQ 
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Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (Sunnyside). The breach of contract claim arose out of 
Sunnyside's severing Printcraft's sewer connection. Judge St. Clair commented that 
"Sunnyside was justified in severing Printcrat1's sewer cOlmection .... " 
Judge St. Clair committed at least two errors in his decision. First, Judge St. Clair 
failed to analyze the claim properly by not considering whether Printcraft's alleged 
IDAPA violation materially breached the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement (the 
Agreement).l Second, the Court usurped the jury's role by making a factual finding on 
the materiality of Print craft's breach of the Agreement. Properly analyzed, the facts 
underlying Printcraft's claim should have prevented summary judgment. Furthennore, 
whether Printcraft materially breached its obligations under the Agreement or the Rules 
and Regulations is a fact question for a jury. Printcraft's motion should be granted. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
In Idaho, Rule 11(a)(2)(B) authorizes motions for reconsideration. IDAHO R. CIY. 
P. 11 (a)(2)(8) (2007). The Rule provides that "a motion for reconsideration of any 
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final 
judgment but not later than fomieen (4) days after the entry of the final judgment." ld. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Rule 1 1 (a)(2)(B) provides district 
courts with authority to reconsider interlocutory orders so long as a final judgment has 
not been entered. Tellord v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932, 950 P.2d 1271 (1998). 
"[T]he case law applying Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) permits a party to present new 
evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, but does not require that the motion 
1 The cOUli's decision never explains why Printcraft's minor infraction of an IDAPA rule justified 
Sunnyside in severing Printcraft's sewer service in perpetuity, One must conclude that the court regarded 
Printcrafi's IDAPA rule violation as a material breach of the Agreement, justifying Sunnyside's non-
perfonnance of its contractual duties under the Agreement 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in suPPorB)~i~1Ption for Reconsideration (Rule 1l(a)(2)(B)) 
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be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho 
2006)( emphasis in original). It is entirely pem1issible for a trial court to reconsider its 
own interlocutory orders for facial errors or errors of law. !d. A judge who replaces 
another judge has the authority to reconsider, review, and vacate rulings made by the 
previous judge. See Farmers Nat'! Bankv. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63,878 P.2d 762 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
I. There are issues of fact whether Printcraft's discharges materially breached 
the Agreement. 
Judge st. Clair erroneously granted summary judgment for Sunnyside. 2 Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that there is "no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." 
Fenwick v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, 160 P.3d 757, 760 (Idaho 2007). The question whether 
Printcraft's discharge of water softener brine materially breached the terms of the 
Agreement is a jury question. 
The Idaho Supreme Court defined "material breach" as a [breach of contract] 
which touches the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of the 
parties in entering into the contract. Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 
699-700,874 P.2d 506,510-11 (1983). Rescission ofa contract is available only when 
one of the parties has committed a material breach which destroys the entire purpose of 
entering into the contract. First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 792, 964 
P.2d 654,659 (1998). Rescission is not available, however, where the breach of contract 
is only incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of the contract. !d. Rescission is 
2 In its opinion. the court stated, "Accordingly the Court finds that there is no issue of material fact that 
Printcraft discharged substances into the sewer system in violation of state law." The court analyzed the 
wrong issue in determining whether any facts precluded granting summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Cf9l~n for Reconsideration (Rule 11(a)(2)(B)) 
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an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and should be granted only where 
one party has committed a breach so material that it destroys or vitiates the entire purpose 
for entering into the contract. Barnard & Son v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 474,708 P.2d 
871, 879 (1985) (Donaldson, J., dissenting).3 "Whether a breach of contract is material is 
an issue of fact." Costa v. Borges, 2008 Ida. LEXIS 29, *14 (March 10,2008). Thus, 
the disconnection of Printcraft from SUIulyside's septic system could only have been 
justified if Printcraft's performance of its obligations materially breached its obligations. 
Judge St. Clair, however, never analyzed the claim in this maImer. 
Printcraft did not materially breach its obligations. Sunnyside never presented the 
Court with any facts suggesting that Printcraft's discharges were in any way contrary to 
the Agreement's fundamental purpose and meaning, i.e., the provision of sewer service to 
Sunnyside Industrial Professional Park's (SIPP) occupants. The discharge's effects on 
Printcraft's and Sunnyside'S obligations, including whether the discharge materially 
breached Printcraft's obligations, are issues of fact for a jury. Both parties have retained 
experts that will testify about water softener brine's effects on the septic system.4 
Thus, there are questions of material fact whether Printcraft's actions materially 
breached the Agreement or the Rules and Regulations. At the time Printcraft moved into 
SfPP, Printcraft did not have the Agreement or the Rules and Regulations. On September 
20,2006, after Sunnyside's septic system failed, SUImyside provided Printcraft with a 
3 It seems almost too obvious that the Agreement and Rules and Regulations do not exist solely for the 
purpose of preventing water softener brine from being discharged into Sunnyside's septic system. Thus, 
any discharge of water softener brine simply cannot be a material breach of these specific agreements under 
any legal standard recognized in Idaho. 
4 Consequently, Printcraft's water softener brine discharge obviously did not destroy the entire purpose of 
entering the contract since. according to Travis Waters, modifying Printcraft's water softener brine 
discharge was "a simple 10 minute fix." Furthermore. the Sunnyside septic system functioned normally 
before and after the June 9, 2006 failure. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 11(a)(2)(B)) 
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copy ofthe Af:,Tfeement and the Rules and Regulations. (Waters Aff. Ex. S.)5 This was 
the first time Printcrafl had been provided with this info1111ation. (ld.) Sunnyside cam10t 
account for the fact that Printcraft had no notice of the Agreement's provisions or the 
provisions in the Rules and Regulations. Violation of the documents' terms without 
providing notice of those terms to Printcrafl cannot be a material breach. The Agreement 
and the Rules and Regulations were not recorded at the time Printcraft moved into SIPP. 
Printcraft had no knowledge of these documents' existence or contents prior to 
September 20, 2006. The fact that Sunnyside did not provide Printcrafl with the 
infonl1ation upon which Sunnyside now relies is probative of the incidental nature and 
importance of the documents' contents. Only a j ury can determine whether the 
documents' contents, unknown to Printcraft at the time of the septic system failure, could 
form the basis for a material breach of contract by Printcraft. 
There are questions of material fact whether discharge of water softener brine 
defeated the Agreement's purpose, i.e., the discharge prevented Sunnyside from 
providing sewer service to SIPP's occupants. H. Eric Nuttall (Nuttall), one of Printer aft's 
expert witnesses, testified that the discharge ofNaCI Brine6 "more probable than not ... 
had no negative effect on the SUI septic system and did not cause the failure." (Nuttall 
Aff. '111.) Nuttall commented that the highest concentration ofNaCI Brine discharged 
into the septic system was 600 parts per million (ppm). (ld.) This concentration is less 
than the salt concentration of brackish water. (ld.) Consequently, the NaCl Brine did not 
cause the septic system's failure. (ld.) Nuttall also concluded that, more probable than 
not, any discharge of hydro quinone was so low in concentration that such a discharge 
5 This affidavit was previously submitted to the Court on August 2, 2007. 
i1 The NaCl Brine is the same as the water softener brine referred to by Printcrafi. 
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could not have caused the septic system failure. (!d.,r 12.) Nuttall similarly found that 
Printcraft's discharges of copper, zinc, and silver were so low in concentration that more 
probable than not those discharges did not cause the septic system's failure. (ld. ~~ 13-
14.) Nuttall's testimony is consistent with Robert C. Starr's (Starr) testimony. Starr 
testified that based on the facts presented in this case that more probable than not the 
failure of the septic system occurred because ofthe volume of wastewater discharged into 
the system. (Starr Aff. ~ 42.) Starr also concluded that the discharge of water softener 
brine had no harmful effect on the septic system. (lei. ,[43.) Thus, there is a genuine 
factual dispute whether the discharge of water softener brine into the system constituted a 
material breach of the Agreement or the Rules and Regulations. Judge st. Clair failed to 
recognize this in his decision and his decision should be vacated. 
Clearly, Sunnyside is attempting to capitalize on the water softener brine issue as 
a pretext for cutting off Printcraft's sewer in perpetuity. The evidence does not suggest 
that discharging water softener brine was even within the realm ofthe pmiies' thinking. 
Kellye Eager, Eastern Idaho Public Health District's Environmental Health Director, 
testified in her recent deposition that she had never been concerned about water softener 
brine being discharged into Sunnyside's system. (Transcript in preparation. f Eager 
testified that District Seven was never concerned with what was being discharged but 
rather Sunnyside'S inability to handle the flows of 11 units when it was only permitted 
for two units. Eager testified that the only time water softener brine is even an issue is if 
the soil is classified as Type C (clay). Here, the soil is undisputedly Type A (gravelly). 
(ld.) Eager testified that she had never initiated enforcement actions for the discharge of 
water softener brine into a septic system. (lei.) Indeed, Printcraft has remediated its 
7 The relevant portions of Eager's deposition wiII be provided to the Court as soon as they are available. 
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"discharge issues" within the meaning of the Rules and Regulations and yet Sunnyside 
insists on obstructing Printcraft's business. 
Whether Printcraft materially breached its obligations under the Agreement or the 
Rules and Regulations is a fact question. The Agreement and the Rules and Regulations 
were not created solely for the purpose of not discharging water softener brine into 
Sunnyside's septic system. The fundamental purposes have not been defeated by the 
water softener brine discharge. Printcraft's motion should be granted. 
II. There are issues of fact whether the Agreement or the Rules and Regulation 
were violated. 
In order to discharge water softener brine into a septic system it is the 
responsibility of the system's designer to acquire director approval from the Idaho 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). 
The relevant portion of the Idaho Administrative Code goveming 
Individual/Subsurface Sewage Disposal govems the design, construction, siting and 
abandonment of individual and subsurface sewage disposal systems. IDAPA 
58.01.03.004.01. The IDAP A regulations are intended to insure that blackwaste and 
wastewater are safely contained, treated "(a) are not accessible to insects, rodents, or 
other wild or domestic animals; (b) are not accessible to individuals; (c) do not give rise 
to a public nuisance due to odor or unsightly appearance; (d) do not injure or interfere 
\\lith existing or potential beneficial uses of the waters of the State." Id. IDAPA provides 
that water softener brine, "cannot be discharged into any system unless that discharge is 
approved by the Director." Id. 58.01.03.004.03. Printcraft violated none of these 
subsections by discharging water softener brine into the septic system. 
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Since IDAP A govems the design and construction of the subsurface sewage 
disposal system, it would have been incumbent on Sunnyside and its principals to have 
acquired Director approval for the discharge of water softener brine into Sunnyside's sub-
standard septic system. Since Sunnyside designed and constructed the septic system it 
should have either acquired Director approval or informed the entities connected to the 
septic system of the limitations. SUllliyside never informed Printcraft of the system's 
limitation until after the system failure in June 2006. Printcraft was never given the 
chance, nor was it Printcraft's responsibility, to have acquired Director approval for 
discharging water softener brine into the septic system. Since Sunnyside never infonned 
Printcraft of the limitations, there are fact issues whether Printcraft violated IDAP A. 8 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Printcraft respectfully requests this Court to vacate its 
August 31,2007 ruling and to permit Printcraft to reinstate its breach of third party 
beneficiary utility agreement claim. 
DATED: April 24, 2008. 
/~ 
~'I 
Micli~ej D. ffney 
LanM. Schuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 This would be as opposed to Sunnyside. Interestingly. and this is something Judge St. Clair completely 
ignored in his previous decision, Sunnyside has unclean hands in its use of IDAP A as a sword against 
Printcraft in this litigation. IDAPA 58.01.03.004.04 states that "unless authorized by the Director. no 
person shall provide for or connect additional black waste or wastewater sources to any system if the 
resulting flow or volume would exceed the design flow of the system." Sunnyside violated this provision 
of IDAP A since its septic system was permitted for 1 or 2 commercial buildings only. (Eager Dep. 142: 19-
143:4. December 7, 2007.) Once Sunnyside allowed a third connection to its system Sunnyside violated 
IDAPA. (ld. 148:17-21.) 
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corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
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PARK LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
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Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
(RULE 11 (A)(2)(B)) 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc., through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair 
Gaffney P A, respectfully moves this Court to reconsider its August 31, 2007, 
Memorandum Decision and Order. This motion is supp0l1ed by a memorandum oflaw 
and affidavits submitted concurrently herewith. Oral argument is requested. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 11(a)(2)(b)) Page 1 
DATED: April 24, 2008. 
Lance 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffiley P A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April 24, 2008, I 
served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 
11 (a)(2)(b)) on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935 
Fax: (208) 524-7167 
Bryan Smith 
McGrath & Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Fax: (208) 529-4166 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Fax: (208) 529-1300 
Lance Schuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
] olm M. A vondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 




QHand-delivered , o Facsimile 
/// 
o U.S. Mail Cd Hand-delivered 0 Facsimile 
",// 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 1 1 (a)(2)(b)) Page 2 
Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
Lance 1. Schuster, ISB No. 5404 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2 J 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80~HH: ' ! 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 




SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO ) 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
AFFIDA VII OF H. ERIC NUTTALL 
I, Eric Nuttall, having first been sworn, depose and state: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify, and do so from personal 
knowledge. 
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2. 1 have been retained as an expert witness by Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft). 
3. I am currently Senior Principal Professional employed with Kleinfelder, Inc. in 
Aibuquerque, New Mexico, and am Professor Emeritus in the Chemical and Nuclear 
Engineering Department at the University of New Mexico. 
4. My focus is on in situ soil and groundwater remediation, both biologically and 
through in situ chemical oxidation. I have worked on and consulted on numerous 
bioremediation processes. 
5. I am of the opinion that more probable than not the failure ofthe Sunnyside Park 
Utilities, Inc. septic system was caused by a grossly under-designed septic system. 
6. The design rate influent rate was 300 gallons per day (gpd). The system was 
subjected to approximately 30 times the design flow rate during the time period of a few 
weeks prior to the observation of water accumulation on the surface immediately about 
the septic system. The system was designed for 300 gpd and to service one or two 
buildings with a total often people. These requirements were greatly exceeded. 
7. More probable than not the vadose zone soil below the drainfield infiltrators 
became saturated and the septic effluent water rose at the ground surface creating the 
ponding. From the photographic evidence 1 have review, there does not appear to be any 
solid waste plugging the waste discharge pipe from Printcraft. 
8. I have also reviewed and analyzed the following chemicals for their effect on the 
septic system bacteria: 
• NaCl Brine; 
• Hydroquinone; 
• Copper (Cu); 
• Zinc (Zn); and, 
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• Silver. 
9. My opinion, more probable than not, is that none of the foregoing chemicals 
negatively impacted the SUI septic system bacteria. 
10. I have not received any data that indicates that the SUI septic system failed due to 
a reduction in bacteria. Printcraft operated for more than four months prior to the June 
2006 failure. Printcraft discharged chemicals and ink into the system during the time 
period before the June 2006 failure and the SUI septic system still functioned 
continuously until the June 2006 failure. 
11. More probable than not the NaCI Brine had no negative effect on the SUI septic 
system and did not cause the failure. The highest concentration ofNaCl Brine discharged 
was 600 parts per million (ppm). To my knowledge, bacteria can survive in brackish 
water ranging in salt concentrations from 1,000 ppm to 10,000 ppm. The estimated 
concentration ofNaCI Brine was less than brackish water. Therefore, more probable than 
not, the NaCI Brine did not cause the SUI septic system failure. 
12. Printcraft discharged hydroquinone at concentrations ranging from 1.5 ppm to 2.1 
ppm. These concentrations are exceptionally low and hydroquinone is biodegradable via 
reductive dehydroxylation in concentrations up to 2,200 ppm. Since the concentrations 
of hydro quinone were so low, hydroquinone, more probable than not, did not cause the 
SUI septic system failure. 
956 
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13. Printcraft discharged copper and zinc well below toxic concentrations. It is my 
opinion that more probable than not the concentrations of copper and zinc did not cause 
the failure of the SUI septic system. It is also my opinion that more probable than not the 
discharge of copper and zinc did not impact the SUI septic system bacteria. 
14. Printcraft's discharge of silver is initially treated in a silver recovery unit prior to 
discharge to the building seWer where it is diluted by other waste\vater from Printcrafi. 
Based on PrintcrafCs treatment of silver and the dilution of the silver in the other 
wastewater my opinion is that more probable than not the silver discharge did not have 
negative effects on the SUI septic system's bacteria. 
DATED: Apri123, 2008 
~lf-di!;J 
Eric Nuttall If 





Jill M. Pranckevicus 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV -06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND TO 
ALLEGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard 
St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully submits the following memorandum in support of its 
Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive Damages against the defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
The defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct against Printcraft. In the event that 
Printcraft can prove fraud against the defendants, Printcraft should be entitled to punitive 
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damages. Thus, Printcraft should be granted leave to amend its complaint to allege 
punitive damages. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES STANDARD 
Idaho Code § 6-1604(1) provides for punitive damages. "In any action seeking 
recovery of punitive damages, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious, or outrageous conduct by the party 
against whom the claim for punitive damages is asselied." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
1604( l) (2007). Punitive damages are not favored in the law and should be awarded in 
only the most unusual and compelling circumstances. Manning v. Tv.-in Falls Clinic & 
Hosp., 122 Idaho 47,52,830 P.2d 1185,1190 (1992). The foundational requirement is 
merely that some legally protected interest be invaded. See Crosby v. Rowand Mach. 
Co., 111 Idaho 939944, 729 P.2d4l4,419 (Ct. App. 1986). The trial court has 
discretion to decide whether to grant a motion to amend to add punitive damages. 
Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 424, 95 P.3d 34, 42 (2004). 
When a party seeks to amend its complaint to allege punitive damages, the 
evidentiary burden is less than the party's burden at trial. Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) 
provides that a court should allow a party to amend its claims to include punitive 
damages if "after weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the moving 
party has established at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2). 
Idaho courts have found that the burden to amend pleadings for punitive damages is a 
preponderance standard as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence standard. Myers 
v. Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,501,95 P.3d 977 (2004). Thus, this court 
must make two decisions. First, the Court must decide whether there are facts supporting 
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a verdict of punitive damages if proven. Second, whether Printcraft has a reasonable 
likelihood of proving those facts by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. 
The purpose of a punitive damages award is to deter bad conduct. See Linscott v. 
Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 857, 606 P.2d 958,961 (1980). An award of 
punitive damages requires proof of a "bad act and a bad state of mind." Id. In the event 
that the district court grants a motion to amend to allege punitive damages, the district 
cOUli retains the discretion to withdraw any claim for punitive damages from the jury 
prior to the close oftrial. Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303,308,32 P.3d 695,700 eCt. 
App.2001). 
STATEMENT OF }<'ACTS REASONABLY LIKELY TO BE PROVED 
1. On August 15, 1996, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC (SIPP) 
completed and filed a septic sewer system pennit for the installation of a septic sewer 
system. The septic sewer system permit included numerous pages from SIPP describing 
the use of the system and included drawings and details of the system's location. The 
septic sewer permit states that it is only for" 1 or 2 commercial office buildings." 
(Waters Aff. Ex. A.)1 
2. District Seven inspected the septic system and tank on August 23, 1996. District 
Seven noted that a 1,000 gallon tank had been installed instead of the 750 gallon tank as 
listed in the original application. (ld. Ex. B.) 
3. District Seven's repmi also notes that the septic tank for SIPP required cleaning 
"every three to five years." (Id.) 
4. On March 29,2002, Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf formed Sunnyside. (ld. Ex. E.) 
I This affidavit was previously submitted to the Court on August 2, 2007. 
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5. At the time SUlU1yside was fonned the original septic sewer system operated with 
more connections that it had been approved for. (Id. Ex. F.) 
6. On April 15,2002, District Seven notified SIPP that "no new connections will be 
allowed to the current sewer collection system until a Large Soil Absorption System 
[LSAS], that replaces the current septic system, is approved and operating." (Id.) 
7. District Seven indicated that it intended to notify BOlmeville County that the 
current septic system servicing SIPP was inadequate for any additional connections. (!d.) 
8. On April 16, 2002, Sunnyside entered into an agreement with Sunnyside Park 
Owners Association, Inc. (SPOA). The agreement provided for water and sewer services 
for the subdivision that was being developed. The agreement is titled "Third Party 
Beneficiary Utility Agreement." (ld. Exs. D & G.) 
9. The Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement obligated Sunnyside to provide 
adequate sewage services for the safe collection and disposal of all sewage from the 
buildings located in the Sunnyside Industrial Park. (ld. Ex. G.) 
10. According to the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, Sunnyside bears the 
full responsibility for adjustment, repair, installation, or improvement ofthe facilities to 
bring the sewer system into compliance with the State ofIdaho's regulations or 
recommendations. (ld.) 
11. Neither Sunnyside nor SPOA recorded the Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
Agreement in 2002. 
12. Prior to the construction of the building occupied by Printcraft, Travis Waters saw 
a sign listing the subdivision as "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park." (Id. '116.) 
13. Travis Waters reviewed the plat map and the subdivision was labeled on the plat 
map as "Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park." (Id. ~ 17.) 
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14. The Second Amended Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Sunnyside 
Industrial and Professional Park (CCRs) provide that the general purpose and use of the 
lots "shall be that of a continued use of said lots for commercial and industrial purposes." 
(ld. Ex. H.) The CCRs also provide that the lots would be used for "manufacturing and 
industrial enterprises." (ld.) 
15. Printcraft relied on the description ofthe subdivision, the plat map, and the CCRs 
in deciding that the SIPP subdivision would be an ideal location for Printcraft's business. 
(ld. ~ 19.) 
16. In early 2005, Travis Waters, Printcraft's president, met with Beck and Woolf. 
Printcraft provided Beck and Woolf with blueprints for the building to be occupied by 
Printcraft. (Id. ~ 20.) 
17. Beck and Woolf told Waters at the September 2005 meeting that a sewer 
connection existed on the lot where Printcraft's building would be built. (ld. ~ 21.) 
18. Waters told Beck and Woolf that Printcraft would be the occupant of the building 
after construction. (l d. ~ 2l.) 
19. Beck and Woolf knew and understood the nature of Printcraft's business. (Id. ~ 
22.) 
20. Beck and Woolf knew the name of Print craft's business. (ld.) 
21. Beck, Woolf, SIPP, and Sunnyside never disclosed to Printcraft that the septic 
sewer system provided by Sunnyside was only pemlitted for "lor 2 commercial 
buildings" prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. (ld. ~ 23.) 
22. Beck, Woolf, SIPP, and Sunnyside did not disclose to Printcraft prior to its 
occupancy of the building that seven or eight commercial buildings were connected to the 
septic system in violation ofthe septic system's permit. (ld. ,f. 24.) 
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23. Beck, Woolf, SIPP, and Sunnyside never disclosed to Printcraft prior to 
Printcraft's occupancy of the building that the septic system consisted of only one l,OOO 
gallon tank and that the system's capacity was only 500 gallons per day. (ld.,r 25.) 
24. Prior to Printcraft's occupancy ofthe building, Printcraft was never notified that 
District Seven had advised Beck and Woolf that "no new connections will be allmved on 
the current sewer collection system until a [LSAS], that replaces the current septic 
system, is approved and operating. (!d. ~ 26, Ex. L.) 
25. Prior to Printcraft's occupancy ofthe building, Printcraft was never notified by 
Beck, Woolf, SIPP, or Sunnyside that the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement or 
the CCRs existed or that the defendants relied upon them. (ld.~ 27.) 
26. In January 2006, Printcraft moved from its previous location to the building 
located within SIPP. Printcraft started operating its business in January 2006 at this 
location. 
27. On August 23, 2006, Beck delivered a letter to District Seven admitting that the 
original system was designed only to handle 500 gallons per day. The letter admits that 
in March 2002, the system approached 300 to 400 gallons per day. (ld. ~ 34, Ex. P.) 
28. On September 20,2006, Printcraft received for the first time a copy of the Third 
Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the CCRs. (ld.,r 39, Ex. S.) 
29. On December 15,2006, Sunnyside severed Printcraft's septic/sewer connection. 
(Jd. ~ 48.) 
30. Had Printcraft learned that the septic sewer system was permitted only to have "1 
or 2 commercial building" connections, Printcraft would not have moved from its 
original building and occupied the premises within SIPP. (ld. ~ 50.) 
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31. Had Printcraft leamed that the septic sewer system consisted of only one 1,000 
gallon tank with a daily capacity of 500 gallons, Plintcraft would not have moved from 
its original building and occupied the premises within SIPP. (ld. ~ 51.) 
32. Had Printcraft leamed that the septic sewer system had seven or eight commercial 
buildings connected to the defendants' inadequate septic sewer system in violation of the 
defendants' pennit, Printcraft would not have moved from its original building and 
occupied the premises within SIPP. (Id. ~ 52.) 
33. Had Printcraft leamed that District Seven had advised that "no new connections 
will be allowed on the current sewer collection system until a [LSAS], that replaces the 
current septic system, is approved and operating" Printcraft would not have moved from 
its original building and occupied the premises within SIPP. (ld. ~ 53.) 
34. Had Printcraft learned that the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement or the 
CCRs existed or that the defendants relied upon them as a way to only accept "human 
waste" into their septic sewer system, Printcraft would have never moved from its 
original building and occupied the premises in SIPP because Printcraft would have 
known that the septic services would be inadequate for Printcraft's needs. 
35. Kellye Eager (Eager) testified that the septic system has a capacity problem. 
(Eager Dep. 142:19-143:4, December 7,2007.) 
36. Eager also testified that the capacity problem with the septic system is derived 
from the 11 connections to a system that was originally permitted for two. (ld. 143:6-8.) 
37. The septic system at Smmyside violates IDAP A because it is located in a pit. It 
could be flooded in the event of a major snow melt. The tanks in series requirements do 
not meet the IDAP A requirements for the said vol ume of the tanks as placed in series. 
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The tanks were installed without inspection and there were other deficiencies to what was 
installed to the temporary system. (Id.143:15-22.) 
38. The septic system also did not take into consideration the process flows. (ld. 
143:24-25.) 
39. The original permit for the septic system allowed 300 gallons per day, one or two 
buildings. The connection of the third building violated IDAP A. (Jd. 148: 17-21.) 
ARGUMENT 
The defendants' fraudulent conduct regarding Printcraft should be deterred by this 
Court. Allowing Print craft to amend its complaint to include a claim for punitive 
damages accomplishes this goal of deterrence. Any amendment claiming punitive 
damages would be derivative of Printcraft's claims of fraud against the defendants. The 
breach of contract claims are not relevant to Printcraft's motion for punitive damages. 
Punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant has committed fraud. See 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(1); see also Walston v. jY/onumental L(le Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 
2 I 1, 221, 923 P .2d 456, 466 (1996). Exemplary damage awards are appropriate when the 
defendant is engaged in deceptive business practices operated for a profit posing danger 
to the general public. Id. Punitive damages are linked to the underlying legal or 
equitable claims alleged by the party. Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 308, 32 P.3d 
695, 700 (Ct. App. 2001). Thus, a party should explain which claims justify an award of 
punitive damages. Printcraft's fraud claims alone justify a claim for punitive damages. 
A "plaintiff must first be entitled to legal or equitable relief before punitive damages can 
be obtained." Id.; see also Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 906-07, 453 P.2d 
551, 555-56 (1969). Thus, if Printcraft can prove fraud, then it should also be able to 
allege punitive damages. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion Amend to Allege Punitive Damages 
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In this case, there is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will prevail on its fraud 
claims against the defendants. The district court has already found that there are 
questions of material fact on the fraud claims and that Sunnyside and SIPP are not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Mem. Dec. & Order 11-18.) Since Printcraft's 
fraud claims are still alive, Printcraft should be allowed to allege a claim for punitive 
damages. See Walston, 129 Idaho at 221,923 P.2d at 466. The case law discussing the 
tort of fraud's relationship with punitive damages suggests that proof of fraud satisfies 
both the "bad act" requirement and the "bad state of mind" requirement for punitive 
damages. See Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 710, 682 P.2d 1247,1257 (1983). "It 
is well established in this state that punitive damages may be awarded when the 
defendant has conunitted fraud." ld.; see also Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702,496 
P.2d 939 (1972). 
In Umphrey, real estate lots within Lone Mountain Ranch were advertised as 
having a "good year-round road" and "domestic water supplied by REP A ... available 
prior to June 1st, 1973." Umphrey, 106 Idaho at 03, 682 P.2d at 1250. The plaintiffs all 
claimed that the adequacy of the road and the water supply had been fraudulently 
represented by the defendants. ld. at 704, 682 P .2d at 1251. Punitive damages were later 
allowed for the plaintiffs. ld. at 710,682 P.2d at 1257. The Court found that the 
defendant's "practice of falsely representing that building lots would be supplied with 
adequate water and access falls squarely within the ambit of deceptive business practices 
in which the award of additional punitive damages is authorized." ld. at 711,682 P.2d at 
1258. The facts in Umphrey are similar to the facts in this case. 
In this case, the SIPP lots were advertised as possessing adequate sewer and water 
for industrial and commercial businesses. Only the defendants knew about the system's 
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limitations. At the time Printcraft arranged to move into SIPP, the Third Party 
Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the CCRs had not been recorded and the defendants 
took no steps to try and record those documents until after Printcraft had moved to the 
subdivision. In fact, the defendants did not disclose the existence of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Utility Agreement until the litigation was in progress. The defendants failed 
to disclose to Printcraft that the defendants' central septic system was being heavily 
scrutinized by District Seven and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) for 
the system's inadequacies. Yet the defendants advertised SIPP as a commercial and 
industrial park for commercial enterprises. Only the defendants knew the limitations 
imposed by District Seven on the septic system. Only the defendants knew the system's 
limitations regarding flows. Only the defendants knew how close the daily flows were to 
exceeding the 500 gallon per day limit. The defendants possessed all of this infonnation 
and the information was never disclosed to Printcraft prior to Plintcraft moving into 
SIPP. The defendants' deceptive business conduct is similar to Umphrey and justifies an 
amendment for punitive damages. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will prove at trial that the 
defendants adveliised the subdivision as an industrial and commercial park. Similarly, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will prove at trial that the defendants also 
represented that the septic system in the subdivision would be sufficient for Printcraft's 
needs. There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will prove that the defendants 
knew the nature of Print craft's business. The defendants knew that Printcraft engaged in 
the business of printing and needed a septic connection. 
The defendants' failure to disclose critical infom1ation as to utilities limitations 
was key to Printcraft's decision to move into the industrial park. It is clear that the 
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defendants knowingly failed to disclose this critical information. Travis Waters testified 
that had Printcraft known the limitations that Printcraft would never have moved into the 
industrial park. This testimony, at a minimum, establishes a reasonable likelihood that 
Printcraft will carry its evidentiary burden at trial. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to show at trial that the 
information possessed by the defendants should have been disclosed to Printcraft. 
Printcraft has a reasonab I e likelihood of showing each of the elements of fraud. There is 
similarly a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to prove that the information 
possessed by the defendants was "so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract 
would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not 
know it." (Mem. Dec. & Order 14.) The Court denied summary judgment because there 
are questions of material fact on al1 of the elements of Printcraft's fraud claims. Thus, 
there is a reasonable chance that Printcraft will be able to establish fraud when this matter 
goes to trial. The reasonable likelihood entitles Printcraft to amend its complaint to 
allege punitive damages. 
There is also a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to show that all of 
the defendants, including Beck and Woolf, should be jointly and severally liable for 
punitive damages. All of the defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct towards 
Printcraft. All of the defendants failed to disclose the system's limitations, the CCRs, the 
Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement, the limitations imposed by District Seven and 
the DEQ, etc. Since all of the defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct toward 
Printcraft, all of the defendants should be responsible for any punitive damages awarded 
by the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing, Printcraft's motion to amend to add a claim for 
punitive damages should be granted. 
DATED: April 24, 2008. 
ney 
Lance . Schuster 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April 24, 2008, I 
served a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Amend to Allege Punitive Damages on the following by the method of delivery 
designated below: 
Mark Fuller 
Fuller & Carr 
PO Box 50935 
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McGrath & Smith 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
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Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
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Fax: (208) 529-1300 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation. SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. an Idaho 
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
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Case No.: CV-06-7097 
AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT C. STARR 
I, Robert C. Stan, having first been sworn, depose and state: 
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1. I am over the age of eighteen, am competent to testify, and do so from personal 
knowledge. 
2. I have been retained as an expert witness by Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft). 
3. My education includes a Bachelor of Civil Engineering, and both a Master of 
Science and a Doctor of Philosophy in Earth Science, with a specialty in contaminant 
hydrogeology. 
4. I have worked as a water resources engineer or hydrogeologist since 
undergraduate graduation. 
S. I have also worked with two engineering consulting firms, one university research 
center, and one national laboratory in either civil engineering or hydrogeology. 
6. I am currently a hydrogeologist and am employed by North Wind, Inc. 
7. My primary expertise is in groundwater hydrology. This discipline includes the 
evaluation of water and contaminants in groundwater and the unsaturated zone above the 
water table, evaluation of the movement and fate of contaminants in the subsurface, and 
the remediation of subsurface contamination. 
8. Septic systems are a common source of groundwater contamination, which falls 
within the discipline of hydrogeology. 
9. I have reviewed numerous documents and other information as the foundation for 
my Op1l11Ons. The basis for my opinions include: 
• Documents related to the permitting and inspection of the Sunnyside 
Utilities, Inc. (SUI) septic system; 
• An examination of the Printcraft facility; 
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• Interviews with Printcraft personnel including Travis Waters, Rick 
Boyack, Todd Landon, Curt Gaddie, and Jeanie Reimer; 
• An examination of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for products used 
by Printcraft; 
• A review of published reports describing the geology of the vicinity of the 
site; 
• Technical calculations performed to detem1ine Printcraft's water usage and 
wastewater flowrates from Printcraft and other tenants of Sunnyside 
Industrial and Professional Park; 
• Calculation of product ingredient concentrations; 
• Visual Examination of Sunnyside Industrial Professional Park (SIPP); 
• Visual examination of the pit in which SUI's septic system is located; and 
• Visual examination of a portion of a gravel pit adjacent to the SUI septic 
system. 
10. The SUI septic tank and leach field (the site) are located in a pit adjacent to 4125 
Professional Way in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
I 1. The geologic materials in the area where the SUI septic system is located consist 
of coarse grained alluvium (cobbles, gravel, and sand) above basalt rock. 
12. The septic system permit application and inspection repmi describe the soil in the 
leach field as: 
• A gravelly/sandy, 0.75 GPD/SqFt 
• A sandy gravel 
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• A gravelly 
13. The soil in which a second septic tank and leach field adjacent to the original 
system were permitted is described as "Soil Type A-2." 
14. Type A-I soil is medium sand. 
15. TypeA-2 is not defined. 
16. Type A-2a soil is medium sand. 
17. Type A-2b soil is either fine sand or loamy sand (sand with a silt or clay fraction). 
18. There is some ll11Celiainty about the soil type at the second leach field and given 
the lack of any mention of fine textured soil in any of the descriptions, Type A-2b can be 
eliminated. Thus, Type A-2a is likely the soil type. 
19. The design wastewater application rate depends on soil type. The design 
application flowrate specified in the septic system permit is 0.75 gallons per day per 
square foot (gpd/ft\ 
20. The design wastewater application rate and the pennitted capacity for the SUI 
septic system is 300 gallons per day. This is calculated by multiplying the design 
application rate of 0.75 gpd/ft2 by the leach field area of 400 square feet. 
21. An examination of the soils exposed in the pit where the SUI septic system is 
located and in a larger adjacent gravel pit, an examination of a photograph of soil 
excavated to expose a leach field line, and an examination of a photograph of soil 
exposed in the bottom of a leach field drain line indicate that the soil is a gravelly 
medium to coarse sand. This soil type has a larger actual infiltration rate than the design 
value, 0.75 gpd/ft2, listed on the septic permit. 
Affidavit of Robeli C. Starr Page 4 
22. The actual infiltration capacity of the SUI septic system is calculated by 
multiplying the infiltration rate (10 gpd/ft2) by the leach field area (400 square feet). This 
results in 4,000 gpd and would allow the system to operate successfully, in tem1S of 
infiltration, at flowrates larger than the pelmitted capacity (300 gpd). 
23. The daily volume of wastewater produced by personnel working within SIPP, at 
businesses other than Printcraft, is calculated by multiplying the number of personnel at 
the businesses and the daily wastewater volume produced per person. 
24. There was an average of 88 people working at businesses other than Printeraft 
within SIPP. 
25. The daily wastewater flowrate for employees in office-type operations required by 
the State for designing septic systems is 20 gallons per person per day (gpd/person). 
26. The daily wastewater flowrate produced by personnel working at businesses other 
than Printcraft there were comlected to the SUI septic system is 88 people x 20 
gpd/person. This totals 1,760 gpd. This is nearly six times the design capacity and 
permitted capacity for the SUI septic system. 
27. The volume of sanitary wastewater for Printcraft persolmel can be calculated in 
the same fashion. Printcraft employed 45 people at its facility on a daily basis from 
January to June 2006. 
28. Thus the daily sanitary wastewater flowrate produced by Printeraft is 45 people x 
20 gpd/person = 900 gpd. In order for Printcraft's sanitary wastewater flows alone to not 
exceed the design flowrate and pennitted capacity of the SUI septic system, Printcraft 
could have employed only 15 people (15 people x 20 gpd/person = 300 gpd). 
29. Until June 2006, the SUI septic system operated successfully until shortly before 
SUI reported the presence of water ponding above the septic system. 
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30. Printcraft discharged sanitary wastewater, process wastewater, spent water 
softener recharge brine, and reverse osmosis (RO) bypass water into the SUI septic 
system. 
31. The flowrate of sanitary wastewater was constant over time. The flowrate of 
water softener recharge brine and reverse osmosis bypass water vmied. 
32. During the seven weeks prior to the wastewater ponding over the septic system in 
June 2006, RO bypass water was the largest component of wastewater discharged by 
Printcraft. 
33. Printcraft's RO system generates high quality water by treating drinking water. 
The process uses a membrane allowing water, but not dissolved salts, to pass through it. 
The system produced 1 gallon of processed water and 9 gallons of bypass water from an 
influent of 10 gallons of drinking water. The dissolved salts initially present in the 10 
gallons of drinking water were retained in the 9 gallons of bypass water. This results in a 
concentration of salts in bypass water being 11 % larger than the initial concentration in 
drinking water. No brine is produced in the RO process. 
34. The volume of RO bypass water is proportional (9: 1) to the volume of RO water 
produced. The RO system was supplied by softened water and the volume of spent 
softener recharge brine produced also increased as the amount of RO-treated water 
increased. 
35. Printcraft uses evaporative coolers to cool the building. RO treated water was 
used to supply the evaporative coolers prior to the date the ponding wastewater above the 
SUI septic system was repOlied. The amount ofRO water used to supply the coolers 
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varied with weather conditions with more water being consumed when the weather was 
hot and dryas compared to cold or damp weather. 
36. I used weather data measured at the Idaho Falls Airport, the manufacturer's 
information for the evaporative coolers located at Printcraft, and system operation 
infonnation from Printcraft to calculate the amount of water used for evaporative cooling 
at the Printcraft facility. The process I used is recognized and accepted in the engineering 
community and I used the commercial software PsyCalc to perform the calculations. 
37. Evaporative cooling at Printcraft began in April 2006 and the amount of water 
used for cooling increased in May and early June 2006. The volume of water consumed 
for cooling varied over time in response to weather changes. The volume of wastewater 
discharge by Printcraft into the SUI system also increased dUling these months. 
38. From January 1, 2006 or earlier until water ponded above the SUI septic system, 
the flowrate into the SUI septic system was greater than the pennitted capacity. The 
flowrate before Printcraft began operating within SIPP also exceeded the pennitted 
capacity for the SUI septic system. 
39. The total volume of wastewater discharged by Printcraft and other tenants 
exceeded 10,000 gpd on some days during May and June of 2006. The majority of 
Printcraft's flow was RO bypass water. 
40. The flowrate of sanitary wastewater discharged by SIPP tenants other than 
Printcraft exceeded the design capacity and permitted capacity of the SUI septic system. 
The flowrate of sanitary wastewater discharged by Printcraft exceeded the design and 
permitted capacity of the SUI septic system. 
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41. The maximum flowrate of waste\vater discharged into the SUI septic system was 
more than 10,000 gpd on some days during May and June of 2006. The flowrate was 
approximately 33 times the design and permitted capacity of the SUI septic system. The 
flowrate also exceeded the actual infiltration capacity of the septic system as indicated by 
water ponding on the ground surface above the septic system. 
42. My opinion is that to a reasonable degree of engineering probability that more 
probable than not the cause of the SUI septic system failure in June 2006 was that the 
volume of wastewater discharged into the SUI septic system exceeded the system's actual 
infiltration capacity. 
43. It is also my opinion that more probable than not the discharge of water softener 
regeneration brine had no hannful effect on the SUI septic system. 
44. I have not seen any data that indicates that groundwater has been contaminated 
due to SUI's undersized septic system, discharge of material to that system by Printcraft 
or any other tenant located in SIPP, or by Printcraft's activities. 
DATED: April 23, 2008 
Robert C. Starr 
cribed and sworn before me on this 23rd day of April, 2008. 
ub IC for the State of I a 10 
Residing at: if.3//ie:.1( /;,,))..., -:::c-tJ 
Commission expires: 3- 13 r ;2. 00 '9 
(SEAL) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on April 24, 2008, I 
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Bryan Smith 
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Fax: (208) 529-4166 
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605 N. Capital Avenue 
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Jeffrey O. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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o U.S. Mail B Hand-delivered 0 Facsimile 
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COMES NOW the Defendant, 
Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROFESSIONAL PARK'S 
ANSWER TO SECOND AME:N"DED 
COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Sunnyside Industrial and 
SUNNYSI INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONA~ PARK' 
ANS(!(IER TO SECOND At"lENDED COIVlPloAINT, 
q 1 v AND DEIVlArw FOR JU{Y - , 
r 
Professional Park, LLC. , an Idaho limited liability 
(hereafter "SIPpH), and in response to the Second Amended 
lain-:::: filed Plaintiff, states and alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant denies each and every allegation set In 
the Complaint except as expressly admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
3. In response to paragraph 1, defendant denies that this 
is an action arising out of certain s osures the defendant 
failed to make. Defendant asserts that this is an action arising 
out of the disconnection of Printcraft Press's sewer connect to 
the Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. (hereafter ide 
Utili ties H) septic system. The defendant admits that there is a 
central septic system located in the side Industrial and 
Professional Park subdivision which is operated and main ained 
Sunnyside Utilities. 
4. In answer to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 de 
admits the same. 
5. In answer to paragraphs 8 and 9 defendant ts the 
same. 
6. In answer to paragraph 10, defendant admits that it 
completed and filed with District Seven Health Department a septic 
permit for the installation of a s ic system that would service 
a minimum of one to two buildings. Defendant admits that a copy of 
District Seven Health Department's septic permit is attached as 
Exhibit "Aft to the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. 
7. In answer to paragraph 11, defendant admits the same. 
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8. In answer to paragraph 12, defendant admits the same. 
9. n answer to paragraph 13, defendant admits on 
S +- J1 L '-:l, 1999, this Defendant and Bonneville County entered o 
a Development Agreement. The defendant denies that it promised to 
provide all street improvements and utilities as were necessary to 
be completed. agreement specifically states that the 
"owner(s)" will construct said needed utility r street 
s. The agreement does not obligate the "Developer" to 
cons ruct needed utility or street improvements. 
10. In anS\ver to paragraph 14, defendant admits the same. 
II. In answer to paragraph 15, defendant denies the same. 
12. In answer to paragraph 16, defendant admits the same. 
13. In answer to paragraph 17, defendant admits that a 
meeting was held. However, defendant denies the remainder of the 
al egations contained in paragraph 17. 
14. In answer to paragraph 18, defendant admits the same. 
15. In answer to paragraph 19, defendant denies that the 
letter sent District Seven Health Department memorialized the 
meeting held on March 29, 2002. Defendant admits that the letter 
attached as Exhibit "F" to Plaintiff's complaint is a true and 
correct of the letter sent by District Seven Health 
Department. 
16. In answer to paragraph 18 [ , 1 SlC j , defendant denies t t 
Sunnyside Utilities entered into an agreement with the Defendant 
Sunnyside Park Owners Association, Inc. (hereafter "SPOA") for the 
providing of water and sewer services to the s vision 
identified in the plat map. Defendant asserts that Sunnyside 
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Utili ties entered into an agreement with SPOA, to provide sewer 
se ces to present and future owners and occupants of any 
s sions which were being or one day be se 
ide Utilities' sewe facilities. 
17. In anSv-Jer to paragraph 19 [sic J, defendant admits the 
same .. 
18. In answer to paragraph 20, defendant admits that the 
rd Party Beneficiary Agreement states: "This shall 
also be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of ... all present 
and future owners or occupants." Defendant denies the remainder of 
paragraph 20. 
19. In answer to paragraph 21, Defendant admits the same. 
20. In answer to paragraph 22, Defendant denies that the 
reement is only g on Plaintiff the ement was 
recorded. Defendant specifically ies that t Agreement 
contains specific 1 ge in several places indicating that the 
Third Party Beneficiary ement would be recorded "so as to 
al persons on notice that any properties receiving sewer se ces 
wou be subject to terms of the Agreement." Defendant admits 
that a true correct of the Third Party Benefic ary 
Utility Agreement is attached as Exhibit "G" to plaintiff's 
int. 
21. In answer to paragraph 23, defendant denies the same. 
22. In answer to paragraph 24 and 25, defendant admits the 
same. 
23. In answer to paragraph 26, defendant admits that on or 
about September 12, 2005 CTR Development, LLC, the owner of the 
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y at that time f entered into an agreement with Sunnyside 
Uti ities for sewer services and paid the $1,800.00 connection 
fee. Sunnyside Utili ties thereafter allowed the selrJer connection 
to be made to the building currently occupied P aintiff. 
Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of Check No. 5896 
made by CTR Development to Sunnyside Utili ties is attached as 
Exhibit" 1/ to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. 
24. T ~n answer to paragraph 27, defendant based upon 
ded the plaintiff, admi s the same. Defendant 
was not a party 0 the described leases. 
25. In answer to paragraph 28, defendant admits that 
S .side Uti ities specifically requested frOIn eTR Devel 
copies of ngs or proposed drawings concerning the bui 
which would be built and located on the premises. Defendant does 
not sufficient information to dete ne whe her Plaintiff 
provided the requested documents or CTR Development p ded the 
requested documents. Therefore, Defendant cannot admit or deny 
whether or not Plaintiff (as opposed to CTR Development) provided 
the to ide Utilities and its officers and/or 
directors. 
6. In answer to paragraph 29, defendant denies the same. 
~'7 L, • In answer to paragraph 30, defendant denies the same. 
28. In answer to paragraph 31, Defendant admits that either 
P aintiff or CTR Development provided the document attached as 
Exhibit "Kif to Sunnyside Utilities. Defendant denies that 
Sunnyside Utilities received a fourth page showing the floor plan 
or layout of the second floor. Sunnyside Utilities was verbally 
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that the second floor was to be used s ely for storage. 
29. In answer to para 32, defendant admits same. 
30. In answer to paragraph 33, defendant admits ~lat there 
were 10 or 11 connections to the sewer system ope rat 
ide Utilities in June of 2006. Defendant admits that one of 
he sewer connections was to the property owned by J&LB Properties 
and that Plaintiff was occupying J&LP Properties' buil as a 
month-to-month tenant. Defendant denies the remainder of the 
al tions in paragraph 33. 
31. In answer to paragraph 34, defendant admits that 
June 2006, Sunnyside Uti ities' sewer system experienced a 
temporary overload as the result of excessive discha s from 
Printcraft. cause of the overload was unknown to defendant at 
that time. Defendant admits that Sunnyside Utili ties ately 
reported the temporary overload to strict Seven Health 
Department and that an onsite investigation was conducted 
District Seven Health Department. Defendant denies the remainder 
of paragraph 34. 
32. In answer to paragraph 35, defendant admits that a 
true and correct copy of the June 28, 2006 letter from District 
Seven Health Department to Defendant and ide Utili ties is 
attached as Exhibit "L" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 35. 
In answer to paragraph 36, Defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of the July 6, 2006 letter is attached as Exh it 
"[vI" to Plaintiff's Amended laint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 36. 
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34. In answer to paragraph 37, Defendant admits that an 
tional s ic permit for installation of t 1 ty 
was obtained. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of the 
septic permit is attached as Exhibit "W' to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 37. 
35. In answer to paragraph 38, defendant admits t District 
Seven Health Department physica ly inspected the insta lation of 
the expansion and repairs of the septic system which were 
conducted and completed Sunnyside Utilities. Defendant admits 
that a true and correct copy of the Sep-cic System Inspect on 
rt s attached to Plaintiff's Amended aint as Exhibit 
"0." Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 38. 
36. In answer to paragraph 39, defendant admits the same. 
3 '7 I. In answer to paragraph 40, defendant ts that a copy 
of the August 23, 2006 letter from Doyle Beck lS attached as 
Exhibit "Q" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 40. 
38. In answer to paragraph 41, defendant admits that a copy 
of the S ember 13, 2006 letter from Greg Crockett is a tached as 
Exhibit "R" to Plaintiff's aint. De ies 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 41. 
39. In answer to paragraph 42, defendant admits that a copy 
of September 6, 2006 letter from Doyle Beck is attached to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as Exhibit "S". Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 42. 
40. In answer to paragraph 43, defendant admits that 
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P aintiff requested from Sunnyside Utilities a copy of the 
contract and rules governing the sewer utility services. Defendant 
denies the rema r of the allegations in paragraph 43. 
41. In answer to paragraph 44, defendant admits that the 
Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the Rules and 
Regulations were provided to Print craft . Defendant admits that a 
true and correct copy of Doyle Beck's September 20, 2006 letter is 
attached as Exhibit "T" to Plaintiff's Amended Compla 
Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 44. 
42. In answer to paragraph 45, defendant admits that 
ide Utilities and the plaintiff met in se 
iations at the plaintiff's premises to discuss the issues of 
the pIa iff's s rges and other comp se iations. 
De ts that plaintiff later agreed to collect and 
d spose of all substances Sunnyside Utilities classified as 
"processed waste." Defendant admits that Plaintiff's counsel 
memorialized the agreement in a letter and that a true and correct 
of such letter is attached as it "U rr to pIa iff's 
Amended Complaint. 
4 3. In answer to paragraph 4 6, defendant admits that Kirk 
Woolf met with the Plaintiff. Defendant admits that the Plaintiff 
asserted to Mr. Woolf that the Flexo ink was aqueous in nature and 
not harmful. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 46. 
44. In answer to paragraph 47, defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of the October 2006 District Seven Health 
Department letter is attached as Exhibit "V rr to plaintiff's 
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l\mended , T aln~ . Defendant denies the remainder of the 
aIle ions in paragraph 47. 
45. In answer to paragraph 48, defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of the October 5, 2006 District Seven Health 
rtment letter lS attached as Exhibit "W" to the Plaintiff's 
Pul1ended aint. Defendant denies the rema r of the 
allegations in paragraph 48. 
46. In answer to para 49, defendant admits tha a 
di e arose between strict Seven Health Department and the 
defendants. Defendant asserts that the only issue re ated to the 
di e between District Seven Health Department and the 
de s is the temporary overload caused Plaintiff in ,June 
of 2006. Defendant admits that a true and correct of the 
Connected Notice of Intent to Re-impose Sanitary Restr ions, 
dated November 21, 2006, is attached as Exhibit "X." 
47. n answer to paragraph 50, defendant admits the same. 
48. In answer to paragraph 51, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Utilities sent the letter atta as Exhibit "Zff to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that the 
statements therein speak for themselves. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 51. 
49. In answer to paragraph 52, defendant ts that 
ide Utilities received a letter dated December 12, 2006 from 
Print craft and that such letter is attached as Exhibit "AA" to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that such letter 
speaks for itself. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 52. 
50. In answer to paragraph 53, defendant admits that 
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ide Utilities sent the letter attached as Exhibi "88" to 
the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that the 
statements rein speak for themselves. De denies t 
remainde of paragraph 53. 
r 4 
J.l. In answer to paragraph 54, de ts that 
Sunnyside Uti ities severed the sewer connection on December 15, 
2006. Defendant does not have sufficient information to either 
t or deny the remainder of the allegations para 54, 
and therefore denies the same. 
52. In answer to paragraph 55, defendant ts that 
Sunnyside Utilities has provided documents to plaintiff 
establis ng that Sunnyside Utilities' sewer system's capacity 
1996 when it was rst constructed and installed th ,June 
of 2006 was in the amount of 500 gallons per day. Defendant also 
admits that ide Utilities' sewer system capacity after June 
2006 was in the total capacity of 2,000 gallons per day. Defendant 
ts that dence of Sunnyside Uti ities' seVJer system 
capaci ties are attached as Exhibit "cc" to PIa iff's Amended 
aint. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 55. 
53. In answer to paragraph 56, defendant ts that 
l Utilities provided documentation to Plai iff that 
Sunnyside Utilities measured sewer discharge into Sunnyside 
Ut iIi ties f sewer system from February 6, 2007 May 16, 
2007, and that the average amount of such discharges were 
approximately 370 gallons per day. Defendant admits a true 
and correct copy of Sunnyside Utilities' calculations and 
measurements are attached as Exhibit "DO" to Plaintiff's Amended 
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laint. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 56. 
54. In answer to paragraph 57, defendant admits that 
i U~ilities has sufficient capaci to receive all sewer 
discharges in accordance with the terms of the contract entered 
into the parties on September 26, 2006. De ts that 
aintiff has demanded reconnection and that ide Utilities 
has refused to allow such a reconnect ion because of the 
p aintiff's intention to discharge substances and quantities 
proh ed by Defendant's Rules and Regulations, the reernent 
entered into the parties on September 26, 2006, and applicable 
state and federal law. 
55. In answer to paragraph 58, defendant denies the same. 
56. In answer to paragraph 59, defendant re-alleges and 
restates all the admissions and denials set forth above in 
paragraphs 1 55 and incorporates the same by reference. 
57. n answer to ragraph 60, defendant admits the same. 
58. In answer to paragraph 61, defendant denies the same. 
59. In answer to paragraph 62, defendant denies the same. 
60. In answer to paragraph 63, defendant denies the same. 
61. In answer to paragraph 64, defendant denies the same. 
62. In answer to paragraph 65, fendant denies that it did 
not record the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement. Defendant denies 
t Sunnyside Utilities provided sewer services to the PIa iff 
merely because Plaintiff was an occupant of the ide 
Industrial and Professional Park Subdivision. 
63. In answer to paragraph 66, defendant denies the same. 
64. In answer to paragraph 67, defendant denies the same. 
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65. In answer to paragraph 68, defendant a ts .l-L. 
unnyside Utilities severed the sewer connection. Defendant denies 
the remainder of the allegations paragraph 68. 
66. In anSVJer to paragraph 69, defendant denies the same. 
67. In answer to paragraph 70, defendant denies the same. 
68. In answer to paragraph 71, defendant admits the same. 
69. In anSVJer to paragraph 72, defendant admits the same. 
70. In answer to paragraph 73, defendant denies same. 
7l. In answer to paragraph 74, defendant denies the same. 
7 In answer to ragraph 75, def hereby re-alleges 
and re-states all the admissions and denials set forth above in 
pa 1 through 71 and incorporates the same herein 
reference as if set forth fully. 
73. In answer to paragraph 76, fendant denies the same. 
74. n answer to paragraph 77, defendant denies the same. 
75. In answer to paragraph 78, defendant denies the same. 
76. n answer to paragraph 79, defendant denies the same. 
77. In answer to paragraph 80, defendant denies the same. 
78. In answer to paragraph 81, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and restates its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 through 77 
as set forth herein. 
79. In answer to paragraph 82, defendant denies District 
Seven Heal Department provided a permit for only "one to two 
buildi If to be connected to Sunnyside Utili ties' sewer system. 
Defendant asserts that such permit provided for a minimum of "one 
to two buildings." Defendant admits that District Seven Health 
Department indicated in April of 2002 that no new sewer 
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connections were to be made to the existing system. Defendant 
denies that such "i cation" had any legally binding effect on 
ide Utilities' sewer system or Sunnyside Utilities' ability 
to connect additional buildings to Sunnyside Utilities' sewer 
system. 
80. In answer to paragraph 83, de denies the same. 
81. In answer to paragraph 84, defendant denies the same. 
82. In answer to paragraph 85, defendant denies the same. 
83. In answer to paragraph 86, defendant denies the same. 
84. In answer to paragraph 87, defendant denies the same. 
85. In answer to paragraph 88, defendant denies the same. 
86. In answer to paragraph 89, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 89. 
87. In answer to paragraph 90, defendant denies the same. 
88. In answer to paragraph 91, defendant denies the same. 
89. In answer to paragraph 92, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 through 
91 as set forth herein. 
90. In answer to paragraph 93, defendant denies the same. 
91. In answer to paragraph 94, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 94. 
92. In answer to paragraph 95, defendant denies the same. 
93. In answer to paragraph 96, defendant denies the same. 
94. In answer to paragraph 97, defendant denies the same. 
95. In anS1;ler to paragraph 98, defendant denies the same. 
96. In answer to paragraph 99, defendant denies the same. 
97. In answer to paragraph 100, defendant denies the same. 
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98. In answer to paragraph 101, defendant denies the same. 
99. In answer to paragraph 102, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states its admissions and denials to paragraphs ~ through .L 
101 as set forth herein. 
100. In answer to paragraph 103, defendant denies the same. 
10l. In answer to paragraph 104, defendant denies the same. 
102. In answer to paragraph 105, defendant denies the same. 
103. In answer to paragraph 106, defendant denies the same. 
104. In answer to paragraph 107, defendant denies the same. 
105. In answer to paragraph 108, defendant admits that 
PIa iff requested any and all documents that would be associated 
with the property and sewer services p ded by ide 
Utili ties. Defendant adlli ts that, in response, on September 20, 
2006, Sunnyside Utilities provided Plaintiff with a copy of the 
Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the Sunnyside 
Utilities Rules and Regulations. Defendant denies the remainder of 
paragraph 108. 
106. In answer to paragraph 109, defendant denies the same. 
107. In answer to paragraph 110, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 110. 
and 
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108. In answer to paragraph 111, defendant denies the same. 
109. In answer to paragraph 112, defendant denies the same. 
110. In answer to paragraph 113, defendant denies the same. 
11l. In answer to paragraph 114, defendant denies the same. 
112. In answer to paragraph 115, defendant hereby re-alleges 
re-states its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 through 
as set forth herein. 
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113. In answer to paragraph 116, defendant denies the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
114. To the extent Plaintiff has failed to satisfy and/or 
wi th all terms, conditions and sions, and/or perform 
all of its obligations under the rd Party Beneficiary Utility 
reement, ide Utilities' Sewer Rules Regulations, and 
the terms of the contract entered into between the parties on 
S ember 26, 2006, Plaintiff's claims are barred and all 
defendants are excused from any duty or performance claimed by 
Plaintiff. 
115. Defendant asserts that the PIa iff lacks st ng to 
pursue the claims all on behalf of any rty. 
6. Plaintiff's damages are barred by the doctrine of 
accord and satisfact 
117. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claims are barred 
lack of privity and that Plaintiff 1S at most an incidental 
bene ciary of any agreement. 
118. Defendant asserts that it s no fiduciary relationship 
th the Plaintiff. 
119. Plaintiff's claims are barred Plaintiff's prior and 
continuing breach of the contracts. 
120. Plaintiff's claims are barred as a result of 
Plaintiff's own illegal acts. 
121. To the extent Plaintiff failed to minimize or avoid 
some or all of the damage alleged in the Second A~ended Complaint, 
any recovery against this defendant must be reduced in whole or in 
part by the amount attributable to such failures. 
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122. Defendant asserts that if Plaintiff lS deemed to be 
entitled to any award of damages against defendant, such award 
must offset amounts owed to Defendant Plaintiff as set 
forth in Defendant's Counterclaims hereafter. 
123. Plaintiff's Second Amended aint, arld each claim 
therein, is barred by the doctrines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
124. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and each claim 
therein, is barred the doctrine of independent intervening 
cause. 
125. The Second Amended laint and each claim therein, is 
barred the doctrine of laches. 
126. Second }\mended Complaint, each cIa rein, 
is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
2 Plaintiff has failed to join one or more indispensable 
parties to this litigation. 
128. The claims in the Complaint are barred by the doctrine 
of illegality. Defendant cannot contract with Plaintiff to commit 
an illegal act and enforcement of any such contract lS barred. 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004 proh ts discharge of cooling water, backwash 
or back flush water, air conditioning water, water softener brine 
o £ ows which exceed the design flow of the system, without prior 
authorization from the Director of the Department of Environmental 
lity. Plaintiff dis rged and seeks to discharge the above 
ited substances and excessive flows of process water into 
the system. Plaintiff s not obtained approval from the rector 
for discharge of such substances or discharge of flows which 
exceed the system design therefore any such discharges into 
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the system would be and are illegal. 
129. Plaintiff has failed to set forth s claims wi th 
suffi ent particularity to permit Defendant to raise all 
appropriate defenses, and therefore, Defendant reserves the ri 
to seek leave of court to amend or supplement its Answer, 
including affirmative '. ::: ae.Lenses, to specify further for 
the claims and causes of action that are the s ect of 
this action. 
130. By reason of the Ii of Plaintiff's Second Amended 
aint, SIPP has been required to retain the services of an 
attorney to defend this action and has incurred attorney fees and 
costs in such defense. In accordance with IRCP 54, Idaho Code 
§12-120, Idaho Code §12-121, Idaho Code §12-123, and IRCP 
11 (a) (1), SIPP is entitled is reimbursement of all attorney fees, 
expenses, and losses incurred herein in defense of Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint and as a result of Plaintiff's actions. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC. 
re lly re sts the following relief against Printcra 
Press, Inc. 
That Printcraft recover nothing reason of its 
Amended Complaint and that all such claims be dismissed. 
2. That Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park be 
awarded a 1 of its costs and attorney fees. 
3. For such other relief, legal or equitable, to which 
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has any rl t or entitlement. 




Attorney for Defendant 
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
de Industrial and Professional Park, LLC hereby 
a trial a twelve (12) person jury on all issues of 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2008. 
Attorney for De 
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Case No. CV-06 7097 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC.'S ANSWER TO SECOND 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, 
COUNTERCLAIMS, PRAYER FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
PlI.RI< UTILI IES' ANS~'JER TO SSCOND .NJjENDED , 
COU[\iTERCLl'.IMS, PRl\YZR FOR PUNITIVE DAlJj}\GES AND DEMAND fOR TRIAL - 1 
10.CO 
COMES NOIiIJ the Defendant, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an 
Idaho ra tion (hereafter "Sunnyside Park Utili ties fI), and in 
response to the Second Amended Compla filed PIa iff, 
sta es and alleges as follows: 
1 
-L • Defendant denies each and every allegation set 
the Amended aint except as expressly admitted rein. 
2. Plaintiff's aint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
3. In response to paragraph 1, defendant denies that this 
s an action arising out of certain disclosures the defendant 
failed 0 make. Defendant asserts that this is an action arising 
out of the disconnection of Printcraft Press's sewer connection to 
Sunnyside Park Utilities' septic system. The defendant admits that 
t.here s a central septic system located 1n the ide 
Industria and Professional Park s sion which is operated and 
maintained by ide Park Utilities. 
4. In answer o paragraphs 2,3, 4, 6, and 7 defendant 
a s the same. 
In anSVJer to paragraphs 8 9 de ts the 
same. 
6. In answer to para 10, defendant admits that 
ide Industrial and Professional Park, LLC (hereafter "SIPP") 
leted and fi ed with strict Seven Health Department a septic 
permit for the installation of a septic system that would service 
a of one to two buildings. Defendant admits that a copy of 
District Seven Health Department's septic penni t is attached as 
Exh t "A" to the Complaint. 
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7. In answer to paragraph 11, defendant admits the same. 
8. In answer to paragraph 12, defendant admits the same. 
9. In answer to paragraph 13, defendant admits that on 
t 4, 1999, SIPP and Bonneville County entered into a 
opment Agreement. The defendant denies that SIPP promised to 
provide all street improvements and utilities as were necessary to 
be eted. The agreement specifically states that the 
"oltJner (s) " will construct said needed utility or street 
s. The agreement does not obligate the "Developer" to 
construct needed utility or street improvements. 
10. In answer to paragraph 14, defendant admits the same. 
II. In answer to paragraph 15, defendant denies the same. 
12. In answer to paragraph 16, defendant admits the same. 
13. In answer to paragraph 17, defendant admits tha a 
meeting was held. However, defendant denies the remainder of the 
a legations contained in paragraph 17. 
14. In answer to paragraph 18, defendant admits the same. 
1 In answer to paragraph 19, fendant denies that e 
letter sent District Seven Heal Department memorialized the 
meeting held on March 29, 2002. Defendant admits t the letter 
attached as Exhibit "F" to Plaintiff's complaint is a true and 
correct copy of the letter sent District Seven Health 
Department. 
16. In answer to paragraph 18 [sic], defendant denies that 
it entered into an agreement with the Defendant Sunnyside Park 
Owners Associat ion, Inc. (hereafter "SPOA") for the providing of 
water and sewer services to the subdivision identified in the plat 
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map. Defendant asserts that it entered into an agreement with 
SPOA, to sewer services present and future o\:mers ana 
o s of any subdi sions which were bei or cne day 
served ide Park Utilities' sewer faci ities. 
17. In answer to paragraph 19 [sic], defendant admits the 
same. 
18. In answer to paragraph 20, defendant admits that 
Third Pa Benef iciary Agreement states: "This eement shal 
a so be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of ... all present 
and future owners or occupants." Defendant denies the remainder of 
pa 20. 
n answer to paragraph 21, Defendant admits the same. 
20. In answer to paragraph 22, Defendant denies that the 
reement is only b ng on Plaintiff if the was 
recorded. Defendant specifically denies that the Agreement 
contains specific language in several places indicating that the 
Third Party Beneficiary Agreement would be recorded "so as to put 
all persons on notice that any properties receivi sewer se ces 
would be s ect to the terms of the reement." Defendant admits 
hat a true and correct copy of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Utility Agreement is attached as Exhibit "G" to plaintiff's 
• -I-aln, .. 
21. In answer to paragraph 23, defendant denies the same. 
22. In answer to paragraph 24 and 25, defendant admits the 
same. 
23. In answer to paragraph 26, defendant admits that on or 
about September 12, 2005 CTR Development, LLC, the owner of the 
SUNNYS DE PARK UTILITIES' ANS\t\lER TO SECOND h\,lENDED C01'1PLIHNT, 
COUNTERCLAIMS, PRl"\YER FOR PUNI lmD DEtJ!P,ND FOR ,JURY - 4 
property at that time, entered into an agreement with ide 
Park Util ties for sewer services and paid the $1,800.00 
connection fee. Sunnyside Park Utilities thereafter allmved the 
sewer connection to be made to the Iding currently occupied by 
Plaintiff. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of Check 
No. 5896 made by eTR Development to Sunnyside Park Util i ties is 
attached as Exhibit "I" to Plaintiff's First Amended laint. 
24. In answer to paragraph 27 f defendant based upon 
information ded the plaintiff, admits the same. Defendant 
was not a party to the scribed leases. 
25. In answer to paragraph 28, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Park Utilities specifically requested from eTR 
Development copies of drawings or proposed drawings concern the 
buil which would be built and located on the ses. 
Defendant does not have sufficient information to determine if 
Plaintiff provided the requested documents or eTR Development 
provided the requested documents. Therefore, De cannot 
~ or deny whether or not PIa iff (as sed to eTR 
Development) ded the drawings to ide Park Utilities and 
its officers and/or directors. 
26. In answer to paragraph 29, defendant denies the same. 
27. In answer to paragraph 30, defendant denies the same. 
28. In answer to paragraph 31, Defendant admits that either 
Plaintiff or eTR Development provided the document attached as 
Exhibit "K" to defendant. Defendant denies that it received a 
fourth page showing the floor plan or layout of the second floor. 
Defendant was verbally informed that the second floor was to be 
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used solely for storage. 
29. n answer to paragraph 32, defendant admits the same. 
30. In answer to paragraph 33, defendant admits that there 
were 10 or 11 connections to the sewer system operated 
defendant June of 2006. Defendant admits that one of the sewer 
connections was to the property owned by J&LB Properties and that 
Plaintiff was occupying J&LP Properties' building as a month-to-
month tenant. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 33. 
31. In answer to paragraph 34, defendant admits that 
June 2006, defendant's sewer system experienced a t 
overload as the result of excessive discharges from Print craft . 
The cause of overload was unknown to defendant at that time. 
Defendant ts that it immediately reported the temporary 
overload to District Seven Health Department and that an onsite 
investigation was conducted by District Seven Health rtment. 
Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 34. 
32. In answer to paragraph 35, defendant admits that a 
true and correct copy of the June 28, 2006 letter from District 
Seven Health rtment to SIPP and Sunnyside Park Utili ties is 
attached as Exhibit "L" to Plaintiff's Amended aint. 
Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 35. 
33. In answer to paragraph 36, Defendant admits t a true 
and correct copy of the July 6, 2006 letter is attached as Exhibit 
"[v1" to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 36. 
34. In answer to paragraph 37, Defendant admits that an 
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add tional septic pe t r installation of additional capacity 
was obtained. Defendant admits that a true and correct of the 
s ic permit is attached as "1'1" to PIa iff's 
Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations J_n 
pa 37. 
35. In answer to paragraph 38, defendant ts that 
District Seven Health Department physically inspected the 
sta lation of the expansion and repairs of the s lC stem 
which l,vere ed and completed Sunnyside Park Utilities. 
Defendant ts that a true and correct copy of the Septic System 
Inspection Report is attached to Plaintiff's A.mended aint as 
Exhibit "0." Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 38. 
36. In answer to paragraph 39, defendant admits the same. 
37. In answer to paragraph 40, defendant admits that a copy 
of the st 23, 2006 letter from Doyle Beck is attached as 
Exhibi t "Qff to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 40. 
38. In answer to paragraph 41, defendant admits a 
of the September 13, 2006 letter from Crockett is attached as 
Exhibi t "Rtf to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 41. 
39. In answer to paragraph 42, defendant admits that a copy 
of the September 6, 2006 letter from Doyle Beck is attached to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as ibit "S". Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 42. 
40. In answer to paragraph 43, defendant admits that 
Plaintiff requested from Sunnyside Park Utilities a copy of all 
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documents, contracts, agreements, or the ike govern si 
Park Util ties' sewer utility se ces. De s t 
remainder of e allegations in paragraph 43. 
In answer to para 44, defendant admits that the 
Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the Rules and 
lations were provided to Printcraft. Defendant ts that a 
true and correct copy of Doyle Beck's September 20, 2006 letter is 
attached as Exhibit "T" to Plaintiff's ["mended Complaint. 
Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 44. 
42. In answer to paragraph 45, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Park Utilities and the plaintiff met in compromise 
iations at the plaintiff's premises to discuss the issues of 
the aintiff's discharges and other compromise iations. 
Defendant admits that plaintiff later agreed to collect and 
d spose of all substances Sunnyside Park Utilities classified as 
"processed waste" which Sunnyside Park Utilities classifies as any 
non-human wastes. Defendant admits that Plaintiff's counsel 
memoria ized the agreement in a letter and that a rue and correct 
copy of such letter is attached as Exh it "UFf to aintiff's 
a 
43. In answer to paragraph 46, defendant admits that Kirk 
Woolf met with the Plaintiff. Defendant admits that the Plaintiff 
assert to Mr. Woolf that exo ink was aqueous in nature and 
not harmful. Defendant denies the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 46. 
44. In answer to paragraph 47, defendant admits t a true 
and correct copy of the October 2, 2006 District Seven Health 
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Department letter is attached as Exhibit "V" to plaintiff's 
Arnended Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of the 
allegations in para 47. 
45. In ansltJer to paragraph 48, defendant admits that a true 
and correct copy of the October 5, 2006 District Seven Health 
Department letter is attached as Exhibit "W" to the Plaintiff's 
l-"u'nended aint. Defendant denies the remainder of the 
allegations in paragraph 48. 
46. In answer to paragraph 49, defendant admits that a 
disput~e arose between District Seven Health Department and the 
defendants. Defendant asserts that the only issue related to t 
dispute between District Seven Health Department and the 
defendants is the temporary overload caused Plaintiff in June 
of 2006. Defendant admits that a true and correct copy of the 
Corrected Notice of Intent to Re~ impose Sanitary Restrictions, 
dated November 21, 2006, is attached as Exhibit "X." 
47. In answer to paragraph 50, defendant admits the same. 
48. In answer to paragraph 51, defendant admits that 
ide Park Utilities sent the letter attached as Exhibit "Z" 
to Plaintiff's AIllended Complaint. Defendant asserts that the 
statements therein speak for themselves. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 51. 
49. In answer to paragraph 52, defendant ts that 
Sunnyside Park utilities received a letter dated December 12, 2006 
from Pr intcraft and that such letter is attached as Exhibit "Al',," 
to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant asserts that such 
letter speaks for itself. Defendant denies the remainder of 
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50. In answer to paragraph 53, defendant ts that 
ide Park Utilit s sent the letter attached as ib "88" 
to Hie Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. De asserts that the 
statements therein speak for themselves. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 53. 
51. In answer to paragraph 54, defendant admits that it 
severed the sewer connection on December 15, 2006. Defendant does 
not have sufficient information to either admit or deny the 
remainder of the allegations in paragraph 54, and therefore denies 
the same. 
52. In answer to paragraph 55, defendant admits that 
Sunnyside Park Utilities has provided documents to plaintiff 
establishi that Sunnyside Park Utilities' seVJer system's 
capacity from 1996 when it was first constructed and installed 
t ~rune of 2006 was in the arnount of 500 gallons per day. 
Defendant also admits that Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer system 
capacity after June 2006 was In the total capacity of 2,000 
gallons per Defendant admits that evidence of Sunnyside Park 
Utilities' sewer system capacities are attached as Exhibit "CC" to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendant denies the remainder of 
par raph 55. 
53. In answer to paragraph 56, defendant ts that 
S ide Park Utilities provided documentation to Plaintiff that 
Sunnyside Park Utilities measured sewer discharge into Sunnyside 
Park Utilities' sewer system from February 6, 2007 through 16, 
2007, and that the average amount of such discharges were 
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te 370 gallons per day. Defendant admits that a true 
correct of Sunnyside Park Utili ties' calculations and 
measurements are attached as Exhibit "DO" to PIa tiff's Alllended 
aint. Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 56. 
4. n answer to paragraph 57, defendant ts that it s 
sufficient capacity to receive all sewer discharges in accordance 
\vi th the terms of the contract entered into the parties on 
Sember 26, 2006. Defendant admits that plaintiff has demanded 
reconnection and that Defendant has refused to allow such a 
reconnect ion because of the plaintiff's intention to discharge 
substances and quantities prohibited Defendant's Rules and 
lations, the agreement entered into by the parties on 
September 26, 2006, and applicable state and federal law. 
55. In answer to paragraph 58, defendant denies the same. 
56. In answer to paragraph 59, defendant re-alleges and 
restates all the admissions and denials set forth above in 
para 1 through 55 and incorporates the same reference. 
57. In answer to paragraph 60, defendant admits the same. 
58. In answer to paragraph 61, defendant denies the same. 
59. In answer to paragraph 62, defendant denies the same. 
60. In answer to paragraph 63, defendant denies the same. 
6l. In answer to paragraph 64, defendant denies the same. 
In answer to paragraph 65, defendant ies that it did 
not record the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement. Defendant denies 
that it provided sewer services to the Plaintiff merely bpcause 
PIa iff was an occupant of the Sunnyside Industrial and 
Pro ssi Park Subdivision. 
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63. In answer to paragraph 66, defendant denies the same. 
64. In answer to paragraph 67, defendant denies the same. 
65. In ans\,yer to paragraph 68, defendant admits that it 
severed the sewer connection. Defendant denies tIle remainder of 
the allegations in paragraph 68. 
66. In answer to paragraph 69, defendant denies the same. 
67. In answer to paragraph 7O, defendant denies the same. 
68. In answer -co paragraph 71, defendant admits the saIne. 
69. In anS",ler to paragraph 72, defendant admits the same. 
70. In ans\',yer to paragraph 73, de nt denies the same. 
7I. In answer to paragraph 74, defendant denies the same. 
72. In answer to paragraph 75, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states all the admissions and denials set forth above in 
pa s 1 71 and incorporates the same herein 
reference as if set forth fully. 
73. In answer to paragraph 76, defendant denies the same. 
74. In answer to paragraph 77, defendant denies the same. 
75. In answer to paragraph 78, defe denies the same. 
6. In answer to paragraph 79, defendant denies the same. 
77. n answer to paragraph 80, defendant denies the same. 
78. In answer to paragraph 81, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and restates its admissions and denials to paragraphs 1 77 
as set forth herein. 
79. In answer to paragraph 82, defendant denies District 
Seven Health Department provided a permit for only "one to two 
buildings" to be connected to defendants building. Defendant 
asserts that such permit provided for a minimum of "one to two 
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buildings." Defendant admits that District Seven Health Department 
indicated in April of 2002 that no new sewer connections were to 
be made to the existing system. Defendant denies that such 
"i ca ion" had any legally binding effect on defendant r s sewer 
system or defendant's ability to connect additional buildings to 
defendant's sewer system. 
80. In answer t- " '--~ paragraph 83, defendant denies the same. 
8l. In answer to paragraph 84, defendant denies the same. 
82. In answer to paragraph 85, defendant denies the same. 
83. In answer to paragraph 86, defendant denies the same. 
84. In answer to paragraph 87, defendant denies the same. 
85. In answer to paragraph 88, defendant denies the same. 
86. In answer to paragraph 89, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 89. 
87. In answer to paragraph 90, defendant denies the same. 
88. In anSVJer to paragraph 91, defendant denies the same. 
89. In answer to paragraph 92, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states its admissions ana denials to paragraphs 1 t 
91 as set forth herein. 
90. In answer to paragraph 93, defendant denies the same. 
91. In answer to paragraph 94, defendant denies the same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 94. 
92. In answer to paragraph 95, defendant denies the same. 
93. In answer to paragraph 96, defendant denies the same. 
94. In answer to paragraph 97, defendant denies the same. 
95. In answer to paragraph 98, defendant denies the same. 
96. In answer to paragraph 98, defendant denies the same. 
S'JNNYSI PARK UTILITIES' ANSl'l)"ER TO SECOND AtviENDED COllljPLAINT f 
COUNTERCLAIMS, PR1WER FOR P(JNI IVE DAMAGES AND DEM1\ND FOR JUPY TRIAL - 3 
... I") 
J. J,., 
97. In ans\",ier to paragraph 100, defendant denies the same. 
98. In answer to paragraph 101, defendant denies the same. 
99. In answer to paragraph 102, defendant hereby re-al eges 
and re-states its ssions and denials to para s 1 
101 as set forth herein. 
100. In answer to paragraph 103, defendant denies the same. 
101. In answer to para 104, defendant denies the same. 
102. In anS\",ier to paragraph 105, defendant denies the same. 
103. In answer to paragraph 106, defendant denies the same. 
104. In answer to paragraph 107, defendant denies the same. 
05. In answer to paragraph 108, defendant ts that 
laintiff requested any and all documents that would be associated 
IrJi th the property and sewer services ded by Sunnyside Park 
Utilities. Defendant admits that, In response, on September 20, 
2006, Sunnyside Park Utili ties provided Plaintiff with a copy of 
the Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and the Sunnyside 
Park Utilities Rules and Regulations. Defendant denies the 
remainder of paragraph 108. 
106. In answer to paragraph 109, defendant denies the same. 
107. In answer to paragraph 110, defendant denies t same. 
Defendant denies each and every subpart of paragraph 110. 
108. In answer to paragraph 111, defendant denies the same. 
109. 1;1 answer to paragraph 112, defendant denies same. 
110. In answer to paragraph 113, defendant denies the same. 
111. In answer to paragraph 114, defendant denies the same. 
112. In answer to paragraph 115, defendant hereby re-alleges 
and re-states its admissions and denials to parag s 1 through 
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113. In answer to paragraph 116, defendant denies the same. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
114. To the extent 21aintiff has failed to satisfy and/or 
Y with all terms, conditions and provisions, and/or perform 
all of its obligations under the Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
Agreement, Sunnyside Pa~k Utilities' Sewer Rules and lations, 
and the terms of the contract entered into between the parties on 
September 26, 2006, Plaintiff's claims are barred and defendant is 
excused from any duty or performance cIa by Plaintiff. 
115. Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff lacks standing to 
pursue the claims alleged on behalf of any non-party. 
116. Plaintiff's damages are barred by the doctrine of 
accord and satisfaction. 
117. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's claims are ba 
lack of privity and that Plaintiff is at most an incidental 
ficiary of any agreement. 
118. Defendant asserts that it has no fiduciary relationship 
with the Plaintiff. 
119. Plaintiff's claims are barred by Plaintiff's prior and 
continuing breach of the contracts. 
120. Plaintiff's claims are barred as a result of 
Plaintiff's own illegal acts. 
121. To the extent Plaintiff failed to minimize or avoid 
some or all of the damage alleged in the Second &~ended Complaint, 
any recovery against this defendant must be reduced in whole or in 
part the amount attributable to such failures. 
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122. Defendant asserts that '.e:-II Plaintiff is deemed to be 
enti tled to any award of damages against defendant, such award 
must be offset amounts owed to Defendant by Plaintiff as set 
forth in Defendant's Counterclaims hereafter. 
123. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and each claim 
t re , is barred by the rines of waiver and/or estoppel. 
124. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, and each claim 
therein, is barred by the doctrine of independent intervening 
cause. 
125. The Second &rnended Complaint and each claim therein, is 
barred the doctrine of laches. 
126. The Second Amended Complaint, and each claim therein, 
s red the doctrine of unclean hands. 
127. Plaintiff has failed to join one or more indispensable 
parties to this liti ion. 
128. The claims in the Complaint are barred the doctrine 
of illegality. Defendant cannot contract with Plaintiff to 
an il egal act and enforcement of any such contract is barred. 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004 proh ts discharge of cooling water, backwash 
or back flush water, air conditioning water, water softener brine 
or flows which exceed the design flow of the system, without prior 
authorization from the rector of the Department of ronmental 
Quali ty. PIa iff dis rged and seeks to discharge the above 
prohibi ted substances and excessive flows of process water into 
the system. Plaintiff has not obtained approval from the Director 
for discharge of such substances or discharge of flows which 
exceed the system design and therefore any such discharges into 
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he system would be and are illegal. 
129. Plaintiff has failed to set forth its claims with 
sufficient particularity to permit De to raise all 
iate defenses, there re, Defendant reserves the right 
o seek leave of court to amend or s ement its Answer, 
including affirmative defenses, to specify further grounds for 
the claims and causes of action that are the sub ect of 
this action. 
130. reason of the filing of Plaintiff's Second Amended 
Complaint f Sunnyside Park Utilities has been required to retain 
the se s of an attorney to defend this action and has incurred 
attorney fees and costs in such defense. In accordance with IRCP 
54, Idaho Code §12-120, Idaho Code §12-121, Idaho Code §12-123, 
RCP 11 (a) (1), and the Sewer Rules and Regulations, Article IV, 
Section 2 f Sunnyside Park Utili ties is entitled is re sement 
of all attorney fees, expenses, and losses incurred herein in 
defense of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and as a resu of 
Plaintiff's actions. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., hereby alleges the following 
counterclaims against Print craft Press, Inc., pursuant to IRCP 13: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTERCLAIMS 
1. Sunnyside Pa Utilities, Inc., (hereafter "Sunnys 
Park Utilities") is an Idaho corporation with its principle place 
of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
2 . Su ide Park Utilities engages in the business of 
p ng water and sewer service to the owners and occupants of 
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certain properties, buildings, and other s in 
accordance th the rd Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement and 
Sunnyside Park Utilities' Rules and Regulations. 
3. Printcraft Press, Inc., (hereafter "Printcraft fi ) is an 
Idaho corporation with its principle place of business located at 
3834 South Professional Way, Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
4. Travis Waters, at all relevant times, was an cfficer of 
ntcraft Press, Inc. , and is an vidual residing in 
lIe County, Idaho. 
S. That jurisdiction and venue of this action arise In 
Bonneville County, State of I 
6. That pursuant to an agreement with CTR Deve 
LLC. , (hereafter "CTR Development") Sunnyside Park Uti iLies 
agreed to provide water and sewer service to the building 
at 3834 South Professional Way, (hereafter "the property") . 
7. That on or about September 12, 2005 Travis Waters 
acti on f of CTR Development Printcraft Press ded 
blueprints of a building being constructed by CTR Devel t on 
the property. 
8. That Doyle Beck on behalf of Sunnyside Industrial and 
Pro ssional Park, LLC and Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. asked 
Travis Waters what the sewage needs for the building would be and 
Mr. Waters stated that there would be sewage from 30 employees. 
9. Provision of water and sewer services to CTR 
Development was to be regulated by the Sunnyside Park Utilities' 
Rules and Regulations, the Third Party Beneficiary Utility 
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reement, and appli e state and federal rules and ations. 
That a of such Agreement and applicable Rules and Regulations 
are attached as its "A" and "B" to Plaintiff's Original 
laint. 
10. In January of 2006, CTR Development sold the property 
and any rights to use Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer services to 
J&LB Properties, Inc. 
11. J&LB Properties, Inc. , thereafter entered into a 
wri ten lease agreement with CTR Management, LLC. (herea er "CTR 
Management If) The lease agreement specifically provided that the 
lessee, CTR Management, was responsible for furnishing and pa 
for all utilities and that J&LB Properties had no obligation to 
furnish any utilities to the building. That a copy of such Lease 
reement is attached as Exhibit "J" to Plaintiff's Second Amended 
aint. 
1. Printcraft is a sub-tenant in the subject property 
pursuant to an oral, month-to-month sub-lease agreement between 
Printcraft and CTR l'1anagement, and possesses no other ri s in 
the subject property. 
13. Pr craft began discharging wastes into Sunnyside Park 
Utilities sewer system on or after January 23, 2006. 
14. Printcraft's discharges inc sewage 40 or more 
employees, hazardous chemicals, water so ener brine, reverse 
osmosis water, ain concentrate, isopropyl alcohol, ink, and 
multiple other scharges that were harmful to ide Park 
Utilities' sewer system, including flows beyond the capacity of 
Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer system. 
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16. Nei ther Printcraft, nor eTR Management, ever formed 
side Park Utilities that the lease agreement th J&LB 
Properties specifically uded eTR Management and Printcraft 
Press from using J&LB Properties' ri s to the sewer connection 
with side Park Utilities. 
17. Printcraft Press either negligently did not read, or 
intentionally d not obey the multiple warnings and it ions 
conta in the Materia Safety Data Sheets for the noxious and 
ha ardous cals Prin craft discharged into t unnyside Park 
Utilities' sewer system. 
18. On or about June 9, 2006, Printcraft's discharges 
caused Sunnyside Park Utili ties' sewer system to overload and 
caused sewage to pond on the ground near ide Park Uti ities' 
drain field. 
1 q 
1. ~ • Defendant observed significant quantities of ink in the 
sewage on the ground as a res of the June 9, 2006 overload. 
20. On or about July 2, 2006, Sunnyside Park Uti ities 
obtained a temporary expansion permit and increa t capacity 
of the sewer system in er to avoid future overloads of the 
system. At t time Sunnyside Park Utilities was still unaware of 
all t various types and quanti ties of discharges from 
Printcraft into the sewer system. 
21. In August 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities discovered 
that Print craft had been discharging reverse osmosis water, ink, 
chemicals and other harmful and illegal substances into the sewer 
system. 
22. On or about September 6, 2006 Sunnyside Park Utilities 
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specifj_cally informed Pr craft that the sewer system was only 
desi to a e human waste and that Print craft needed to 
res ict its scharge ities and cease discharging cals, 
ssed water, and ink into the sewer system. 
23. On or about September 20, 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities 
provided Printcraft th a copy of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Utility Agreement and Sunnyside Park utilities' Eules and 
lations. 
24. On September 26, 2006, Printcraft Press after receipt of 
the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and the Eules and 
Regulations acknmvl that it was aware of the system 
limitations and of the disputes with the Department of 
ronmental Quality and District Seven Health Department as a 
result of the June, 2006 overload, and contracted to collect and 
dispose of all substances that Sunnyside Park Utilities classif 
as "processed wastes," including all reverse osmosis water, In 
exchange for future sewer services. 
25. During December of 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities 
scovered Printcraft continued discharging substances t 
Sunnyside Park Utilities classified as "processed wastes." 
26. On December 11, 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities sent a 
letter to Printcraft, demanding that Print craft cease all 
discharges of "processed wastes" immediately. 
27. On December 13, 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities again 
requested that Printcraft cease all discharges of ~processed 
wastes" and formed Printcra that Printcraft must allow 
toring of its discharges if Printcraft desired to continue 
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rece ng sewer services. Print craft refused to allow its 
scharges to be monitored only because Printcraft was ly 
and intentionally discharging "processed wastes" had no 
intention of ceasing to discharge "processed wastes U despite the 
agreement reached between Printcraft and Sunnyside Park Util ies 
on or about September 26, 2006. 
28. On December 5, 2006, Sunnyside Park Utilities severed 
the sewer connection to the building Printcraft is occupy 
29. On December 19, 2 ° 0 6, Print craft caused its portable, 
non- scharging above ground sewer system, with a capacity of 
1,000 gallons, to overload, allowing sewage to on the ground 
near Printcra , s Iding. Multiple additional overloads have 
occurred and are continuing. 
30. On December 20, 2006, the Department of Environmenta 
Qua ity conducted an investigation of the sewage on the ground and 
determined that "Odor of wastewater smelled like ink. Color of 
wastewater was a dark blue to black color." A copy of the 
investigation letter dated January 5, 2007 is attached as t 
"1." 
31. The investigation the Department of ronmental 
Quality, only five days after Sunnyside Park Utilities severed the 
sevver connection, confirms that Printcraft was discharging 
"processed wastes." 
32. On Ap r i 1 2, 2 008, craft's agents, Lance Schuster 
and Robert Starr, entered onto property owned by Sunnyside Park 
Utilities. 
33. ide Park Utilities did not give authorization for 
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Lance Schuster, Robert Starr, or any other agent of craft to 
enter onto ide Park Utilities' property, and side Park 
Utilities had placed "No Trespassing" signs not less than every 
660 feet on the property_ 
COUNT I: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
30. Defendant re-alleges paragraphs 1 th 25 
reference. 
31. Defendant and PIa iff entered into a b 
contractual relationship as follows: 
a. On September 6, 2006, Defendant formed PIa iff 
that Defendant's sewer system had capacity only to 
and dispose of "human waste" and that no other wastes would 
be allowed into the system. 
b. On Septembe 9, 2006, Plaintiff requested a copy of 
any contracts, agreements, documents, or the ike, which were 
applicable to parties receiving sewer services from ide 
Park Utilities. 
c. On September 20, 2006, Defendant PIa iff 
"Ji th Defendant's rd Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement 
and Defendant's Rules and Regulations for sewer service. Such 
Rules and Regulations specifically define "sewage" as 
blackwaste or blackwater (also known as "human wastes") and 
specifically excludes a lengthy list of "processed wastes" 
from be discharged into the sewer system. 
d. On September 20, 2006 Sunnyside Park Utilities 
offered to continue accepting sewage from Printcraft, only if 
Printcraft would agree to cease scharging any "processed 
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VJastes" into the system. Sunnyside Park Utilities 
specificaLly identified substances and flows ch it 
classified to be ~processed wastes." 
e. On or about September 26, 2006, Plaintiff agreed to 
ab de the September 20, 2006 offer and agreed not to 
scharge any substance Defendant classified as "processed 
waste" o side Park Utilities' sewer system. 
f. er September 26, 2006 De a ed 
Plaintiff's sewer discharges in exchange for PIa ntiff's 
of the monthly sewer service fee of $17.50. 
32. Defendant substantially performed its obli ions under 
the contract from September 26, 2006 until December 15, 2006 and 
did not materially brea the contract. 
33. Plaintiff materially breached the contract 
discharging water softener brine, hazardous chemicals, substances 
that are harmful to Defendant's sewer facilities, inks, and 
excessive flow of discharges. 
34. As a direct result of the acts of PIa iff, Defendant 
was required to disconnect Plaintiff from the sewer system on 
December 15, 2006. The costs of such disconnect lnc 
$1,228.64 for a backhoe and operator to perform the disconnec~ion 
and $1,420.00 for inspection and supervision the Defendant. 
35. As a rect and proximate result of the breaches of 
contract by Plaintiff, Defendant lS entitled to damages of 
$2,648.64 or such other amount as may be proven at trial. 
36. In accordance with IRCP 54, Idaho Code §12-120, 12-1 1, 
12-123, IRCP 11 (a) (1), and the Sewer Rules and Regulations, 
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J\rticle IV, Section 2, Sunnyside Park Utilities is entitled to 
re sement of all attorney fees, expenses, and losses incurred 
rein in prosecution of ide Park Utilities' counterclaims. 
COUNT II. COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
37. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges pa s 1 
through 32 by reference. 
38. The contract between these parties includes material 
lied covenants. 
39. ied 1n every contract is a covenant that the 
parties ,-Ji 11 act in good fai th and fair deal ,-Ji th each r 
with respect to the terms of the contract. 
40. Printcraft has failed to deal fairly with and act in 
faith towards Sunnyside Park Utilities and has breached the 
1 covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
41. Printcraft's breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing has unfairly frustrated Sunnyside Park 
utilities' right to receive the benefits of the contract. 
42. ntcraft's breach of the lied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a material breach of the contract and is 
the direct and proximate cause of damages suffered by Sunnyside 
Park utilities, ch damages are continuing. 
43. Sunnyside Park Utilities has suffered damages and will 
hereafter suffer damages in an amount to be proven at trial in 
excess of the jurisdictional amount of this Court. 
COUNT III. TRESPASS 
44. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1 
through 39 by reference. 
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45. P ntcraft, its agents, Lance S ster and 
Robert Starr went upon Sunnyside Park Utili ies' property on il 
2, 2008. 
46. Sunnyside Park Utilities did not consent to 
rintcraft's entry upon Sunnyside Park Utilities' property. 
47. Sunnyside Park Utilities' property, at the time of the 
entry upon the property Printcraft's agents, was posted with 
"No Trespassing" signs, spaced at intervals of not less than one 
(1) notice per SlX hundred sixty (660) feet along such real 
property. 
48. ide Park Utilities has been damaged in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
49. Sunnyside Park Utili ties is entitled to treble the 
amount of damages which may be assessed or fifty dollars ($50.00), 
r is greater, under Idaho Code §6-202. 
50. S ide Park Utili ties is entitled to a reasonable 
at orney's fee, which shall be taxed as costs, pursuant to Idaho 
§6-202. 
COUNT IV. FRAUD 
51. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1 
50 reference. 
52. Printcraft Press, t its rector, Travis Waters 
stated that the disposal needs of the building Print craft intended 
to occupy, was capacity for disposal of waste generated by thirty 
(30) employees. 
53. Such statement was false as Printcraft Press's sewage 
needs included capacity for disposal of waste generated in 
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excess of fort (40 ) oyees, reverse osmosis water totaling 
se ral thousand gallons of waste per , water softener ine, 
inKs, lut cals, air conditioner water, and other 
hazardous wastes. 
4. Such statement was materia because had ide Park 
ies known the truth of the matter, it would never have 
al owed Printcraft to discharge any substances o the sewer 
sys em, because Sunnyside Park Uti ities wou d have known that t 
scha s ng from ntcraft would cause the system to fai , 
and \;,Jould s ect Sunnyside Park Utilities to criminal penalties. 
5. Printcraft Press s Wa ers knew he statement 
was false as Tra s Waters was familiar with the nting 
industry, s 1!Jaters owned and operated a nt business 
r severa years, Travis Waters had in his possession Mate ial 
SafeLY Data Sheets ded the s iers of chemica s, inks, 
and ha ardous substances, Travis Waters knew the specific 
operations of Print raft, and Travis Waters was liar with the 
design of he buil ng, the ure location of the ting 
equ t in the il ng, the types of discharges that could be 
expected from each piece of printing equipment, water softner 
equ , and reverse osmosis equipment in the building, and the 
substances and ities that Printcraft customarily dischar 
rectly o s ks and ins thout any pre-treatment. 
56. Sunnyside Park Utilities did not that the 
statement was false, as the only other information it had been 
ided by Printcraft through Travis Waters were the bui ng 
plans which stated the word "Printcraft," and showed only toilets 
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and bathroom sinks. The plans did not designate any of the 
Printcraft planned to use and did not designate some of 
the sinks or drains that Printcraft intended to discharge 
chemicals, inks, and other substances into. The plans not 
indicate that Printcraft intended to use a reverse osmosis system, 
a water softener system, or air conditioning units. 
57. Printcraft Press and Travis Waters intended Sunnyside 
Park Utilities to rely upon the statement because Printcraft 
Press would only have to pay $17.50 per in order to receive 
sewer services. If Printcraft Press had not misrepresented its 
sewage needs to Sunnyside Park Utilities, Printcraft Press would 
have been forced to develop its own sewer system, at significant 
cost. 
58. ide Park Utilities did rely upon the statement 
and allowed the connection of the building to occur and provided 
the Idi with sewer services until December 15, 2006. 
59. Sunnyside Park Utilities' reliance was reasonable under 
al of t circumstances because Sunnyside Park Utilities asked 
Printcraft to identi its sposal needs, and Sunnyside Park 
Utilities reasonably expected Printcraft to truth ly sclose 
what such disposal needs would be. 
60. Sunnyside Park Utilities suffered damages proximately 
caused reliance on the false statement, illcluding failure of 
the system, litigation between Sunnyside Park Utilities the 
rtment of Environmental Quality and strict Seven Health 
Department and costs to expand the sewer system. 
61. Sunnyside Park Utilities has suffered damages In an 
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amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT V. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
62. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges para 1 th 
61 reference. 
63. Printcraft Press and Travis Waters failed to disclose 
the substances, chemicals, inks, and flows that Printcraft Press 
intended to scharge into the system, prior to any discharge of 
such substances into the system. 
64. Printcraft Press and Travis Waters were aware of, and 
speci cally knew the substances and flows Printcra Press 
intended to discharge into Sunnyside Park Utilities' septic 
system. In failing to disclose this information to ide Park 
Utilities, Printcraft Press and Travis Waters are to be treated as 
'f' lL ey had represented that none of L substances would be 
scharged into the septic system, other than the waste of 30 
employees. 
65. In fa ling to disclose to Sunnyside Park Utili ties the 
substances and flows that would be discharged by Print craft Press, 
both Printcraft Press and Travis Waters are chargeable with the 
falsity of that statement. 
66. The information regarding the substances Print craft 
Press would discharge into Sunnyside Park Utilities' septic system 
was material in that Sunnyside Park Utilities' was not given the 
opportuni ty to determine whether it, in fact wanted to proceed 
with accepting Printcraft Press's sewage, when such sewage would 
cause the septic system to fail and subject Sunnyside Park 
Utilities to criminal sanctions. 
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67. Printcraft Press and Tra s Waters were aware of the 
failure to sclose and knew that Sunnyside Park Utilities would 
have no -way of scove the true nature of Printcraft Press's 
scharges thout disclosure. 
68. Sunnyside Park Ut ili ties was ignorant of, and had no 
way of knowing, the types and quantities of discharges coming from 
Printcraft Press until after Pr tcraft Press caused the 
septic system to overload. 
69. Sunn.yside Park Utili ties relied upon the nondisc osure 
of the substances and flows Printcraft was discharging the 
system, allowi Print craft to scharge its sewage into 
ide Park Utilities' sept c system until December 15, 2006. 
70. Sunnyside Park Utilities was justified n relyi upon 
the nondisclosures Printcraft and Travis Waters because 
Sunnyside Park Utilities speci cally asked Travis Waters to 
identi the sposal needs for the building, and Sunnyside Park 
Utilities relied upon Travis Waters to make a t 1 full 
disclosure of what the building's sposal needs would be. 
1. }'lll of the damages and issues that have arisen as a 
resul t of the over f lOVJ in ,June 2006, are a resul t of Printcraft 
Press's and Travis Waters' failure to disclose to Sunnyside Park 
Utili ties the substances that Print craft intended to scharge 
a septic system. Had ide Park Utilities of 
substances and flows that Printcraft intended to dis into 
the septic system, it never would have a lowed Print craft to 
discharge anything into the septic system. All of the damages set 
herein would have been avoided if Sunnyside Park Utilities 
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had been told Printcraft Press and Travis Waters the true 
nature of Printcraft's disposal needs. 
COUNT VI. NUISANCE ABATEMENT 
72. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1-71 by 
reference. 
73. On or about December 15, 2006, Printcraft Press began 
discha ng its human sewage and industrial process wastewater 
into an above ground container, in a location that is easily 
vis e to the general ic, located on the county rl of way, 
and within a few feet of a public roadway in the ide 
I strial Professional Park subdi sion. 
4. From December 15, 2006 to the present, Printcraft has 
added additional above ground containers, and now Printcraft 
discharges its sewage into three above ground containers, located 
on a tra ler, ch is currently parked in the county right of-way 
and directly above ide Park Utilities' water lines, water 
meter, and water valve. 
75. From December 15, 2006 to the present, Printcraft has 
caused or allowed the above ground containers to overflow on 
mUltiple occasions causing raw sewage to on the 
visible to the general lic and easily accessible to the general 
public, animals, insects, etc. 
76. In September of 2007, Print craft caused or allowed t 
above ground containers to overflow causing raw sewage to flow 
directly into Sunnyside Park Utilities' man-hole which contains a 
water meter and water lines owned by Sunnyside Park Utilities. 
77. Eastern Idaho Public Health District asked Printeraft 
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to move tanks to an alternative location so that contamination 
of Sunnyside Park Utilities water system would not occur. 
ntcraft moved the tanks for a short time, but has now moved the 
sewage tanks so that they currently sit directly above Sunnyside 
Park Utilities' property and restrict Sunnyside Park Utilities' 
ability to access its own property which is located entirely 
within an easement ed to Sunnyside Park Utilities. 
78. The raw sewage ponding on the ground is injurious to 
health, is offensive to the senses, and obstructs Sunnyside Park 
Utilities' free use of Sunnyside Park Utilities' propery, so as to 
interfere with Sunnyside Park Utilities' comfortable enj of 
its proper 
79. Thousands of gallons of raw sewage now sit directly 
Sunnyside Park Utilities' water meter and water valve. The 
raw sewage is frequently allowed to leak, which constitutes a 
direct and severe health threat to Sunnyside Park Utilities' water 
system. If the water system is contaminated through Printcraft's 
continuing sance, will irreparably damage each and every 
customer served Sunnyside Park Utilities. 
80. side Park Utilities is entitled to an order 
abat the nuisance. 
81. Sunnyside Park Utilities is entitled to damages In an 
amount to be proven at tal. 
pm~ITlVE DAMAGES 
82. Sunnyside Park Utilities re-alleges paragraphs 1-81 by 
reference. 
83. Printcraft's actions were wanton, malicious and in 
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rec ess disrega ng of Sunnyside Park Utilities' ri sand 
prope ty. 
84. Sunnyside Park Utilities has suffered damages to its 
r s and property. 
85. Printcraft's wanton, malicious, and reckless actions 
continue. 
86. Sunnyside Park Utilities is entitled to an award of 
i lve damages, in an amount to be determined by t jury, to 
deter Pr ft from continuing in its wanton, malicious, and 
reckless o )~ 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. respectfully 
requests the following relief against Printcraft Press, Inc. and 
T s vJaters 
1. That Printcraft recover nothing by reason of its Second 
Amended Complaint and that all such claims be dismissed. 
2. That Sunnyside Park Utilities be awarded its damages 
for intcraft's breach of contract in the amount of $2,648.64, or 
such amount as may be proven at trial. 
3. That ide Park Utili ties be awarded general and 
special damages for Pr craft's breach of t covenant of good 
fa and fair dealing. 
4. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded t rebJe the 
amount of damages proven at trial, or $50.00, whichever is 
greater, for Printcraft's trespass onto Sunnyside Park Utilities' 
property. 
5. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded general and 
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special damages against Printcraft Press ana Travis Waters for 
Travis Waters' fraudulent conduct. 
6. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awa general and 
special damages against Printcraft Press and Travis Waters for 
Travis Waters' failure to disclose the substances and flows 
craft would discharge into Sunnyside Park Utilities' septic 
system. 
7. That the Court order Printcraft to abate the nuisance 
created by Printcraft's use and improper maintenance of the above 
ground tanks. 
8. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded its damages 
for the nuisance caused Printcraft's use and improper 
rnaintenance of the above ground tanks. 
8. That ide Park Utilities be awarded punitive 
damages, in an amount to be determined by the jury. 
8. That Sunnyside Park Utili ties be awarded all of its 
costs and attorney fees. 
9. For such other relief, legal or equitable, to which 
l Park Utilities has any right or entitlement. 
DATED this 28th of Z\pril, 2008. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
Sunnyside Park Utilities hereby demands a trial by a twelve 
(12) person jury on all issues of fact. 
Dl\TED this 28th of April, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUNNYSIDE Pp"RK UTILITIES' ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED CO]'v]PLAINT, 
COiJNTERCLAHlS, PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DEt"lAND FOR Jl1RY TRIAL - 35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
foll ng des eading or document on the attorneys listed 
low on is 28 day of April, 2008: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Lance J. Schuster, Esq. 
John M. Avondet, Esq. 
chael D. Gaf ,Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, 0 83404 
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
P . O. Box 50935 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 - 0935 
TELEPHONE: ( 2 0 8) 524 - 54 00 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SUl'JrJYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, AND 
STmNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. , an) Case No. CV - 06 - 7 0 9 7 
Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) SPU'S AND SIPP'S 
v. ) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND 
) TO ALLEGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES,) DAMAGES 
INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS ) 
ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho) 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL) 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited) 
liability corporation, DOYLE) 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK ) 





SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES,) 





PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS ) 
WATERS, an individual. ) 
) 
Counter-defendants. ) 
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COMES NOW Defendants, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., an 
Idaho corporation, (hereafter individually "SPU") and Sunnyside 
Industrial and Professional Park, LLC., an Idaho limited liability 
company (hereafter individually "SIPPII), (both SIPP and SPU 
hereafter collectively "Sunnyside"), and file this Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive Damages. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Code §6-1604(1) provides that to recover punitive 
damages, " .. . the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct 
by the party against whom the claim for punitive damages is 
asserted." However, a trial court is required to hold a pretrial 
hearing and decide whether or not the claimant will be allowed to 
amend to assert punitive damages pursuant to Idaho Code §6-
1604(2). The Court should allow the amendment, " .. . if, after 
weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes that, the 
moving party has established at such hearing a reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an 
award of punitive damages." Idaho Code §6-1604(2). 
Printcraft argues that "[s]ince Printcraft's fraud claims are 
still alive, Printcraft should be allowed to allege a claim for 
punitive damages." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 9. 1 Idaho Code 
§6-1604(2) does not provide for application of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment standard, (construing all contested facts in 
favor of the moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
1 Printcraft cites to Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 923 
P.2d 456 (1996), to support its argument, however, that case does not hold 
that amendments should be allowed if the moving party "survived" summary 
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the moving party's favor), instead, the statute requires the Court 
to actually "weigh the evidence presented." Id. (Emphasis Added) . 
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court is 
not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve controverted 
factual issues./I See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 2-3 
(citing Bybee v. Clark, 118 Idaho 254, 257, 796 P.2d 131, 134 
(1990)) (Emphasis Added). If the legislature intended punitive 
damages amendments to be allowed any time the moving party 
"survived" summary judgment, it would have stated that standard in 
Idaho Code §6-1604(2). Instead, to allow an amendment for punitive 
damages, the legislature requires the Court to weigh the evidence 
and find a "reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial 
sufficient to support an award of punitive damages" before 
allowing such an amendment. Printcraft's argument would render §6-
1604(2) meaningless because punitive damages would be allowed to 
go to the jury every time there was a trial on contested issues of 
fact, after denial of a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In deciding whether Printcraft has established a "reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an 
award of punitive damages," the Court must necessarily decide 
whether Printcraft is reasonably likely to prevail on its causes 
of action for constructive fraud. Printcraft asserts that, "if 
Printcraft can prove fraud, then it should also be able to allege 
punitive damages." It also logically follows that if Printcraft is 
not reasonably likely to prove constructive fraud, it should not 
judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Development Agreement was recorded on the records of 
Bonneville County on August 4, 1999. Id. 
2. On December 23, 1999, SIPP transferred the property now known 
as Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park by warranty deed to Miskin Scraper Works, 
Inc. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Exhibit H. 
3. On March 29, 2002, Kirk Woolf incorporated SPU. See Affidavit 
of Travis Waters, dated August 2, 2007, Exhibit E. 
4. On or about April 16, 2002, SPU entered into an agreement 
titled "Third Party Beneficiary Utility Agreement" with the 
Defendant Sunnyside Park Owners Association, Inc. (hereafter 
"SPOA") for SPU to provide water and sewer services to 
Defendant SPOA and its members. See Plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint, Ex. G. 
5. Miskin Scraper Works was not in 2002 and has never been a 
member of SPOA. See Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated May I, 
2008, para. 4. (Emphasis Added). 
6. Mr. Waters testified that "[i]n the early part of 2005, I 
began thinking about a new building for Printcraft Press. 
Printcraft had outgrown its facility on South Yellowstone in 
Idaho Falls and I was looking to build a bigger facility for 
the company." See Affidavit of Travis Waters, dated December 
5, 2007, para. 3. 
2 If the Court grants Summary Judgment to Sunnyside on Printcraft's 
Constructive Fraud causes of action, based upon the new evidence submitted in 
Response to Printcraft's Motions for Reconsideration, this Motion is moot. 
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7. Printcraft asserts that it made the decision to occupy a 
building in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
subdivision based upon " ... the sign, the plat map and the 
CC&Rs ... " See Affidavit of Travis Waters, dated August 2, 
2007, para. 19. 
8. The sign and the plat map allegedly informed Waters that the 
name of the subdivision was "Sunnyside Industrial and 
Professional Park." See Travis Waters Affidavit, dated August 
2, 2007, para. 16-17. 
9. The advertisement sign located near the entrance to the 
subdivision, was placed by KW Contractors, Inc. to advertise 
KW Contractor's building construction services in the 
subdivision. 
10. Prior to purchasing a lot from Miskin Scraper Works, 
Waters did discuss a potential purchase of Block 4, Lot 5 and 
Block I, Lot 10 with KW Contractors, Inc. See Deposition of 
Travis Waters, pg. 81, In. 15-25. 
11. However, neither Travis Waters, Printcraft or any 
entity related to Travis Waters ever purchased a lot in the 
subdivision from KW Contractors, Inc. See Affidavit of Kirk 
Woolf, dated May I, 2008, para. 6. 
12. Neither Travis Waters, Printcraft or any other entity 
related to Travis Waters ever purchased a lot in the 
subdivision from Sunnyside. Id. 
13. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, (hereafter 
"CCRs") referenced by Travis Waters do not even benefit Lot 
5, Block 1 of the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park 
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subdivision. See Affidavit of Travis Waters, para. 18, and 
Ex. H. (Note: The CCRs encumber and benefit only "Lots 6-10, 
Block Ii Lots 4-5, Block 2; Lots 1-7, Block 3; and Lots 1-8, 
Block 4" and do not affect Lot 5, Block 1 (the property now 
occupied by Printcraft), because Lots 3, 4, and 5 of Block 1 
were sold to Miskin Scraper Works, prior to the signing and 
recordation of any of the CCRs for the subdivision. See 
Second Amended Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 
attached to the Affidavit of Travis Waters, Ex. Hand 
Warranty Deed from SIPP to Miskin, attached to Plaintiff's 
Second Amended Complaint, Ex. H.) 
14. Prior to construction of the building on Lot 5, Block 
1, Printcraft entered into an agreement with the owner 
[either Waters Land and Cattle or CTR Development] to occupy 
the property after construction was completed. See Deposition 
of Travis Waters, pg. 87, In. 21-pg. 88, In. 5. See also 
Building Plans, attached as Exhibit 7 to the Deposition of 
Travis Waters. 
15. Travis Waters testified that the plans were drafted, 
showing Printcraft as a tenant, in early 2005. See Deposition 
of Travis Waters, pg. 89, In. 4-7. 
16. In September, 2005, months after Printcraft had already 
contracted to occupy the property, and prepared blueprints 
showing "Printcraft Press" as an occupant in the property, 
Waters met with Sunnyside and provided a copy of the 
blueprints of the building that CTR Development was 
constructing for Printcraft to occupy. See Affidavit of 
SPU'S AND SIPP'S OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO AMEND TO ALLEGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES - 6 
041 
Travis Waters, para. 20. 3 
17. During the September, 2005 meeting Waters told 
Sunnyside that Printcraft was going to occupy the building 
after construction was completed. See Affidavit of Travis 
waters, para. 21. 
18. Waters testified that he told Sunnyside "nothing" 
regarding what Printcraft intended to discharge into the 
sewer system. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 119, In. 
10-17. (Emphasis Added). 
19. Waters testified that Sunnyside did not promise any 
type of sewer services to Printcraft before Printcraft began 
occupancy_ See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 109, In. 25 
through pg. 110, In. 2. 
20. Waters acknowledged that Printcraft conducted no 
investigation regarding the services provided by SPU prior to 
Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See Waters 
Deposition, pg. 109, In. 20-24. 
21. Printcraft's brief asserts that "Beck and Woolf knew 
and understood the nature of Printcraft/s business" and cites 
to paragraph 22 of Waters' August 2, 2007 affidavit. See 
Plaintiff/s memorandum, pg. 5, para. 20. However, paragraph 
22 of Water's affidavit was stricken from the record by the 
Court's August 27, 2007 order, which held " .. . all statements 
not based upon personal knowledge in the Affidavits of Lane 
Erickson and Travis Waters are stricken from the record. 
3 Printcraft's brief asserts that the meeting occurred in "early 2005," 
however, Mr. Waters affidavit clearly states that the meeting occurred in 
"early September 2005." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 5. 
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Statements which are expressly based on the affiants' 
personal knowledge and the documents attached to the 
Affidavits are not stricken ... " See August 27, 2007 Order, 
para. 4. Mr. Waters has no way of knowing what Beck and Woolf 
understood. 
22. On or about September 12, 2005, CTR Development, LLC 
owned Block I, Lot 5 of the subdivision and paid a sewer 
connection fee in the amount of $1,800.00 and SPU allowed CTR 
Development to connect Block I, Lot 5 to SPU's sewer lines. 
See Second Amended Complaint para. 24(C) and 26. 
23. Waters testified that Printcraft had no involvement In 
the process of connection of the building to Sunnyside's 
sewer service. See Waters Deposition, pg. 105, In. 10-13. 
24. On or about January 23, 2006, CTR Development 
transferred Block I, Lot 5 to J&LB Properties. See 
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, para. 24(D). J&LB 
Properties is the current owner of Block I, Lot 5. 
25. On or about January 23, 2006, J&LB Properties entered 
into a written lease agreement with CTR Management, LLC for 
use of the building located on Block I, Lot 5. Id. Para. 26. 
26. On or after January 23, 2006, Printcraft entered into 
an oral month-to-month sub-lease agreement with CTR 
Management, wherein Printcraft agreed to sub-lease a portion 
of the building on Block I, Lot 5 from CTR Management. Id. 
para. 27. 
27. Printcraft occupied the building pursuant to the month-
to-month sublease agreement beginning in January of 2006. See 
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Second Amended Complaint, para. 27. See also Deposition of 
Travis Waters, pg. 103, In. 1-3. 
28. Printcraft was provided with sewer services without any 
limitation until September of 2006, when the parties entered 
into an agreement whereby Printcraft would cease discharging 
all substances Sunnyside classified as "processed waste" into 
the septic system. See Second Amended Complaint, para. 42-45. 
(para 42: "In this September 6, 2006 letter, the Defendants 
for the first time attempt to put the Plaintiff on notice 
that their intention was only to accept human waste and not 
handle any other types of discharges into the sewer system." 
(Emphasis Added)). 
29. On December 15, 2006 SPU severed the sewer connection 
to Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision. See Second Amended 
Complaint, para. 54. 
30. Bonneville County Planning and Zoning did not issue a 
"Certificate of Occupancy" allowing Printcraft, as a renter, 
to legally occupy the building until February I, 2007. See 
Certificate of Occupancy, dated February I, 2007, attached as 
Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated November 
21, 2007. See also Temporary Certificate of Occupancy, dated 
March 16, 2006, attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Kirk Woolf, dated February I, 2007. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PRINTCRAFT DOES NOT HAVE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF 
PREVAILING ON ITS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE 
FRAUD 
The Idaho Court of Appeals stated: " .. . punitive damages are 
MOTION 
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unavailable unless the plaintiff can show the invasion of a 
legally protected right ... the plaintiff must first be entitled to 
legal or equitable relief before punitive damages can be 
obtained.1! Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 308, 32 P.3d 695 
(Ida.App. 2001). The Court should only allow the amendment to 
allege punitive damages, if it concludes that Printcraft is 
reasonably likely to prove the facts necessary to support 
Printcraft's constructive fraud causes of action. 
The elements of actionable fraud or misrepresentation are as 
follows: 
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of 
its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the 
person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the 
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent 
and proximate injury. 
Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980). "Fraud 
may be established by silence where the defendant had a duty to 
speak.1! G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co. I 119 Idaho 514, 521 808 P.2d 
851 (1991). However, "[t]he absence of anyone of the elements is 
fatal to recovery. I! Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. I 141 Idaho 233, 
239, 108 P.3d 380 (2005) 
a. Duty to Disclose 
This Court previously addressed the "duty to disclose." See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, entered August 31, 2007. 4 The Court 
found that under Sowards v. Rathbun, there may be a duty to 
disclose: 
4 Printcraft has filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Part of the Court's 
August 31, 2007 Order, however, Printcraft's pending Motion for 
Reconsideration does not address the Constructive Fraud portion of the 
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(l)if there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust 
and confidence between the two parties; (2) in order to 
prevent a partial statement of facts from being misleading; 
or (3) if a fact known by one party and not the other is so 
vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be 
voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the 
other does not know it. BethlahmYI supra. 
134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). 
The Court then found that Printcraft had not established any 
evidence to satisfy the first two prongs of Sowards. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 14. The Court found that there 
was an issue of material fact regarding the third prong. Id. The 
third prong requires proof of two elements: (a) a contract between 
two parties; and (b) a fact known by one of the parties and not by 
other which would make the contract voidable. 
A. Contract between the parties 
This court previously found that a contract was entered into 
between the parties in approximately September of 2006. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, dated April 23, 2008. See also 
Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31, 2007, pg. 5-6. 
None of the contracts which have been alleged prior to 
September, 2006 included both Sunnyside and Printcraft as the two 
contracting parties. A contract was entered into between SIPP and 
Miskin Scraper Works. See Second Amended Complaint I para. 24(A). A 
contract was entered into between Miskin Scraper Works and Waters 
Land and Cattle. Id. para. 24(B) A contract was entered into 
between Waters Land and Cattle and CTR Development. Id. para. 
24(C). A contract was entered into between Printcraft and either 
Waters Land and Cattle or CTR Development. See Deposition of 
decision. 
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Travis Waters, pg. 87, In. 21 through pg. 88, In. 5. A contract 
was entered into by SPU and SPOA, to which Printcraft was a 
beneficiary, but not a contracting party. See Second Amended 
Complaint, para. 18. A contract was entered into between CTR 
Development and Sunnyside, to which Printcraft was arguably a 
beneficiary, but clearly not a contracting party. See Second 
Amended Complaint, para. 26. Printcraft entered into an oral 
month-to-month contract with CTR Management. Id. para. 27. The 
only contract involving the parties in this litigation was the 
September, 2006 agreement entered into between Printcraft and 
Sunnyside. See Second Amended Complaint, para. 45. 
B. Printcraft had knowledge in September of 2006 
The Court's decision focused on two specific disputed 
material facts: (1) "_~aters testified that [sic] Woolf and/or 
Beck understood the nature of the business and its need for a 
septic connection_in and (2) "Waters further testified that he did 
not know the limitations of the septic system." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, dated August 31, 2007, pg. 14-15. 
It is clear that by the time the parties entered into the 
September 2006 agreement, Waters did know the limitations of the 
septic system. As Sunnyside indicated in its Response to Motion 
for Reconsideration, additional information was disclosed by 
Printcraft after the Court made its decision on August 31, 2007. 
On October 26, 2007, Printcraft admitted that: "In June of 2006 
Doyle Beck told Travis Waters what kind of system was being 
operated by the defendants." See Plaintiff's Responses to 
Defendant's First and Second Sets of Interrogatories, Requests for 
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Production and Requests for Admission, No. 59, Attached the 
Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, Exhibit B. In addition, Printcraft 
admitted that: "In June of 2006 Doyle Beck told Travis Waters the 
capacity of the sewer system." Id. No. 60. Printcraft had received 
a copy of the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and Sunnyside 
Utilities' Rules and Regulations for sewer service. See Second 
Amended Complaint, para. 44. Printcraft's attorney acknowledged 
that Printcraft was aware of the ongoing negotiations with DEQ. 
See Letter of Lane Erickson, dated September 26, 2006, attached as 
Exhibit U to the Second Amended Complaint. Travis Waters also 
acknowledged that he knew District Seven had concerns in July or 
August of 2006. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 204, In. 14 
through pg. 205, In. 2. Based on these facts, Printcraft does not 
have a reasonable likelihood of proving that it did not know the 
limitations, the type of system, the existence of the Rules and 
Regulations, or that there were issues with D7HD and DEQ, when it 
entered into the agreement in September of 2006. 
Even if the Court looks at the state of the facts prior to 
Printcraft's occupancy of the building, the evidence, when 
weighed, clearly suggests that Sunnyside did not know the true 
nature of Printcraft's business or the types of substances 
Printcraft intended to discharge. The pending Motion to Amend does 
not require the Court to construe the facts liberally in favor of 
Printcraft, it requires the Court to weigh the evidence and 
determine if Printcraft has a reasonably likelihood of proving 
that Sunnyside "knew the nature of Printcraft's business and the 
types of substances it would discharge into the system." See 
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Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000); See 
also Idaho Code §6-1604(2) 
The only evidence Printcraft has presented showing that 
Sunnyside knew the nature of Printcraft's business and the types 
of substances it would discharge into the system, is that Travis 
Waters disclosed the name "Printcraft Press" to Sunnyside. See 
Affidavit of Travis Waters, para. 21, and Exhibit K to the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
There is significantly more evidence that establishes that 
Sunnyside did not know the nature of Printcraft's business, and 
especially that Sunnyside did not know the types of substances 
Printcraft would discharge into the system. Even according to 
Travis Waters, Printcraft did not tell Sunnyside what was to be 
discharged into Sunnyside'S system. Travis Waters' deposition 
testimony establishes that fact: 
Q. [Mark Fuller] Did Printcraft inform Sunnyside about the 
types and quantities of waste Printcraft intended to 
discharge into Sunnyside'S septic system? 
A. [Travis Waters] No. 
Q. What was Sunnyside told by Printcraft, if anything, would 
be discharged? 
A. Nothing. 
Travis waters deposition, pg. 119, In. 10-17. In addition Travis 
Waters testified as follows: 
Q. [Fuller] Did Printcraft ever identify to Sunnyside any of 
the chemicals that were being discharged into Sunnyside'S 
sewer service prior to disconnection? 
A. [Waters] In Printcraft's history, I don't remember ever 
telling the City of Idaho Falls, our own septic system, or 
anything, or Sunnyside what was going down the drain. 
Id. Pg. 165, In. 21 through pg. 166, In. 3. The blueprints that 
Travis Waters provided to Sunnyside also do not disclose any 
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information about the nature of Printcraft's business or the types 
of substances Printcraft planned to discharge. See Blueprints, 
attached as Exhibit K to Printcraft's Second Amended Complaint. A 
close examination of the blueprints shows three small sinks and 
two toilets. Id. There is no disclosure on the plans of the 
reverse osmosis system, the water softener system, the L-Shaped 
sink in which Printcraft discharged hundreds of colors of inks 
(see Waters Deposition, pg. 74, In. 25 through pg. 76, In. 12; Ex. 
3, pg. 2 pics A, B, C and D), or any of the machines which 
discharged chemicals into the septic system. 
Doyle Beck's testimony confirms that Sunnyside did not know 
what Printcraft was putting into the septic system as a result of 
misrepresentations by Travis Waters. See Deposition of Doyle Beck, 
pg. lOS, In. 6 through pg. 107, In. 22. Doyle Beck testified as 
follows: 
Q. [Lane Erickson] Did you inquire about the processes that 
he used in his building? 
A. [Doyle Beck] I didn't know that he had any processes. 
Id. Pg. 107, In. 15-18. Notably, Travis Waters continues to 
characterize Printcraft's sewage as limited to "domestic" even 
after Sunnyside disconnected Printcraft from Sunnyside's septic 
system. See City of Idaho Falls, Septage Hauler Chain of Custody, 
dated September 4, 2007, attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of 
Mark R. Fuller, dated May I, 2008. This is likely because the City 
of Idaho Falls "Industrial Wastewater Acceptance" agreement states 
that: "Domestic sewage is the only septage which will be 
accepted." See City of Idaho Falls, Industrial Pretreatment 
Program, attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, 
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dated May 1, 2008. Even the City of Idaho Falls "Industrial 
Pretreatment Program ll doesn't accept Printcraft's industrial 
wastes. Id. The Idaho Deputy Attorney General for DEQ also 
confirms that Printcraft cannot discharge its industrial wastes 
into a subsurface disposal system. See Letter of Courtney Beebee, 
dated April 11, 2008, attached to the Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, 
Exhibit E. 
In order to find in Printcraft's favor, the Court must find 
that in order to obtain $15.00 a month (See Deposition of Doyle 
Beck, pg. 338-339), Sunnyside was knowingly prepared to incur 
criminal penalties including a misdemeanor charge and fines of 
$10,000 per occurrence or $1,000 per day for continuing 
occurrences from violations of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03 and that 
Sunnyside was willing to allow its sewer system to overflow and 
fail by Printcraft's discharge of thousands of gallons of reverse 
osmosis water, water softener brine, hazardous chemicals, and 
other substances that were harmful to Sunnyside's septic system. 
Such a finding is clearly not reasonable. 
While Printcraft put forth a small amount of evidence, which 
the Court previously found sufficient for Printcraft to "survive" 
summary judgment, that evidence alone, is not nearly sufficient to 
establish that Printcraft has a reasonable likelihood of proving a 
duty to disclose by Sunnyside at trial. The evidence regarding a 
duty to disclose, when weighed without the benefit of a liberal 
construction and all reasonable inferences drawn in Printcraft's 
favor, clearly establishes the tenuous nature of Printcraft's 
causes of action for constructive fraud. Printcraft's motion to 
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amend should be denied because Printcraft is not reasonably likely 
to prove a duty to disclose. 
b. Lack of Reliance and Materiality 
Printcraft must establish that it relied upon the alleged 
non-disclosures of Sunnyside and that the non-disclosures were 
material to Printcraft's decision to occupy the building. Faw v. 
Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980). While there 
is an issue of material fact regarding whether or not Printcraft 
relied on the alleged non-disclosures (see Order, dated December 
26, 2007), Printcraft has not established a reasonable likelihood 
of proving reliance or materiality at trial. 
The evidence clearly indicates that Printcraft made its 
decision to cease doing business at its previous location and move 
into the building located at Block 1, Lot 5 of the subdivision 
independent of, and prior tO I any interaction between Sunnyside 
and Printcraft regarding sewer services. 
Printcraft asserts that "Printcraft relied upon the 
description of the subdivision, the plat map, and the CCRs in 
deciding that the SIPP subdivision would be an ideal location for 
Printcraft's business." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 5. 
However, the information that Printcraft allegedly got from the 
sign and the plat map was simply the name of the subdivision. See 
Affidavit of Travis Waters, para. 16-17. The sign was KH Woolf 
Development's sign for KW Contractors, Inc. services to construct 
buildings in the subdivision. See Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated 
May If 2008, para. 5. Waters acknowledged that his only contact 
with any of the defendants prior to his purchase of property from 
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Miskin Scraper Works was directly with Mr. Woolf. See Deposition 
of Travis Waters, pg. 81, In. 8-22. Mr. Waters also testified that 
he discussed Block 4, Lot 5 and Block 1, Lot 10 with Mr. Woolf. 
See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 81, In. 15-25. However, Water 
did not purchase any of the lots he discussed with Mr. Woolf. See 
Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated May 1, 2008, para. 6. The CCRs 
referenced by Printcraft do not even cover the lot Waters 
purchased from Miskin. See Second Amended Covenants, Conditions, 
and Restrictions, attached as Exhibit H to the August 2, 2007 
Affidavit of Travis Waters. 
Waters testified in his deposition that it was Miskin Scraper 
Works, not Sunnyside, that represented that Lot 5, Block 1 came 
with water, sewer and county taxes. See Deposition of Travis 
Waters, pg. 79, In. 3-21. Mr. Waters also testified as follows: 
Q. [Mark Fuller] Did Mark Miskin represent to you that the 
property he was selling you had sewer service in place? 
A. [Travis Waters] Yes. 
Q. Prior to your purchase of the property were any 
representations regarding sewer service made to you by any 
representative of Sunnyside Park Utilities? 
A. Can you read that? 
(The record was read.) 
THE WITNESS: Prior to me purchasing, no. 
See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 80, In. 21 through pg. 81, 
In. 14. If Miskin Scraper Works had additional information that 
Printcraft did not have, when that contract was entered into, 
Miskin Scraper works might have a duty to disclose. However, 
Sunnyside cannot be held liable for any alleged non-disclosures by 
of Miskin Scraper Works. 
In addition, Waters acknowledged that Sunnyside did not 
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promise any type of sewer services to Printcraft before Printcraft 
began occupancy of the building. See Deposition of Travis Waters, 
pg. 109, In. 25 through pg. 110, In. 2. Waters also testified that 
Printcraft did no investigation regarding the services provided by 
Sunnyside prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. Id. Pg. 
109, In. 20-24. 
Prior to construction of the building on Lot 5, Block I, 
Printcraft entered into an agreement with the owner to occupy the 
property after construction was completed. See Deposition of 
Travis Waters, pg. 87, In. 21 through pg. 88, In. 5. This 
agreement necessarily would have been entered into prior to early 
2005, when the plans showing "Printcraft Press" as a tenant, were 
created. See Building Plans, attached as Exhibit 7 to the 
Deposition of Travis Waters. See also Waters Deposition, pg. 89, 
In. 4-7. 
Because Sunnyside did not make any representations regarding 
the sewer services to Printcraft, or any promises regarding sewer 
services to Printcraft before Printcraft entered into an agreement 
to occupy the building, Printcraft could not have relied upon any 
non-disclosures from Sunnyside in making the decision to close 
down its business on South Yellowstone, in early 2005, and move to 
Block I, Lot 5 of the subdivision. This is especially true where 
Travis Waters testified that Miskin Scraper Works, who is not a 
party to this lawsuit, was the entity which Printcraft claims 
represented that Block 1, Lot 5 already had sewer services. 
Because Printcraft does not have a reasonable likelihood of 
proving reliance or materiality at trial, the Court should deny 
MOTION 
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Printcraft's motion to amend. 
c. Justifiable Reliance 
Even if the Court concludes that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that Printcraft can establish a duty to disclose by 
Sunnyside, reliance by Printcraft, and materiality, Printcraft 
should not be allowed to amend its Complaint because the alleged 
reliance was not justifiable. Consideration of justifiable 
reliance is relevant in deciding whether or not Printcraft is 
reasonably likely to prevail on its fraud cause of action, because 
" ... occupation of the property without an occupancy permit 1S 
simply evidence which may have an affect on whether reliance was 
justified ... " See Order, dated December 26, 2007. 
Sunnyside has established that no Certificate of Occupancy 
had been issued for the building when Printcraft occupied the 
building. See Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated November 21, 2007. 
Black's law dictionary defines "Justifiable" as: "Rightful; 
defensible; warranted or sanctioned by law; that which can be 
shown to be sustained by law; as justifiable homicide." See 
Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968). 
There is no dispute that Printcraft moved its operations into 
and began using the subject property in January of 2006. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 57, In. 24-25. There is also no 
dispute that when Printcraft began using the property, no 
certificate of occupancy had been obtained allowing Printcraft to 
lawfully occupy and use the building. See Printcraft's Responses 
to Requests for Admissions No. 12 and 14, previously filed. Under 
the International Building Code, Printcraft's occupancy and use of 
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the building was unlawful. See International Building Code 2003, 
section 110.1 and 113.1, attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of 
Kirk Woolf, dated November 21, 2007. Printcraft's occupancy of the 
building was not sanctioned by law and was not therefore 
justifiable. 
The Court should deny Printcraft's Motion to Amend because 
Printcraft is not reasonably likely to prove that its occupancy of 
the building was justifiable, when such occupancy was specifically 
prohibited by law. 
d. Damages 
Printcraft has not suffered any damages which were 
proximately caused by any alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside. In 
order to establish fraud, Printcraft must prove that the non-
disclosure proximately caused Printcraft's alleged injuries. 
Edmark Motors, Inc. v . Twin Cities Toyota, III Idaho 846, 848, 
727 P.2d 1274 (Ida.App.1986). \\ [P]roximate cause refers to the 
causal link between the plaintiff's act of reliance and his 
subsequent injury. If Id. 
Printcraft's Memorandum does not set forth any evidence 
regarding damages it allegedly suffered. Most of Printcraft's 
damage evidence, obtained by Sunnyside through discovery, relates 
to costs of hauling sewer to the City of Idaho Falls, alleged lost 
profits after Sunnyside disconnected the sewer services, and costs 
to obtain alternative sewer services as a result of the December, 
2006 disconnection of the sewer services. See Excerpts of Report 
of David Smith, attached to the Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, dated 
May I, 2008, Exhibit F. Printcraft's own breach of the contract 
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entered into with Sunnyside in September of 2006, breaks the chain 
of causation for any damages caused by the December, 2006 
disconnection of the sewer service. This Court found that there 
was at least an implied-in-fact contract which was breached by 
Printcraft's illegal discharges. See Memorandum Decision and 
Order, entered April 23, 200B. If Printcraft had not breached that 
agreement, none of Printcraft's alleged damages arising from the 
sewer disconnection would have ever occurred, as Printcraft would 
still be receiving sewer services under that agreement. 
Printcraft's only other alleged damages are costs Printcraft 
incurred to move into the building and to cease operating at its 
previous location. See Affidavit of Travis Waters, dated December 
5, 2007, para. 16. However, Mr. Waters' affidavit fails to set 
forth any specific evidence of the alleged damages. Based only on 
Mr. Waters' affidavit, there is not sufficient evidence for the 
Court to conclude that Printcraft is reasonably likely to prevail 
at trial. 
Printcraft simply does not have a reasonable likelihood of 
proving any damages which were proximately caused or recoverable 
as a result of the alleged non-disclosures by Sunnyside. 
II. PRINTCRAFT HAS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF A BUSINESS 
SCHEME FOR PROFIT 
Printcraft states in its brief that "[e]xemplary damage 
awards are appropriate when the defendant is engaged in deceptive 
business practices operated for a profit posing a danger to the 
general public." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. B. (Emphasis 
Added). Printcraft also claims that the facts in Umphrey v. 
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Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 710, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983), where the 
Court found the defendants were operating a "deceptive business 
practice" which was operated for a profit, are similar to the 
facts in this case. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 9. However, 
the cases referenced by Printcraft are easily distinguishable 
because in this case there is no dispute that Sunnyside was not 
operating the septic system to generate a profit. 
SPU only received approximately $15.00 a month from 
Printcraft, for Printcraft's use of the septic system during the 
time Printcraft was connected to the septic system. See Deposition 
of Doyle Beck, pg. 338, In. 24 through pg. 339, In. 3. 
Furthermore, while Printcraft claims "the SIPP lots were 
advertised as possessing adequate sewer and water for industrial 
and commercial purposes," Printcraft does not establish or allege 
that Sunnyside was responsible for such advertisements. Instead KW 
Contractors, Inc., advertised its own building construction 
services with the sign, however, neither Printcraft Press, nor any 
Travis Waters related entities purchased anything from KH Woolf 
Development. See Affidavit of Kirk Woolf, dated May 1, 2008, para. 
6. Printcraft did assert that Miskin Scraper Works advertised 
Block 1, Lot 5 as having sewer and water, but Printcraft has not 
asserted or proved that Miskin Scraper Works is in any way related 
to Sunnyside. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 79, In. 3-11. 
Instead, Waters acknowledged that Sunnyside never represented 
anything to him prior to his purchase of Block 1, Lot 5, and that 
Sunnyside never promised to provide Printcraft with any type of 
sewer services prior to Printcraft's occupancy of the building. 
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See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 81, In. 8-14. These facts 
clearly distinguish the current litigation from the facts in 
Umphrey, and establish that Printcraft is not entitled to punitive 
damages because there was no "deceptive business scheme operated 
for a profit" by Sunnyside. 
III. VIOLATONS OF IDAPA ALLEGED BY PRINTCRAFT 
Printcraft included various alleged statements from Kellye 
Eager, of the Eastern Idaho Public Health district in its 
statement of facts, however, Printcraft does not address how those 
statements are relevant to its Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive 
damages. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 7-8. 
According to Printcraft, Mrs. Eager's testimony was that the 
septic system has a capacity problem because there are eleven 
buildings connected to the system. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 
7, para. 35 and 36. However, Mrs. Eager also testified that she 
doesn't actually know what any of the resulting flows from any of 
the buildings connected to SPU's septic system are. See Deposition 
of Kellye Eager, taken April 23, 2008 (transcript in preparation) . 
Mrs. Eager also testified that, in her opinion, the septic 
system violated several IDAPA provisions including its location in 
a pit, that it could be flooded in the event of a major snow melt, 
the connection of the third building, etc. See Plaintiff's 
Memorandum, pg. 7-8. However, when asked to identify which 
specific IDAPA provisions she was referring to, Mrs. Eager was 
unable identify even one violation of a specific regulation. See 
Deposition of Kellye Eager, taken April 23, 2008 (transcript in 
preparation). Likewise, Printcraft has failed to identify any 
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specific provision of IDAPA which Sunnyside violated. See 
Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
Printcraft has not established any violation of IDAPA 
provisions by Sunnyside. The only IDAPA violations occurred when 
Printcraft discharged its water softener brine, hazardous wastes, 
inks, chemicals, and excessive flows of water into the septic 
system. See Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31, 2007, 
pg. 5. Therefore, the Court should deny Printcraft' s motion to 
amend to include a prayer for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Printcraft is not entitled to amend its Complaint to include 
a prayer for punitive damages because Printcraft does not have a 
reasonable likelihood of proving its constructive fraud causes of 
action at trial. Printcraft has not set forth sufficient evidence 
to establish that Sunnyside had a duty to disclose any information 
to Printcraft. Printcraft has not set forth sufficient evidence to 
establish that it actually relied on any alleged non-disclosures 
from Sunnyside. Printcraft has not set forth sufficient evidence 
to establish that any alleged reliance was justified, because of 
Printcraft's lack of a Certificate of Occupancy. In addition, 
Printcraft has not set forth sufficient evidence to establish that 
any recoverable damages were suffered. 
Unlike the cases cited by Printcraft, there is no evidence 
that Sunnyside was involved in a "deceptive business scheme" 
operated by Sunnyside in order to reap profits from the unknowing 
public. Finally, other than violations caused by Printcraft's own 
misfeasance, Printcraft has not established evidence of any 
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violations of IDAPA. 
Sunnyside respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Printcraft's Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive Damages. 
DATED this I day of May, 2008. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
below on this I day of May, 2008: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
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county of Bonneville) 
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) AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK WOOLF IN 
) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) MOTION TO AMEND TO ALLEGE 













Kirk Woolf, being first duly sworn upon his oath states and 
alleges as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident of Bingham County, State of Idaho 
and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge. 
2. Affiant is an officer of Sunnyside Park Utilities, 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK WOOLF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND TO ALLEGE PUNITIVE DAMAGES - 1 
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Inc. , Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC, and 
Sunnyside Park Owners Association, LLC. 
3. Affiant is an officer of KW Contractors, Inc. 
4. Miskin Scraper Works, Inc. was not in 2002, and never has 
been, a member of Sunnyside Park Owners Association, LLC. 
5. The advertisement sign located near the entrance to the 
subdi vision, was placed by KW Contractors, Inc. to advertise KW 
Contractor's building construction services in the subdivision. 
6. Neither Travis Waters, Printcraft Press, or any other 
entity owned or operated by Travis Waters ever purchased a lot in 
the subdivision from KW Contractors, Inc., Sunnyside Industrial 
and Professional Park, LLC, Sunnyside Park Owners Association, 
Inc., Sunnyside Park Owners Association, Inc. or Kirk Woolf. 
7. Further this Affiant sayeth naught. 
/5~ 
DATED this ~ay of May, 2008. , 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me 
2008. 
Not~ry Public efo~ I~aho{ 
Resldlng at: "<J;-d4hJ f-I}/ > 
My Commission Expir!=~:"O'~':'u9-J9 
this day of May, 
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INC., an Idaho 
SUNNYSIDE 
AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK 
WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS 





























Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUMMONS 
NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED COUNTERCLAIMANT. 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
SUMMONS - 1 
TO: TRAVIS WATERS 
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, 
an appropriate written response must be filed with the above 
designated court within 20 days after service of this Summons on 
you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter judgment 
against you as demanded by the Counterclaimant in the 
Counterclaim. 
A copy of the Counterclaim is served with this Summons. If 
you wish to seek the advice or representation by an attorney in 
this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights 
protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule 
10 (a) (1) and other Idaho Rules of civil Procedure and shall also 
include: 
1. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Counterclaim, it must 
contain admissions or denials of the separate allegations of 
the Counterclaim and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the 
signature, mailing address and telephone number of your 
attorney. 
4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to 
counterclaimant's attorney, as designated above. 
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your 
response, contact the Clerk of the above-named court. 
DATED this day of , 2008. 
---'-""-+-'--'--"+-----
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMONS - 2 
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698) 
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237) 
FULLER & CARR 
41 0 ME~J!ORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201 
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IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935 
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INC., an Idaho 
SUNNYSIDE 
AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability corporation, DOYLE 
BECK, an individual, and KIRK 
WOOLF, an individual. 
Defendants. 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation. 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MARK FULLER IN 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville) 
Mark R. Fuller, being first duly sworn upon his oath states 
and alleges as follows: 
1. Affiant is a resident of Bonneville County I State of 
Idaho and executes this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge. 
2. Affiant is over the age of 18 and is competent to 
testify. 
3. Affiant is an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho 
and is counsel for the Defendant Sunnyside Park utilities, Inc. 
and Defendant Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park, LLC. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct 
copies of excerpts from the Deposition of Printcraft Press, 
Testimony of Travis Waters, dated April 25, 2007, including pgs. 
5 7, 74 - 76 , 7 9 - 81, 8 7 - 8 9 , 103 flO 5 , 10 9 - 111, 119, 2 04, Ex . 3, pg. 
2, and Ex. 7. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct 
copies of Plaintiff's Responses to Requests for Admissions No. 59 
and 60. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy 
of the City of Idaho Falls, Septage Hauler Chain of Custody, dated 
September 4, 2007, which was obtained from the City of Idaho 
Falls, pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum served on the City of 
Idaho Falls on November 6, 2007. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy 
AFFID~ .. YJ~ OF MARK FULLER IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
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of the City of Idaho Falls, Industrial Pretreatment Program, 
Industrial Wastewater Acceptance, Septage Hauler Permit, dated 
June 21, 2007, which was obtained from the City of Idaho Falls, 
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum served on the City of Idaho 
Falls on November 6, 2007. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy 
of a Letter from Courtney Beebee, Deputy Attorney General for the 
state of Idaho, dated April 11, 2008, which was obtained from 
Kellye Eager pursuant to subpoena at her deposition on April 23, 
2008. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit F are true and correct 
copies of excerpts from the Report of David Smith, dated April 11, 
2008, pgs. 8-9. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit G are true and correct 
copies of excerpts of the Deposition of Doyle Beck, dated May 30, 
2007, including pgs. 105-107, and 338-339. 
11. Further this Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this day of May, 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of May, 
200~. \! . 
J • , 
"l~~"". l /,~~ ,/ ',' '.'/-1 
. ~ t l,.\.:: !/ Z CL"· (6 
Notary Jiublic for~daho 
Residing at: Rigby 
My Commission Expires: 06-28-2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
below on this I day of May, 2008: 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq. 
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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DEPOSITION OF TRAVIS WATERS 
Wednesday, April 25, 2007, 9:00 a.m. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Rebecca M. Martin, 
CSR 
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April 25, 2007 
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Deposition of: Travis Waters April 25, 2007 
Page 54 
1 A. I did, Crystal Water. 
2 Q. Is that an individual or the name of the 
3 company? 
4 A. Name of the company. 
5 Q. Crystal Water? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Are they here in Idaho Falls? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Do you know what happened to your old 
10 system? 
11 A. I still have it. 
12 Q. Why? 
13 A. Because it's mine. 
14 Q. Does it function? Is it still connected 
15 to the service somehow? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Did Crystal Water provide the new system 
18 that's been installed? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. You've requested a spec sheet from them 
21 to get infonnation from them about that machine? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Does the new machine consume less 
24 than the old machine? 
25 A. Yes. 
Page 55 
1 Q. You'd indicated that the old machine 
2 consumed about eight gallons of water to produce one 
3 gallon of reverse osmosis water? 
4 A. Con·ect. 
5 Q. How many gallons offresh water does the 
6 new machine use to produce a gall on of reverse 
7 osmosis water? 
8 A. Less than eight to one. 
9 Q. Do you know what that ratio is? 
10 A. I don't. 
11 Q. Who would know? 
12 A. Oystal Water. 
13 Q. Is there a specific individual at 
14 Crystal Water who could provide that infonnation? 
15 A. Joe Blakely. 
16 Q. Was Mr. Blakely the individual who 
17 actually did the switch-out? 
18 A. I believe so. 
19 Q. You were refening to some document. Do 
20 you have a spec sheet on the new machine? 
21 A. No. I requested it, but I don't have 
22 it. 
23 Q. Will you provide a copy of that to your 
24 attorney? 




















































Q. You don't know the name of the old 
system? 
A. I still have it, as I mentioned. I can 
get it for you. 
Q. The new system you think is a General 
Electric. Do you know anything more about the 
identification than that? I 
A. I don't. I looked at it briefly. It !j 
had a snazzy name, and it had GE's logo on it. h 
Q. Looking at picture D on page 1 of 
Exhibit *-003, can you identifY for me how the , 
plumbing has been changed with the installation of !, 
the new system? Have all of these lines been Ii 
eliminated? I'm still looking at picture D here. 
You said this machine no longer is installed; is that 
correct? iJ 
A. That's correct. The new machine, of 
course, has the same, an inlet, an outlet, an RO 
outlet. The plumbing is basically the same. I think 
your question is where does it go, does it go down 
the drain or outside. It goes outside. 
Q. Looking in this upper right hand comer 
of picture D on page 1 of Exhibit *-003, you said 
that it goes to a T and then goes straight up. Do 
you see where I'm referring to? 
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I~ A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Just to the right of that is a valve. 
What is the purpose for that valve? 
A. Basically, it's a secondary way to let 
that water out. Currently, we don't have that in 
place. 
Q. Was there previously a drain connected 
to that valve going into the sewer system? 
A. No. 
Q. That valve has never been utilized? 
A. No. 
Q. The reverse osmosis system puts out 
water while it's working; am I correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. It clarifies the water; would you agree 
with that? What word would you use to describe what 
I;' 
it does? Ii 
A. It takes water and filters it and takes 1 
the pure water out. 
Q. Did that reverse osmosis equipment ever 
drain into the sewer system? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? During what time period? 
A. From when we moved in in January, 
February of '06, until Mr. Beck asked me to drain it 
15 (Pages 54 to 57) 
! 
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1 A. The water that flows into the sink is 
2 pure. it's clean. 
3 Q. My question is, when it drains out the 
4 bottom, having been utilized to wash parts, is there 
5 any treatment of the discharge from that sink before 
6 it goes into the septic system? 
7 A. No. Evelything that goes down that sink 
8 is environmentally friendly. I'll provide those MSDS 
9 sheets for you this afternoon. 
10 Q. Who has access to that sink, all of your 
11 employees? 
12 A. It's not in a secure --
13 Q. It's open to anybody who wants to come 
14 in? 
15 A. Not necessarily, but it's not a secured 
16 area. 
17 Q. It's not locked in a room anywhere? 
18 A. Right. You don't need a secure access 
19 to get there. 







Q. Only the flexo press? 
A. Only the flexo press. 
Q. Look down at picture C on that same 
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1 page. I assume that the sink in the upper right hand 
2 comer of picture C is the same sink in the upper 
3 right hand corner of picture A? 
4 A. That sink is one unit. It's an L-shaped 
5 unit. 
6 Q. It is cormected to the part on the left 
7 of picture C? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. How do they flow together, or is it just 
10 one big sink? 
11 A. Yeah. It's much like a kitchen sink 
12 that has a left and right hand side, and they come 
13 down to P-trap and come into a drain. 
14 Q. Actually, both sides drain. It looks 
15 like there's another drain in the left hand side of 
16 picture C? 
1 7 A. Yeah, they both drain. 
18 Q. Do I understand that those ink sinks do 
19 not go in the sewer? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. They go directly into the sewer? 
22 A. Correct. 
23 Q. Is picture D a picture of the interior 
24 of that sink? 
2 5 A. As near as I can tell. 
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1 Q. The picture that you have is primarily 
2 red; is that correct? 
3 A. No. It's primarily gray. 
4 Q. May I see the color picture for just a 
5 minute? I'm looking at what's in the bottom of that 
6 sink. It looks to me like it's been used to wash red 
7 colored ink. 
8 A. You said. primarily the picture is red. 
9 Primarily, the majority of that picture is gray. 
10 Q. Let me restate the question. How many 
11 different color inks do you wash? 
12 A. Hundreds. 
13 Q. Are you planning to bring me MSDS sheets 
14 on the ink as well? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 1-'IR. FULLER: Let's take a break for just a 
17 minute. 
18 (A break was taken from 11 :02 a.m. to 
19 11:17 a.m.) 
2 0 Q. BY rvIR. FULLER: Can you identify for me .i 
21 who constructed the building that Printcraft Press 
22 now occupies? 
23 A. CTR Development. 
24 Q. When was it built? 
25 A. '05, '06. 
Page 77 R 
1 Q. What is your involvement with CTR, 
2 personally? 
3 A. It's an LLC, and I'm a manager, member I 
4 should say, managing member. 
5 Q. Who are the other members of CTR 
6 Development? 
7 A. There's one other member, and that's 
8 Lawry Wilde. 
9 Q. His last name is spelled. W-i-l-d-e? 
10 A. Uh-huh. 
11 Q. Did you seek approval from the 
12 architectural control committee of the Sunnyside 
13 Industrial and Professional Park before you 
14 constructed the building Printcraft Press now 
15 occupies? 
16 A. Yes. I accessed the committee through 
1 7 Doyle Beck. I never did meet with the committee in 
18 whole. 
19 Q. \\Tho did you meet with? 
2 0 A. Doyle Beck. 
21 Q. Anyone else? 
22 A. No. !f 
23 Q. Did you have any discussions with iJ 
24 Mr. Beck regarding the anticipated water usage of the 
2 5 building? 
tntreport@ida.net T&T Reporting 

























































Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Beck the 
parameters of the building that you intended to 
construct. the size? 
A. Yes. I provided blueprints. 
Q. \\lho was the owner of the real estate, 
the dilt, at the time the building was constructed? 
A. Waters Land and Cattle bought the 
propelty from Miskin Scraper Works and then at some 
point did a quitclaim to CTR. I don't know the 
dates. 
Q. Who is Waters Land and Cattle Company? 
A. That's a company that my wife and I own. 
Q. Miskin owned the dirt, and it was sold 
to Waters Land and Cattle, and then it was sold to 
CTR? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Ihen it's been sold to somebody else 
since then. Who now owns the property? 
A. J&LB Properties. 
Q. Who acted on behalf of Waters Land and 
Cattle in negotiating the purchase of the property 
from Miskin Scraper Works? 
A. Myself. 



























Q. They were running from what facilities? 
A. Sunnyside Utilities. 
Q. Did you view those connection lines 
yourself? 
A. At that time? 
Q. At the time of purchase. 
A. No. I viewed the markers marking them. 
Q. How do you know that they were there? 
A. There were markers marking them. 
Q. Describe those for me. 
A. I think they were green fence posts or 
two-by-fours, one ofthe two. 
Q. What do you recall seeing? Those are 
distinctly different markers. I want to know what 
you recall. 
A. I don't recall. I just remember 
markers. 
Q. What did Mr. Miskin tell you was the 
service already in place? 
A. I don't remember asking or him saying. 
Q. Let me be very specific. Did Mark 
Miskin represent to you that the property he was 
selling you had sewer service in place? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
Page 79 Page 81 
Miskin? 1 A. I don't recall. 
A. Mark Miskin. 2 Q. Did Mark Miskin represent to you that 
Q. Were any promises or representations 3 the propelty he was selling you had water service in 
made to Waters Land and Cattle Company by Miskin 4 place? 
Scraper Works prior to the purchase of the real 5 A. Yes. 
property with regard to water or utility access? 6 Q. What did he say? 
A. Can you read that? 7 A. I don't recall. 
(The record was read.) 8 Q. Prior to your purchase of the property, 
TIlE \\lITNESS: It was represented with water, 9 were any representations regarding sewer service made 
sewer, and county taxes, just like the sign out there 10 to you by any representative of Sunnyside Park 
on the street. 11 Utilities? 
Q. BY MR. FULLER: What sign? 12 A. Can you read that? 
A. 111e Sunnyside Industrial Park sign. 13 (The record was read.) 
Q. Did Miskin agree to provide you with 14 THE WITNESS: Prior to me purchasing, no. 
utilities? 15 Q. BY MR. FULLER: You hadn't had any 
A. Miskin agreed to seIl me a lot that had 16 discussions with Mr. Wolf or Mr. Beck regarding sewer 
utilities with it. 17 or water service? 
Q. Did the lot have utilities at the time 18 A. I discussed the lots in general with 
you purchased it? Were there any services on the lot 19 Mr. Wolf because I was looking at buying some 
at the date of purchase? 20 property from him in there where it was discussed 
A. Yes. 21 that they had sewer, they had water, and they had 
Q. Describe that for me. 22 county taxes. 
A. There was, I think, a one inch or inch 23 Q. What other parcels were you looking at 
and a half poly line feeding the east side, as well 24 within the subdivision? 
as a four inch sewer line feeding the east side. 25 A. Block 4 Lot 5 and Block 1 Lot 10. 
" 
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this acquired with your participation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It actually says down here the 
contractor is Teton West and Travis Waters. Can you 
indicate for me what was your personal involvement as 
a contractor? TIle previous certificate of occupancy, 
the temporary one just showed Teton West. Why is 
your name on Exhibit *-006? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Were you a contractor involved in the 
construction of this building? 
A. No. 
Q. It also shows the owner as being 
Printcraft Press and Waters Land and Cattle, LLC; is 
that cOlTect? 
A. Not as of the date on that certificate. 
Q. That is what it says, did I read it 
correctly? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But that isn't accurate, is it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. As of February of 2007, Printcraft and 




Q. Can you help me understand why these 
elTors are on this certificate of occupancy that you 
applied for? 
A. No. That would be a county question. 
87 
Q. On February 1st of2007 when this 
celtificate of occupancy was issued, how long had 
Printcraft already been in occupancy in the building? 
A. Probably about a year. 
Q. Was the building constructed 




A. A portion of it was. 
Q. Which portion? 
A. The east half. 
14 Q. Is Waters Land and Cattle Company an 
15 occupant of the building? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Do you know why Waters Land and Cattle 
18 was issued a certificate of occupancy? 
19 A. No. I assume it's because it was on the 
2 0 original ownership of the dirt. 
21 Q. At the time the building was 
Page 88 
1 Q. Can you explain the tenus of that 
2 agreement which would have becn, as I understand it, 
3 then, between Printcraft and CTR Development? 
4 A. It was a verbal agreement that we would 
5 occupy the building, the east half. 
6 Q. What were the tenns of that verbal 
7 agreement? 
8 A. There were no tenus at the beginning. 
9 Q. Was there a length of time that 
10 Printcraft could occupy, had that been decided? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Was there a rate that Printcraft would 
13 pay for its rights of occupancy? 
14 A. No. 
15 (Exhibit *-007 marked.) 
16 Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'm handing you what's 
17 been marked as Exhibit *-007. Can you identify that 
18 document for me? 
19 A. It looks like a copy of the blueprints 
20 for the building. 
21 Q. It says they were prepared for CTR 
22 Development. Were you involved in requesting these 
23 drawings to be prepared? 
24 A. Yes, as a member of CTR Development. 
25 Q. It indicates these were preparedby 
Page 
1 Design Intelligence, LLC. Is that your recollection 
2 of who drew up these plans? 
3 A. Con"ect. 
4 Q. These don't show a date. Can you 
5 indicate for me when these were prepared? 
6 A. Probably early 2005. They actually show 
7 2005 on the bottom. 
8 Q. You're correct. It shows an account 
89 
9 number 2005-128. Okay. Do these accurately describe 
10 the building that was, in fact, constructed? 
11 A. Very close. It looks like there were 
12 some minor changes made. 






A. This is actually missing a sheet. 
Q. What sheet is missing? 
A. I assume it's A4. 
Q. Were these the documents that you 
19 provided to the architectural control committee? 
20 
21 
22 constructed, did Printcraft already have an agreement 22 
A. They're missing a sheet that I provided. 
Q. Do you have that sheet with you today? 
A. No. 
23 with the owner of the property for occupancy of the 23 Q. \\Inat would have been on sheet A4, if 
24 building after construction was completed? 24 that was provided to them? 
25 A. Yes. 25 A. If you look at A2, there's a stairway 
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1 with regard to maintenance and upkeep of the building 
2 under the lease agreement it has with CTR 
3 Development? 
4 A. None. 
5 Q. Who is responsible for maintaining the 
6 structure of the building? 
7 A. I don't know. 
8 Q. Does Printcraft have any obligations to 
9 maintain any of the equipment that services the 
10 building as pmi of its occupancy obligation? 
11 A. Explain equipment. 
12 Q. There's a humidifier? 
13 A. Printcraft would maintain that. 
14 Q. What else does Printcraft have to 
15 maintain? 
16 A. Light bulbs, carpet, paint. 
17 Q. Is Plintcraft required to pay the 
18 insurance costs for the building? 
19 A. I don't know. 
20 Q. Is Printcraft required to pay the taxes, 
21 the real property taxes on the building? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. \\inen did the lease agreement between 
24 Printcraft and CTR Development begin? 
25 A. Never. 
Page 10 
1 Q. Are you just there on a month to month 
2 basis? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. There is no written agreement in any 
5 form? 
6 A. No. 
7 (Exhibit *-008 marked.) 
8 Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'm handing you what's 
9 been marked as Exhibit *-008. Are you familiar with 
10 this agreement? 
11 A. I am. 
12 Q. Was Printcraft Press involved at all in 
13 negotiation of this lease agreement? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Does CTR have any rights under this 
1 6 lease agreement? 
17 fvlR. ERICKSON: I'm going to object to that 
18 on the basis this is a 30(b)( 6) on behalf of 
19 Printcraft Press. If you know the answer, go ahead 
20 and give it. 
21 THE W1TNESS: Could you be more specific? 
2 2 (The record was read.) 
23 Q. BY MR. FULLER: Does Printcraft Press 
24 have any rights under this agreement? 
25 A. I don't know. 
Page 104 Ie 
1 Q. Could you turn with me to page 4 
2 paragraph 4. This provision addresses the issue of 
3 assignment and subleasing. The last sentence reads. 
4 it is understood that lessee, intends to sublease a 
5 portion of the leased premises to Printcraft Press. 
6 Inc., and lessor hereby consents to such sublease. 
7 Are you aware if any such sublease exists? 
8 A. [thought I said we had a verbal 
9 agreement with CTR Management, which I would construe 
10 as that. I, 
11 Q. That verbal month to month agreement is [; 
12 what is referred to here as a sublease? 
13 A. I would assume. 
14 Q. You don't know what the rental amount 
15 is. Do you know who the rent is paid to') 
16 A. Printcraft Press pays the rent to CTR 
17 Management. 
18 Q. How often is that rent paid? 
19 A. Monthly. 
20 Q. How long does Printcraft intend to 
21 occupy the building? 
22 A. 10 years fi'om the inception. or when we 
23 moved in. 
24 Q. Do you have any plans to move earlier 
2 5 than that, as you sit here today? 
Page 105 Ii 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. When did Printcraft Press connect to 
3 Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer system? 
4 A. I don't think Printcraft Press ever did 
5 connect. 
6 Q. Vv110 is connected to the system? 
7 A. CTR Management is leasing a building 
8 from J&LB Propeliies that is connected to the -- that 
9 was connected to the sewer system. 
10 Q. What was Printcraft Press' involvement 
11 in the process of connection of the building to 
12 Sunnyside Sewers' service'? 
13 A. None. 
14 Q. Do you have any knowledge of who paid 
15 the connection fee? 
16 A. CTRDevelopment. 
1 7 Q. How do you know that'? 
18 A. I've seen a voided check, and I've 
1 9 signed the check. 
20 Q. What did Printcraft Press pay as part of 
21 the connection fee? 
22 A. Nothing, to my knowledge. 
23 (Exhibit *-009 marked.) 
24 Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'll hand you what's 
25 been marked as Exhibit *-009. To my knowledge, this 
!i 
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was provided by you. Is this a copy of the canceled 






Q. Do you know what this is? I 4 
A. I don't. It looks like a statement out 5 
of Quickbooks or something. I 6 
tvIR. ERlCKSON: For the record, Mark, I think 7 
we actually provided you a copy of the check along 8 
with these documents is my recollection. I'm 9 
10 certainly willing to go back and take a look again at 10 
11 what we produced. My recollection was seeing it and 11 
Page 108 i~ 
A. l1ley were the owner of the building. 
Q. Did CTR Development know what kind of 
sewer service Plintcraft Press would need when it 
subleased the property to Printcraft? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you explain for me what was 
discussed between Printcraft and CTR Development 
about the needs of Print craft at the time that 
sublease was agreed to? 
A. 111at they'd need four bathrooms. a drain 
for the Roland 305, a water heater, a break room with 
12 providing it in connection with these documents. 12 a sink in it, and a wash-up area for the flexo area. 
13 MR. FULLER: We'll check again. I think 13 Q. Was there any discussion about the kind 
14 this is the only one we've been able to locate. It 14 of chemicals that would be discharged by Printcraft 
15 actually has what I think is the check number written 15 with its processed waste? 
16 up here in the comer. 1 6 A. There was no need for a discussion, 
1 7 MR. ERlCKSON: What you'll find unusual is 1 7 because there was nothing of any alann. 
18 it wasn't printed by a computer. It says Sunnyside 18 Q. It wasn't discussed? 
19 Utilities. Incorporated in handwriting. That's 19 A. Huh-uh. 
20 probably what you'll need to look for. I'll go back 2 0 Q. Who would be the participants in this 
21 and double-check on that as well. 21 conversation on behalf of Print craft? 
22 Q. BY MR. FULLER: All I'm trying to 
23 establish is that Print craft Press itself paid 
24 nothing for the cost of connection; isn't that 
25 cOITect? 
Page 107 
1 A. Correct. I have a copy of that check. 
2 I'm sure I could find it if you want. 
3 Q. If you wouldn't mind, that would be 
4 great. 
5 MR. ERlCKSON: I'll double-check, too, Mark. 
6 I kept a complete copy of everything that I sent to 
7 you. 
8 MR. FULLER: Let's stop for just a minute. 
9 (A break was taken from 12:02 p.m. to 
10 12:03 p.m.) 
11 Q. BY MR. FULLER: We've gone off the 
12 record for just a minute, Mr. Waters. You provided 
13 me with a copy of check number 5896, which is now 
14 page 3 of Exhibit *-009; is that correct? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 MR. FULLER: By stipulation of counsel, 
17 we've agreed to just attach that as an additional 
18 page of Exhibit *-009; is that correct, Counsel? 
19 MR. ERlCKSON: That is correct. 
20 Q. BY MR. FULLER: Just to finalize this, 
21 am I con'ect that the connection fees were paid by 
22 CTR Development, LLC, and that Printcraft Press paid 
23 no portion of the connection fee? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. Why did CTR Development pay the fee? 
,C',;c "~A'\t'" ;.~ 
A. Travis Waters. 22 
23 Q. Who would be the participant in that 
24 conversation on behalf of CTR Development? 



























Q. Do you recall a specific conversation 
regarding the needs? 
A. No. 111ere was hours and hours and hours 
of conversations and details concerning the building. 
Q. Did CTR Development make any promises to 
Printcraft regarding the type of sewer services that 
would be available? 
A. No. 111ere was an assumption that there 
was sewer and water. 
Q. On what was that assumption based? 
A. That that subdivision had sewer and 
water. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any investigation made by 
Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by 
Sunnyside Park Utilities before construction of the 
building began? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any investigation made by 
Printcraft Press regarding the services provided by 
SUlmyside Park Utilities before Printcraft began 
occupancy? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to 
tntreport@ida.net T&T Reporting 
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1 Printcraft before Printcraft began occupancy? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Did Sunnyside promise anything to CTR? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. What? 
6 A. Sewer and water service. 
7 Q. To whom were those promises made at CTR 
8 Development? 
9 A. I'd say Travis Waters and Lawry Wilde. 
10 Q. By whom were those promises made by 
11 Sunnyside? 
12 A. 1 would say it's through a document 
13 that's filed at Bonneville County that says that 
14 Sunnyside will provide sewer and water. 
15 Q. Which document are you refen-ing to? 
16 A. I think it's the development agreement, 
17 the plat has that on there. I think there's multiple 
18 documents. actually, that have the commitment between 
19 Sunnyside Utilities. Sunnyside Industrial Park and 
20 Bonneville County and District Seven. 
21 Q. My question was, what promises were made 
22 by Sunnyside Utilities to CTR. You had indicated 
23 that CTR was promised sewer and water and that 
24 promises were made to Travis and Lawry. 
25 was, who at 
1 made those promises? Can you identify any verbal 
2 statements, or are you relying only upon the written 
3 documents you've refeITed to? 
4 A. I don't recall any verbal. 
5 Q. We're just talking about the \vritten 
6 documents? 
7 A. COITec!. 
8 Q. Was there any direct cOITespondence, 
9 letters, between Sunnyside Utilities and CTR 
10 promising specific services? 
11 A. I don't know, not that I know of. 
12 Q. Okay. So we're talking about the 
13 development agreement, the plat. What other 
14 documents did CTR rely upon regarding sewer and water 
15 services? 
16 A. TIle CCNRs, the development agreement, 
17 the plat, anything that we would have gotten at 
18 closing. 
19 Q. Did Sunnyside patiicipate in preparing 
20 any of those closing documents? 
21 A. Yeah. It's got your name on a lot of 
22 those documents. 
23 Q. This is the documents by which the 
24 property was acquired from Miskin, right? 
25 A. Correct. 
Page 112 
1 Q. Those are the closing documents you're 
2 referring to? 
3 A. Right. And you prepared some of those 
4 documents and then filed them with the county. "Dlen 
5 the title company requested a copy of those filed 
6 documents and provided them to us. 
7 Q. Did you keep a copy of your closing 
8 documents, your closing file? 
9 A. Yes. I'm sure I've got that. 
10 Q. Do you have those? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Would you have those available to bring 
13 back with you after lunch? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. 1bey are available to produce to your 
16 attorney? 
17 A. Yes. 

























A. I don't recall. 
MR. FULLER: I think that's a good place for 
us to stop at lunch. Vvl1Y don't we start back up 
again at I: 15. 
(A break was taken from 12:11 p.m. to 
1:33 p.m.) 
BY MR. FULLER: We're back on the record 
Page 113 
after a lunch break. You understand, Mr. Waters, 
that you're still under oath? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want to ask you for just a minute 
about a document we had already discussed this 
moming. I'm handing you what's been marked 
Exhibit *-007. Is this the document that you 
actually dropped off to Mr. Beck? You indicated 
there was also a fourth page to it? 
A. I dropped offfull size blueprints in a 
roll, not an 8 li2-by-11 representation of that. 
Q. How large would they have been? 
A. 24-by-36. 
Q. This size'? 
A. I dropped those off as well. 
Q. You're saying they were bigger than 
this? 
A. Yeah. There should have been a set that 
was bigger than that that had the site plan with it 
from Mountain River Engineeling and a full, just like 
I gave to the county that would reside on the 
premises during construction. 
Q. Can you tum to the second page of 
Exhibit *-007 for me? There's some handwliting on 
the lower left; is that your handwriting? 
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1 Q. This document was dropped offto 
2 Mr. Beck after you had a visit with him; is that 
3 con'ect? 
4 A. No. I think we visited at the time I 
5 dropped it off. 
6 Q. Why were these items written on this 
7 document if it was given to him during a meeting with 
8 him? 
9 A. So that I wouldn't forget to address 
10 them. 
11 Q. You wrote these on in advance of the 
12 meeting? 
13 A. I believe so. 
14 Q. Then discussed them with him at the 
15 meeting? 
16 A. Right. 
17 Q. If I understand your testimony, in both 
18 cases he said he would get back to you but did not? 
19 A. With the railroad easement, he was going 
20 to get me that. With the phone line, I don't 
21 remember if he at that point said, that's your 
22 responsibility, and I just left it at that, or he got 
23 back with me later, I don't recall. 
24 Q. Did Printcraft infom1 Sunnyside about 
25 the types and quantity of waste Printcraft intended 
Page 119 
Page 120 
1 MR. ERICKSON: Let me tell you how we 
2 organized these, too, so it may help you in aid of 
3 your questions. What we did is, we prepared these 
4 documents by system. like, the flexo system or the 
5 litho system, some of which would be discharged, some 
6 of which would not be discharged. We wanted to keep 
7 it all together so you could go through that way and 
8 talk about one complete system and be done \Vith it. 
9 What I'm hoping Travis was able to do 
10 is, he'll identify for you what would have been 
11 discharged and what would not have been discharged. 
12 In other words, for the litho process. some of the 
13 chemicals did go into the sewer, some of them did 
14 not. But all the MSDS sheets for that process are 
I 15 included behind that tab. Does that make sense? 
1
16 MR. FULLER: I'm afraid it doesn't. Try 
17 once more. 
18 MR. ERICKSON: In order to use the litho 
19 system, there are a number of chemicals that are used 
20 in that process. Travis talked earlier today about 
21 some that are used with the water and would have been 
22 discharged with the water. Some of those chemicals 
I 23 are not discharged into the sewer system, but they're 
24 still used in the process. 
2 5 MR. FULLER: They're consumed in the 
Page 121 
1 to discharge into Sunnyside's septic system? 1 process? 
2 A. I need you to say Sunnyside Utilities or I 2 MR. ERICKSON: I'm not sure if they're 
3 Sunnyside Industrial Park so we both know who you're 3 consumed or recirculated or collected and disposed 
4 talking about. I 4 of, but Travis can answer all those questions for 
5 Q. Unless I specify othelwise, my questions I 5 you. In your subpoena you listed two specific issues 
6 concern Sunnyside Utilities. I will identify if I 6 for MSDS, those that would have been discharged and 
7 mean anything other than that entity; are you 7 those that would have been used that were disposed of 
8 comfortable with that? 8 a different way. 
A. I am. I 9 MR. FULLER: That's correct. 9 
10 Q. Let me restate the question. Did 
11 Printcraft inform Sunnyside about the types and 
12 quantities of waste Printcraft intended to discharge 
13 into Sunnyside's septic system? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. What was Sunnyside told by Printcraft, 
16 if anything, would be discharged? 
1 7 A. Nothing. 
18 Q. You have been asked to bring documents 
19 that specifically identify all chemicals and other 
20 substances discharged into Sunnyside's sewer system 
21 by Printcraft. You asked to delay that until the 
22 beginning of the afternoon to gather those documents. 
23 Do you have documents in compliance with that 
24 request? 





MR. ERICKSON: What we did is simply provide 
you a list of all chemicals for each specific 
process, that's how we categorized them, and Travis 
will be able to identify for you which of those would 
have been discharged and which of those would have 
15 not been discharged. 
16 MR. FULLER: The binder you have given me, 





THE WITNESS: That's my only copy. 
MR. ERICKSON: You'll see where the sticky 
notes are, those are the tabs and the categories that 
2 1 have been prepared for each of those processes. 
22 MR. FULLER: Why don't I have him explain 
2 3 the process. As I indicated to you, I have a brief 
24 hearing that will only take 15 minutes at 3:00. That 
will be a good time to take a break, and then my ,25 
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1 meet with Channel 8 or Channel 6. That's my 1 it relates to the system into which you are 
2 recollection. 2 discharging? 
3 (Exhibit *-019 marked.) 3 A. Then or now? 
4 Q. BY MR. FULLER: I'll hand you an 4 Q. Let's start with then. 
5 article, exhibit marked as Exhibit *-019. Let me be 5 A. Then I was oblivious to what this whole 
6 very specific. Did you contact the Post Register, or 6 system was or wasn't, that it was basically a 
7 did the Post Register contact you? 7 residential septic system for a whole commercial 
8 A. I don't recall, but I can get that I 8 subdivision. 




Q. Did you understand at the time that you 
10 Q. Who would know that'? could discharge any quantity that you wished? 
11 A. I would on my lap top. I had 11 A. Yes. 
12 cOlTespondence back and forth with Paul Menser. I 12 Q. That there were no limitations on the 
13 can go back and see where that initiated. 13 quantity that you could dispose of? 
14 Q. Do you recognize that as a copy of the 14 A. When we came into the subdivision, I had 
15 aliicle that was published after your conversation 15 no idea that there had been issues with District 
16 with Mr. Menser? It's on two pages, there's the 16 Seven limiting the amount of flows into that septic 
17 photograph, and then the wording is on the next page. 17 system. 11 
18 A. Sure. 18 Q. Did you have any contact with District Ii 
19 Q. I'd like you to look with me at the 19 Seven at the time you began construction? 
20 second page in the center column, the third full 20 A. No. ii 
21 paragraph. He said that the only discharge from his 21 Q. When did you first have contact with 
22 plant that might be objectionable is brine from his 22 District Seven? 
23 water softener, which is part of the reverse osmosis 23 A. It was probably July or August I was 
24 that takes ordinary well water and removes minerals 24 observing what was going on down there with the 
25 and impurities before it is used in the printing 25 Band-Aid fix for the septic tanks and observed ') 
Page 203 Page 205 
j 
1 process. He estimated that Printcraft discharges at 1 somebody down there taking pictures. I asked her who i 
2 most 500 gallons a day. Is that an accurate 2 she was, she said she was with District Seven. 
3 statement of your statement to Mr. Menser? 
I 
3 Q. Do you recall her name? 
4 A. No. 4 A. I don't. 
11 5 Q. How is it wrong? I 5 Q. Do you know her name now? 
6 A. Our flows are more like 850 to 1,000 a 6 A. No. I'd never seen her before that, 
7 day. 7 haven't seen her since. 
8 Q. 500 is in error too low? 8 Q. With regard to the paragraph that I read 
9 A. Yes. 9 from the center column of page 2 of Exhibit *-019, i; 
10 Q. What number did you tell him? 10 you indicated that Me Menser quoted the \vTong il 
11 A. I don't recall. Any of those numbers 11 gallonage per day. Other than that. does he 
fj 12 are within what we're allowed through IDAP A. 12 accurately state what you told him? 
13 Q. What amount are you allowed through 13 A. I wouldn't let him talk for me in there. i' 
14 IDAPA? 14 I don't think it's very accurate, but rm not going 
, 
15 A. About 1,300 gallons a day. 15 to --
16 Q. What is that based on? 16 Q. What do you disagree with in that 
17 A. The IDAP A Code. 17 paragraph? \V11at is wrong? 
18 Q. How do you calculate that? 18 MR. ERICKSON: Counsel, could you identify 
19 A. Based on employees, size of the 19 that paragraph for me again? 
20 business, number of employees. 20 MR. FULLER: It's the third full paragraph 
21 Q. Does that have any reference to the size 21 in the center column beginning with the word he. 
22 of the system into which you are discharging? 22 THE WITNESS: Only, I think is a little, I~ 23 A. No, not that I recall. 23 too, specific, not that I've got other things in 
24 Q. Do you understand there to be any 24 mind. The water softener feeds the water heater as Ie 
25 restriction on the quantities that you discharge as 25 well. He make s it sounds like it's specifically for I; 
P' /, ~", ' 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
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Jolm M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
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Case No.: CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
corporation DEFENDANT'S FIRST AND SECOND 
SETS OF rNTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION AND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc., by and through counsel of record, bereby responds 
to Defendant's First and Second Sets ofIntenogatories, Requests for Production and 
Requests for Admission as follows. As a preliminary matter the plaintiff objects on the 
basis that this is not the first and second sets of discovery. As the defendants all have 
retained the same counsel they should not be penl1itted to each submit separate discovery 
requests asking at times identical questions. Such discovery is abusive to the plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's First and Second Sets of Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production and Requests for /\dmission Page 1 
until the system was discOlmected in December of 2006. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 57: Please admit that Printcraft Press 
received sewer services, other than for "processed waste," from Sunnyside Park Utilities 
for the month of November 2006. 
RESPONSE: Deny. The plaintiff does not know what the defendant is 
classifying as "processed waste" and therefore deny. The defendant put limits on the 
plaintiff's use of the sewer system beginning in June of 2006. Such limitations continued 
until the system was discomlected in December of 2006. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 58: Please admit that Plintcraft Press 
received sewer services, other than for "processed waste," from Sunnyside Park Utilities 
from December 1,2006 through December 15, 2006. 
RESPONSE: Deny. The plaintiff does not know what the defendant is 
classifying as "processed waste" and therefore deny. The defendant put limits on the 
plaintiff's use of the sewer system beginning in June of2006. Such limitations continued 
until the system was disconnected in December of 2006. 
REQUEST FOR ADl\lISSION NO. 59: Please admit that Printcraft Press never 
asked Sunnyside Park Utilities to identify what type of sewer system Sunnyside Park 
Utilities operated. 
RESPONSE: Deny. In June of 2006 Doyle Beck told Travis Waters what kind 
of system was being operated by the defendants. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 60: Please admit that Prilltcraft Press never 
asked Sunnyside Park Utilities to identify the capacity of Sunnyside Park Utilities' sewer 
system. 
087 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's First and Second Sets of Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production and Requests for l\dmission Page 40 
RESPONSE: In June of2006 Doyle Beck told Travis \Vaters the capacity of the 
sewer system. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 61: Please admit that Printcraft Press never 
asked Sun11yside Park Utilities about any restrictions on Smlliyside Park Utilities' sewer 
system. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is unintelligible and plaintiff 
does not understand what the reference to "restrictions" refers to. Plaintiff therefore 
denies the request for admission. 
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John M. A vondet 
Beard S1. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's First and Second Sets of Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production and Requests for Admission Page 41 
City Of Idaho Falls 













State, Zip Code 
Customer Phone 
County 
Type of Waste: 
I 
Each Origin must be listed. 
Use seperate sheet for each customer. 
, l~ g~Yb~ 
tWO) Sz..3!:ll'l2-
:¥x>V\J\JW \ U.e 
(I.E., Domestic Septic Tank, Portable TOilet, Etc.) 
Date Delivered at WWTP 
Time Delivered at WWTP 
I 
/0: <.! u AM.@ 
; 
~ c7 ~ Drivers Signature ~ -;7 ~_:::.::::.:::.:::_-_ --~--=--==;;v 
~ 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
INDUSTRIAL PRETREATMENT 
EFFECTIVE DATE~ January 1, 2007 
EXPIRATION DATE~ JANUARY 1, 2008 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
INDUSTRIAL USER: SEPTAGE HAULER 
PERMIT NUMBER #IF-7699-562991-25 
1. COMPANY NAME: Pride Air Express 
2. DIVISION NAME: Pride Air Express 
3. MAILING ADDRESS: 865 Pancheri 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83402 
4. FACILITY ADDRESS: 865 Pancheri 
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83402 
5. OFFICIAL: Lawry Wilde 
6. TELEPHONE NUMBER: (208) 522-7742 
APPROVED BY: 
DAVID C. SMITH / SEWER 
CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 
P.O. BOX 50220 




The above Industrial User is authorized to discharge industrial 
wastewater to the City of Idaho Falls sewer system in compliance 
with the City of Idaho Falls Ordinance Sec. 8, Ch. 1 in 
accordance with,' effluent limitations, moni toring requirements, 
and other conditions set forth herein. This Acceptance Form may 
be modified at the discretion of the City so as to bring it into 
compliance with Federal and Local regulations 0 The Industrial 
User shall comply with the effluent concentrations specified. 
o 
EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS & LIMITS 
LOCAL LIMITS~ The following pollutant limits are established to 
protect against pass through and interference. No person shall 
discharge wastewater containing in excess of the following daily 
maximum allowable discharge limits. 










OIL & GREASE (petroleum 
or mineral oil products) 





























All metals shall be reported as total 
The above limits apply at the point where the wastewater is 
discharged to the POTW (end of pipe). All concentrations for 
metallic substances are for "total" metal unless indicated 
otherwise. The Director may impose mass limitations in ,addition 
to, or in place of, the concentration-based limitations above. 
Where a User is subject to a categorical pretreatment standard 
and the local limit for a given pollutant, the more stringent 
limit or applicable pretreatment standard shall apply. 
POTWfs may develop Best Management Practices to implement 
paragraphs as listed in 40 CFR 403.5(c) (l)and(c) (2). Such BMPs 
shall be considered local limits and Pretreatment Standards for 
the purpose of this part and section 307(d) of the act. 
I. All pollutant analyses, including sampling techniques, 
shall be performed in accordance lAJi th the techniques 
prescribed in 40 CFR Part 136; unless otherwise specified in an 
applicable categorical pretreatment standardo If 40 CFR 
Part 136 does not contain sampling or analytical techniques for 
the pollutant in question, sampling and analyses must be 




UNIT OF MEASUREMENT SAMPLING FREQUENCY TYPE 
City may sample any load, and by the City WWTP at their 
discretion. 
POINT OF DISCHARGE: 
LOCATION 
Idaho Falls Wastewater Treatment Plant 
AUTHORIZED PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED 
OR SERVICES PROVIDED: 
Product Produced/Service Provided SIC Code NAICS 
Septage Haulers 7699 562991 
SPECLAL CONDITIONS & COMPLIANCE SCHEDULES: 
A. In accordance with Section 8 Chapter 1 of the City of Idaho 
Fa,lls Sewer Ordinance, the City must be notified 30 days 
prior to changing any of the discharge characteristics as 
allowed in this IWA. 
(', C I) 
v '-.) t~ 
Be The IWA and right to discharge may be revoked at any time 
after inspection p monitoring p sampling or other analyses 
determines that the Septage Hauler is in violation of 
Federal, State Dr Local laws, including the City of Idaho 
Falls Sewer Use Ordinance or for protection of the 
processes and equipment at the Wastewater Treatment 
Facilities. 
C. Service station and garage pit waste will not be accepted, 
Do Any waste containing dry cleaning chemicals will not be 
accept:;ed. 
E. Domestic sewage is the only septage which will be accepted. 
F. Septage Hauler is required to report to Wastewater 
Treatment Plant personnel prior to dumping. 
PROHIBITED DISCHARGE STANDARDS 
(A) General Prohibitions: No User shall introduce or cause to 
be introduced into the POTW any pollutant or wastewater 
which causes pass-through or interference. These general 
prohibitions apply to all Users of the POTW whether or not 
they are subject to categorical pretreatment standards or 
any other national, state or local pretreatment standards 
or requirements. 
(B) Specific Prohibitions: No user shall introduce or cause to 
be introduced into the POTW the following pollutants, 
substances or wastewater: 
(1) Pollutants which create a fire or explosive hazard in the 
POTW, including, but not limited to, wastestreams with a 
closed-cup flashpoint of less than 1400 F (60°C) using the 
test methods specified in 40 CFR 261.21; 
(2) Wastewater having a pH less than 5 0 0 or more than 900 c or 
otherwise causing corrosive structural damage to the POTW 
or equipment in the WWTP; 
(3) Solid or viscous substances in amounts which will cause 
obstruction of the flow in the POTW resulting in 
interference, but in no case solids greater than one-half 
inch (1/2") in any dimension; 
(4) Pollutants, including oxygen-demanding pollutants released 
in a discharge at a flow rate and/or pollutant 
concentration which, either singly or by interaction with 
other pollutants, will cause interference with the POTW; 
(5) Wastewater having a temperature which will inhibit 
biological activity in the WWTP resulting in interference, 
but in no case wastewater which causes the temperature at 
the introduction into the WWTP plant to exceed 104°F (40°C) 
unles~ the Director, approves alternate temperature limits 
in writing; 
(6) Petroleum oil, non-biodegradable cutting oil, or products 
of mineral oil origin, in amounts that will cause 
interference or pass through; 
(7) Pollutants which result in the presence of toxic gases! 
vapors, or fumes within the POTW in a quality that may 
cause acute worker health and safety problems; 
(8) Trucked or hauled pollutants, except at discharge points 
designated by the City; 
(9) Noxious or malodorous liquids; gases, solids, or other 
wastewater which either singly or by interaction with other 
wastes, are sufficient to create a public nuisance or a 
ha~ard to life or health, or to prevent entry into the 
sewers for maintenance or repair; 
84 
(10) Wastewater which imparts color which cannot be removed by 
the treatment process, such as, but not limited top dye 
wastes and vegetable tanning solutions, which consequently 
imparts color to the treatment plantPs effluent, thereby 
violating the City's NPDES permit. Color in combination 
with turbidity shall not cause the treatment plant effluent 
to reduce the depth of the compensation point for 
photosynthetic activity by more than ten percent (10%) from 
the seasonably established norm for aquatic life; 
(11) Wastewater containing any radioactive wastes or isotopes 
except as specifically approved in writing by the Director 
in compliance with applicable state or Federal regUlations; 
(12) storm water, surface water, ground water, artesian well 
water, roof runoff, subsurface drainage, swimming pool 
drainage, condensate deionized water, non-contact cooling 
water, and unpolluted wastewater, unless specifically 
authorized by the Director. 
(13) Any sludges, screenings, or other residues from,the 
pretreatment of industrial wastes or from industrial 
processes; 
(14) Medical wastes, except as specifically authorized by the 
Director; 
(15) Wastewater causing, along in conjunction with other 
sources, the WWTP's effluent to fail a toxicity test; 
(16) Detergents, surface-active agents, or other substances 
which may cause excessive foaming in the POTW; 
(17) Any liquid, solids, or gases which by reason of their 
nature or quantity are, or may be, sufficient either alone 
orcby interaction with other substances to cause fire or 
explosion or be injurious in any other way to the POTW or 
to the operation of the POTW. At no time shall two (2) 
successive readings on an explosion meter! at the point of 
discharge into the system (or at any point in the system), 
be more than five percent (5%) nor any single reading over 
ten percent (10%) of the lower explosive limit (LEL) of the 
meter. 
(18) Grease, garbage other than ground garbage, animal guts or 
tissues, paunch manure, bones; hair, hides or fleshings; 
entrails, whole blood; feathers, ashes F cinders; sand; 
spent lime, stone or marble dusts, metal, glass; straw, 
shavings, grass clippings, rags, spent grains, spent hops, 
waste paper, wood, plastics; gas; tar asphalt residues, 
residues from refining or processing of fuel or lubricating 
oil, mud; or glass grinding or polishing wastes, 
(19) Any substance which will cause the POTW to violate its 
NPDES and/or other disposal system permits. 
(20) Any wastewater, which in the opinion of the Director can 
cause harm either to the sewers, WWTP or equipment, have an 
adverse effect on the receiving stream, or can otherwise 
endanger life, limb, public property or constitute a 
nuisance, unless allowed under special agreement approved 
in writing by the Director, except that no special waiver 
shall be given from categorical pretreatment standards. 
(21) The contents of any tank or other vessel owned or used by 
any person in the business of collecting or pumping sewage, 
effluent, septic tank waster, or other wastewater unless 
said person has first obtained testing and approval as may 
be generally required by the City and paid all fees 
assessed for the privilege of said discharge. 
(22) Any hazardous wastes as prohibited or regulated by the 
state of Idaho or in 40 CFR part 261. 
(23) Persistent pesticides and/or pesticides regulated by the 
Federal Insecticide Fungicide Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
(24) Sewage sludge, except in accordance with the City's NPDES 
permit, providing that it specifically allows the discharge 
to surface waters of sewage sludge pollutants. 
ass 
Pollutants; substances or wastewater prohibited by this section 
shall not be processed or stored in such a manner that they 
could be discharged to the POTWo (Ordo 2223, 1-9-97) 
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE PERMIT TRANSFER: 
wastewater discharge permits may be reassigned or transferred 
to a new owner or operator only if the permittee gives at least 
thirty (30) days' advance notice to the Director and the 
Director approves the wastewater discharge permit transfero The 
notice must include a written certification by the new owner or 
operator which: 
(A) States that the new owner or operator has no immediate 
intent to change the facility's operations and 
processes; 
(B) Identifies the specific date on which the transfer is 
to occur; 
(e) Assumes full responsibility for complying with the 
existing wastewater discharge permit beginning on the 
date the transfer is to occuro 
Failure to provide advance notice of 
wastewater discharge permit voidable as 
transfer. (Ord. 2223,1-9-97 
a transfer renders the 
of the date of facility 
WASTEWATER DISCHARGE PERMIT MODIFICATION: 
The Director may modify the wastewater discharge permit for good 
cause including, but not limited to, the following: 
A To incorporate any new or revised Federal, state or 
local pretreatment standards or requirements; 
87 
B To address significant alterations or additions to the 
User's operation p processes or wastewater volume or 
character since the time of wastewater discharge 
permit issuance; 
C A change in the POTW that requires either a temporary 
or permanent reduction or elimination of the 
authorized discharge; 
D Information indicating that the permitted discharge 
PoS€S a threat to the City is POTW r City personnel or 
receiving waters; 
E Violation of any terms or conditions of the wastewater 
discharge permit; 
F Misrepresentation or failure to fully disclose all 
relevant facts in the wastewater discharge permit 
application or in any required report; 
G Revision of or a grant of variance from categorical 
pretreatment standards pursuant to 40 CFR 403.13; 
H To correct typographical or other errors in the 
wastewater discharge permit; 
I To reflect a transfer of the facility ownership or 
operation to a new owner or operator, provided however 
modification for this purpose may not be allowed 
unless the wastewater discharge permit is transferable 
as provided in section 8-1-44 of the Sewer Use 
Ordinance. (Ord. 2223, 1-9-97) 
STANDARD CONDITIONS~ 
A. The User shall comply with all the general conditions and 
prohibitive discharge standards as set forth in the ,City of 
Idaho Falls Sewer Use Ordinance. 
B. ANY person whop knowingly makes any false statement on any 
report or other required document; renders any monitoring 
dev-ice or method inaccurate, or otherwise violates 
provisions of the City Sewer Use Ordinance, and EPA's 
pretreatment regulatory requirements shall be liable to 
enforcement in accordance with the City of Idaho Falls 
Sewer Use Ordinance. 
C, The User is subject to fines, enforcement action, 
surcharges and other costs resulting from their discharge 
in excess of those specified in this document, the City 
of Idaho Falls Sewer Ordinance or other agreements, 
Do Except for information deemed confidential under the City 
of Idaho Falls Sewer Ordinance I all reports required by 
this agreement shall be available for public inspection. 
Eo A minimum of sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of 
this permit, the User shall submit an application for a new 
permit by completing a wastewater discharge permit 
application. 
F. Sampling costs incurred by the City may be charged to the 
User. 
NOTE: Effluent concentr§tions and loading limits may be 
modified prior to expiration of this permit. 
04-11-20 08 14 :32 From- HOPKIN N 208523447 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OfFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEML 
LAWH !:::Nc.;E G, WASDEN 
April 11 , 2008 
Via FacsimiJerand US Mail 
Mr. Jeffery D. Brunson and Mr. John Avondet 
2105 Coronadu Streel 
Idaho Falls, 10 83404 
Facsimile Number: (208)529-9732 
Re: Printcraft Press and Discharge of Saltwater Brine 
Dear Mr. Brunson and Mr. Avondet, 
T-213 P 004/00 5 F- 120 
I am writing regarding our meeting on April 1, 2008, in which you requested a statement 
frum my client DEQ regarding 1) whether your client Printcraft PrQSS can discharge 
saltwater brine from its facility, into the storage tanks located on the property, and 2) 
whether DEQ or the EIPHn regulates the discharge under the MOU and IDAPA rules. 
According to IDAPA 58,01.03.004.01 and 03 (Individual 'Subsurface Sewage Disposal 
Rules), a facility cannot discharge industrial wastes such as saltwater brine into 
"individual and subsurface sewage systems/' unless that discharge is approved by the 
director. However, based on the Information received by DEQ, 1he storage tanks located 
on Printcraft's property do not meet the definition of either an individual system or 
subsurface sewage system 3nd therefore the IndividwaliSubsurmce ~ewage Disposal 
Rules would not apply. As long as Printcrafi continues to properly haul, store, and 
dispose' of the industrial wastes produced by its operation, it wlll not be subject to 
enforcement by DEQ for discharging saltwater brine from its facility, 
However, please note that should Printcraft install a subsurface sewdge system, 
Printcraft will become subject to the Individual and Subsurface Disposal Rules, and 
cannot discharge saltwl:lter brine, or other industrial wastos into :a subsurface sewage 
system. Also, should Printcraft access and connect to the City of Idaho Falls system, it 
wiH become subject to IDAPA 58.01.16 and 59.01 17. 
Natur1Il Resources Oivision, Enviromnetrt<ll au,,!!ly $QctiOh. 
1410 N, H II [on, 2n Cl Floor, !;lOiSe, 'elMo Cl370r;;-'128S 
T ... lpnhnnp· r?nRl 3?~_/).t~." I=AX' r?m n ~7',\_n4R1 
EXHIBIT t= 
u4- 11-2008 14:32 From-HOPKIN 
ML Jeffery D. Brunson and Mr. John Avondet 
April 11,2008 
Page 2 of2 
2085234474 T-213 P 005/005 F-120 
Thank you for your patience, my litigation schedule has I~cpt me from being able to 
more timely address your question. Please let me know if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
~




cc: James Johnston, Regional Administrator, rFRO 
Willie T suscherl Enginqgr, IFRO 
Rick Huddleston, Waste Water Program Manger, DEQ State Office 
Barry Burnell, Water Quality Administrator, DEQ State Office 
Gregory Crockettl Attomey for EIPHD, (208) 523-4474 
1101 
David M. Smith 
Idaho State Accountancy Board #1345 
SMITH AND COMPANY CPAs, PLLC 
310 Elm Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Telephone: (208) 524-2601 
Facsimile: (208) 522-0502 
Expeli Witness for the Plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 











SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. an ) 
Idaho Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK ) 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Idaho ) 
corporation, and SUNNYSIDE ) 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL ) 







CASE NO. CV-06-7097 
Disclosure of 
Expeli Witness Opinions 
David M. Smith CP AI ABV, CV A, 
CMEA,CFFA 
Under the second remedy, Relocate the Business, the Plaintiff suffered, or will 
suffer, the following damages: 
1. Estimated cost of relocating. 
2. Cost incurred for temporary sewage storage and transportation. 
3. Cost incurred obtaining water. 
4. Reduced profit from lost employee time. 
The second remedy is problematic. The determination of what building would 
represent suitable replacement property is sUbjective and open to debate between the 
parties. Therefore, this remedy, even if less costly than connecting to the City of Idaho 
Falls utilities, may cost more in the long run due to extended litigation over acceptable 
replacement property, remodeling costs, decorating costs, too high or too low rent, etc. 
The following is a summary of the opinions I expect to give at trial or deposition. 
Attached are the opinions, basis for the opinions, and Curriculum Vitae of David M. 
Smith, CPAJABV, CVA, CMEA, CFFA. 
OPINIONS 
Opinion #1 - DAMAGES SUFFERED IF PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. 
CONNECTS TO THE CITY OF IDAHO FALLS. 
Printcraft suffered loss (damages) due to the alleged actions of the Defendant 
(discormecting sewer and water) in an amount between $419,247.09 and 522,868.87 
(including interest). This amount represents the expected cost to connect to the City of 
Idaho Falls utilities and reimburse costs incurred. 
1C3 
EXPERT WITNESS REPORT OF DAVID M. SMITH CP AI ABV, CV A, CMEA, CFFA-
PAGES 
Opinion #2 - DAMAGES SUFFERED IF PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. 
RELOCATES 
Printcraft suffered loss (damages) due to the alleged actions of the Defendant 
(disconnecting sewer and water) in the amount of $457,746,64 (including interest). This 
anl0unt represents the expected cost to relocate the business and reimburse costs 
incurred. 
Opinion #3 - DAMAGES SUFFERED IN LOSS OF VALUE OF PREMISES 
The owner of the premises will suffer a decrease in value of the real estate if Printcraft 
Press, Inc. relocates to another location, leaving the building empty without sewer 
service. The owner vv:i1l undoubtedly proceed against Printcraft Press, Inc. for the 
decrease in value, which Printcraft Press will in proceed against the Defendant for the 
damages caused by the actions of the Defendant. 
The damages claimed by the Plaintiff have been calculated to a reasonable degree of 
celiainty based on the information available at this time, and depend upon the remedy 
sought and/or options available. 
DavidM. Smith CPAIABV, CVA, CMEA, CFFA 
April 11, 2008 
'lC4 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
PRINTCRAFT PRESS , INC ., an Idaho 
corporati o n, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . Case No. CV-06-7097 
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES , INC. , 
an Idaho corporation , 
Defendant. 
30 (B) (6) DEPOSITION OF SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC. 
TESTIMONY OF DOYLE H. BECK 
May 30 , 2007 
REPORTED BY : 
DANIEL E. WILLIAMS, CSR No . 686, RPR 





Registered Professional Reporters 
SOUTHERN 
1-800-234-9611 
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NORTHERN 
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208-765-1700 













t'age -LUI J:'dy'=' .LVJI 
1 and dump is what put . lation and caused ,1 about 
2 our failure. I 2 A. No. 
3 Q. Okay. And let's be specific about I 3 Q. Why not? 
4 that, Mr. Beck. \Vhat day was that? When did I 4 A. Well, because he answered my questions. 
5 that occur? I 5 What more could I ask him? 
6 A. Well, we don't know. I mean, when they i 6 Q. It seems to me that there's quite a few 
7 staIied business, they represented to us that I 7 questions that you might be able to ask him. But 
8 they had 30 employees for sanitary sewer purposesi 8 it's your opinion or your testimony that you 
9 only. 19 didn't ask him anything fmiher? 
10 Q. Okay. And who made that 110 A. Once he satisfied my concerns that his 
11 representation? '111 purposes was for his employees or for sanitary 
12 A. Travis Waters did. 112 reasons, there's no more questions to ask. What 
13 Q. \Vas it made -- was that representation 113 more could I ask other than the needs for the 
14 made in response to a request or a statement from 114 people? 
I 
15 you? 115 Q. Did you inquire about the processes 
16 A. That was made at the time of the CC&R /16 that he used in his business? 
17 drawing interview. I asked him what their uses 117 A. I didn't know that he had any 
18 and needs was going to be for sewer, and he told [18 processes. 
19 me 30 employees for sanitary purposes only. 119 Q. But as you sit here today, you did know 
20 Q. I want to make sure that I understand '120 what business he operated. You knew it was 
21 that too. Is that how it was phrased, "What are 21 Printcraft Press business? 
22 your sewer services needs going to be?" 122 A. That's COlTect. But I also know that 
23 A. 1 said, "What are your needs for sewer 1'23 Anheuser-Busch processes barley, but unless they 
24 service going to be?" ?4 tell me, I don't know that they're going to be 
D"L'~' .......................................................................................................... :::: .............. ·0·." ... ,,·[,,-5..putting.a.million.gallonsa.dayintoaseweL .. . 
Page 
1 A. And he said, "We should have 30 I 1 system. 
1 
2 employees, and that's all we'll need it for." 12 Q. This failure that you mentioned in 
3 Q. You never asked him how many emPlOyees,. 3 paragraph No.7 in this counterclaim, this 
4 that he had; he volunteered that to you? 4 temporary failure, you state that it resulted in 
5 A. Yes. He said he would need services 5 an investigation by District Seven. Do you know 
6 for 30 employees. [6 when this investigation began? 
7 Q. Did you make any other inquiries other 17 A. It began the day that we went into 
8 than that time? I 8 their office and told them that we had a problem. 
9 A. Well, my inquiry was -- he said he '9 Q. Do you remember approximately what day 
10 needed it for 30 employees, aIld my inquiry was, 110 that was? 
11 "For sanitary purposes only?" And he said, 11 A. No. 
12 "Yes." 112 Q. I know that some ofthe docunlentation 
13 Q. Okay. It's your position that you were 113 that we'll go through refers to it being in June 
14 very specific about what that term "sanitary 114 of 2006; does that sound accurate? 
15 purposes only" was? 115 A. Yes. 
16 A. Sanitary purposes for those 30 116 Q. Do you -- well --
17 employees, yes. 117 MR. FULLER: Counsel, the paragraph 
18 Q. Do you recall approximately when this 118 you're refelTing specifically refers to June 
19 happened, this conversation that you're talking \19 2006. 
20 about? 120 MR. ERICKSON: Oh, yes, it does. 
21 A. No. 121 You're exactly right. 
22 Q. Did you know what type of business 122 Q. (BY MR. ERICKSON) How was that 
1 
23 Mr. Waters operated? 123 investigation started by the district? What did 
24 A. Yes. I knew that he printed. 1 G 8,24 they do? 
25 Q. Did you ask him any specific questions 125 A. I don't know what you mean. 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-9611 
t:'age ,:u'l 
unJerstand exactly what you're 
Z Let me have you tum to the page that 
3 has Bates No. 00688. Can you tell me what this 
4 document is? 
5 A. That is the supplies that BECO paid for 
3 the drainfield expansion, to Clay Excavation, for 
7 meter reading, and for my time. 
S Q. Let me have you refer again real 
9 quickly to Exhibit No. 47. 
o :MR. FULLER: Can you identify that, 
1 Counsel? 
I 
I 1 and we can't eal with lie, deny, and 
I 2 dump for $15 a momn. So that's my time for 
i 3 having to deal with it up to that point. 
14 Q. Okay. When you say "up to that point," 
i 5 what do you mean by that? 
I 6 A. This is my babysitting fee. 
I 7 Q. Okay. The date order is June of2006? 
i 
I 8 A. un-huh. 
19 Q. I'm assuming that that's when this was 
11 0 all filled out, or was it filled out a later 
111 date? 
I 
2 :MR. ERICKSON: It is a letter dated !12 A. It's filled out -- you look at the date 
3 June 28, 2006, from District Seven to Kirk \Voolf. 113 on the bottom of it. . 
4 THE WITNESS: Okay. 114 Q. Okay. What IS that date? 
5 Q. (BY Iv1R. ERICKSON) In Exhibit No. 47, ~15 A. 12-30-06. 
6 note on the first paragraph that it says -- 116 Q. Okay. So are you saying that it's from 
7 Ms. Eager wrote this letter, and it says that 117 June of '06 to December of '06? 
8 June 9,2006, Doyle Beck and you -- I'm assuming 118 A. From the begilming of babysitting to 
9 she's referring to Kirk Woolf -- announced to her 119 the end of babysitting. 
~O that the subsurface disposal system failed, is j20 Q. Okay. And what you're quantifYing as 
~1 that accurate? Do you believe that that occurred 121 babysitting is from the date of the failure 
~2 on that date? 122 after? 
~3 A. I believe so. 123 A. Right. From the beginning of lie, 
~4 Q. Now, the invoice that I'm looking at 124 deny, dump until we cut hiln off. 
~5.hereM.says..6:on6~ .... Is..thatjustfor .. Iune.'n6?........................... ...............i25 ......................... Q ....... Dkay..And .. vou'reaUotting.yourself64 ........... . 
Page 3381 • Page 340 
1 A. That's the order date. 1 and a half hours. Did you keep track of the time 
2 Q. Okay, date of order. So that would be 2 that you spent? 
3 the date that these items were ordered? 3 A. I think I've got some notes on it that 
4 A. Yeah. 4 is close. 
5 Q. Do you know specifically what date that 5 Q. Time sheets, or what do you have that 
6 was in June? 6 supports that? 
7 A. No. I just put down the month. 7 A. Just notes. I don't keep time sheets. 
8 Q. Was it in relationship to the failure 8 Q. It's your opinion that you have some 
9 that was identified in that exhibit we just 9 notes that would support this? 
10 looked at? ,10 A. Yeah. the hours. 
11 A. Yes. 1111 Q. And how did you derive at the rate of 
12 Q. Now, you mentioned that it had a 112 $60 an hour? 
13 listing for yourself, Doyle Beck. It appears to 113 A. That's what I charge. 
14 be a 64.5. The type is kind of hard to read. 114 Q. For? 
15 But is that accurate? 115 A. IfI consult or work for someone, I 
16 A. Yes. 116 charge $60 an hour. 
17 Q. Is that the number of hours? 117 Q. SO it's just your regular going rate? 
18 A. Yes. 118 A. Dh-huh. If I had a law degree, I could 
19 Q. And then there's an "at" sign, $60, it 1119 add 200 to that, couldn't I? 
20 appears to be? 120 Q. I imagine that the drainfield 
21 A. Yes. 121 supplies -- that's just the actual components for 
22 Q. And could you itemize for me what that 122 the drainfield? 
23 is? 123 A. Yeah. And I think there's probably an 
24 A. That's the time -- you've got to 1 ~47 invoice in here. 
25 realize we've done all of this for $15 a month, i25 Q. Yeah. Where did you buy those items, 
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SPU'S AND SIPP'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
Printcraft has filed a Motion for Reconsideration, under Rule 
11 (a) (2) (B), of the Court's August 31, 2007 Memorandum Decision 
and Order. In addition, Printcraft has filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's April 23, 2008 fv1emorandum Decision 
and Order. Printcraft contends that the Court erred by its 
application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case. 
Sunnyside disagrees that the Court made any error in its 
application of the law in the two Memorandum Decisions and Orders. 
Sunnyside does believe however, that additional evidence, 
disclosed by Printcraft after the Court's August 31, 2007 order 
was entered, resolves a finding of fact which the Court previously 
found was in material dispute. Sunnyside agrees that the Court 
should reconsider the August 31, 2007 order, but believes that 
upon reconsideration, the Court should uphold the grant of summary 
judgment on the Breach of the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement, 
and should grant Summary Judgment to Sunnyside on Printcraft' s 
Constructive Fraud causes of action. Sunnyside believes that upon 
reconsideration of the April 23, 2008 order, the Court should 
affirm that decision, as it was in accord with the law and the 
facts. 
STANDARD ON RECONSIDERATION 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) (2) (B) authorizes motions 
for reconsideration. A Rule 11(a)(2)(B) request for 
reconsideration "permi ts a party to present new evidence ... but does 
not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. If 
Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472,147 P.3d 100 (Ida.App. 
2006) . (Emphasis in Original). Johnson v. Lambros, refers to 
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several other decisions which seem to hold that a Court should 
grant a Motion for Reconsideration if (1) newly presented evidence 
alters the previous findings of facti or (2) if the court 
concludes that there were errors of law or fact in the initial 
decision. Id. 471-473. 
BREACH OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT 
a. Material Breach of the Contract 
Printcraft asserts that the Court erroneously granted summary 
judgment because " ... whether Printcraft's discharge of water 
softener brine materially breached the terms of the Agreement is a 
jury question. ,,1 vJhile generally issues regarding whether a breach 
of contract is material create an issue of fact, "[i] nterpreting 
contracts, determining a statute's meaning, and applying law to 
undisputed facts all constitute matters of law." Fisk v. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, LTD., 141 Idaho 290, 292, 108 P.3d 990 (2005). 
(Emphasis Added) There is still no dispute that "Printcraft 
discharged water softener brine, hazardous wastes, processed water 
and excessive flows of wastewater into the system in violation of 
IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." See Memorandum Decision, dated August 31, 
2007, pg. 5. 
Printcraft cites to several cases which define a "material 
breach" of the contract. See Printcraft Memorandum in Support of 
Reconsideration, pg. 3 and 4. None of the cases involve a breach 
of contract which constituted illegal action by the breaching 
1 Printcraft ignores the fact that in addition to water softener brine the 
court also found, as an undisputed fact, that Printcraft discharged 
" ... hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wa.stewater into the 
system in violation of IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03." See Memorandum Decision and 
Order, dated August 31, 2007, pg. 5. 
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party. Id. A material breach of contract is a breach which touches 
the fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the object of 
the parties in entering into the contract. Ervin Construction Co. 
v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 699-700, 874 P.2d 506, 510-511 
(1983) The Idaho Civil Jury Instructions require as an element of 
every enforceable contract: "A lawful purpose." IDJI 6.01.1. A 
fundamental purpose of every enforceable contract is that it 
complies with the law, otherwise the contract is void. 
Refusal to provide a party with a recovery, when that party 
has acknowledged its illegal conduct has been upheld by Idaho 
Courts. See Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 12, 56 P.3d 765 
(2002) citing Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 300, 31 P.3d 273 (1934) 
(" ... rights based on violation of law will never be enforced by the 
courts and that when a transaction is shown to be illegal because 
of contravention of a statute, the court is justified in its 
refusal to uphold the transaction in any way." (Emphasis Added)). 
Furthermore the Court in Nash v. Meyer, stated: 
No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of 
action upon an immoral or illegal act. If from the 
plaintiffs' own stating, or otherwise I the cause of action 
appears to arise ex turpa causa, or the transgression of a 
positive law of this country, there the court says he has no 
right to be assisted. It is upon that ground that the court 
goes not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will 
not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. 
54 Idaho 283, 300, 31 P.2d 273 (1934) (Emphasis Added). Because 
Printcraft undisputedly violated IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03, it is not 
entitled to acquire the assistance of the Court in recovering on 
its cause of action for breach of contract. Therefore, after 
reconsidering the evidence presented, and the laws applied by the 
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Court in its August 31, 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order, the 
Court should uphold the prior grant of Summary Judgment on 
Printcraft's cause of action for Breach of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Agreement. 
Printcraft is correct that "the evidence does not suggest 
that discharging water softener brine was even within the realm of 
the parties' thinking." See Plaintiff's Memorandum pg. 6. Water 
softener brine was not in the "realm of the parties' thinking" 
because Travis Waters told Sunnyside "nothing" regarding what 
Printcraft intended to discharge into the septic system. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 119, In. 10-17. However, the fact 
that Waters never disclosed that Printcraft would discharge water 
softener brine does not make Printcraft's discharge any less 
illegal. "Ignorance of the law is not a defense." State v. Fox, 
124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993) (citing Hale v. 
Morgan, 22 Cal.3d 388, Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 584 P.2d 512, 517 
(1978)). 
b. No issues of fact whether the Agreement or the Rules 
and Regulations were violated. 
Printcraft's second argument asserts that "[i] n order to 
discharge water softener brine into a septic system it is the 
responsibility of the system's designer to acquire director 
approval from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) ." See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 7. However I Printcraft 
does not cite to any IDAPA provision which requires that the 
system's designer (Benton Engineering in this case. See Second 
Amended Complaint, Exhibit A, pg. 8), obtain such approval or why 
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Benton Engineering's alleged failure is relevant. Instead IDAPA 
58.01.03.002.04(a) states: "Every owner of real property is 
jointly and individually responsible for: ... Obtaining necessary 
permits and approvals ... " Under this provision, either Waters Land 
and Cattle or CTR Development, the property owners, were 
responsible for obtaining such approval when they contracted with 
Printcraft for Printcraft's occupancy of the building. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 87, In. 21 through pg. 88, In. 5. 
Under IDAPA 58.01.03.002.04(b) , Sunnyside would only be 
responsible if it explicitly agreed to accept water softener brine 
into its septic system because it is only responsible for 
"compliance with each of these rules that are relevant to that 
service or product. II (Emphasis Added). It is undisputed that 
Printcraft did not disclose that it intended to discharge water 
softener brine into the sewer system. See Deposition of Travis 
Waters, pg. 119, In. 10-17. It is also undisputed that when 
sunnyside learned of Printcraft's discharge of water softener 
brine it demanded that Printcraft cease violating IDAPA 
58.01.03.004.03. See Letter of Mark Fuller, dated September 20, 
2006, attached as Plaintiff's Response to Request for Admission, 
No.6. Sunnyside did not have an obligation to acquire approval 
for discharge of water softener brine, instead, Printcraft had an 
obligation to ensure that water softener brine was not discharged. 
By way of footnote Printcraft claims that Sunnyside has 
unclean hands resulting from Sunnyside's alleged violated IDAPA 
58.01.03.004.04 once Sunnyside connected the third building to its 
septic system. See Plaintiff's Memorandum, pg. 8. Sunnyside 
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strongly disagrees that it violated this IDAPA provision. IDAPA 
58.01.03.004.04 deals with "resulting flow or volume" it does not 
deal with "number of buildings." However, even assuming that this 
were a violation, Printcraft does not explain how it is relevant 
to the current Motion for Reconsideration. Sunnyside is not even 
pursuing any causes of action for breach of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Agreement, or breach of the 2005 Agreement between 
Sunnyside and CTR Development. Sunnyside's only breach of contract 
cause of action relates to the September, 2006 agreement formed 
after Sunnyside applied for and obtained the June 29, 2006 
expansion permit, resolving the issues with the one or two 
buildings language in the 1996 permit. See June 29, 2006 permit, 
attached as Exhibit N to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 
Based upon the arguments presented by Printcraft, there is no 
reason for the Court to overturn its previous decision granting 
summary judgment to Sunnyside on Printcraft's cause of action for 
Breach of the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement. Sunnyside 
respectfully requests that the Court uphold that portion of the 
Court's August 31, 2007, Memorandum Decision and Order. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT ALLEGED BY SPU 
Printcraft also seeks reconsideration of the Court's April 
23, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order, granting summary judgment 
to Sunnyside Park Utilities, on Count One of SPU's Counterclaim. 
Printcraft's sole basis for the Motion for Reconsideration of the 
April 23, 2008 Memorandum Decision, is that "the April 23, 2008 
decision is based upon the August 31, 2007 decision and in the 
event that the August 31, 2007 decision is reconsidered, the April 
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23, 2008 decision should also be reconsidered." See Second Motion 
for Reconsideration, dated April 28, 2008, pg. 1-2. Printcraft 
Press already made the argument regarding "materiality" in its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Fourth Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated April 1, 2008, pgs. 11-16. Specifically, 
Printcraft argued "something as trivial as soft water brine, which 
is discharged by residences and businesses across the state, is 
not a material breach of the contract." Id. pg. 16. Sunnyside's 
argument is the same now as it was in response to Printcraft' s 
earlier allegation: 
Sunnyside Utilities does not agree that discharging water 
softener brine is a trivial matter, where such a discharge 
subjects Sunnyside Utilities and the owner of the building 
(J&LB Properties), each individually, to criminal penalties, 
including a misdemeanor charge and fines of $10,000 per 
occurrence or $1,000 per day for continuing violations, 
whichever is greater. See IDAPA 58.01.03.012.03. See also 
Idaho Code §39-117i See also IDAPA 58.01.03.002. The 
triviality of water softener brine is not something that can 
be decided by Printcraft, Printcraft's counsel, Printcraft's 
experts, or this Court. The legislature in its wisdom, has 
decided that the discharge of water softener brine into a 
septic system is illegal, unless specific authorization is 
obtained from the Director of the Department of Environmental 
Quality. See IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. 
See Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment RE: Sunnyside Utilities' Breach of Contract Cause 
of Action, dated April 8, 2008, pg. 17. Printcraft' s argument 
becomes even more frivolous after one realizes that on April 11, 
2008 Printcraft received specific instructions from the Idaho 
State Attorney General's office regarding IDAPA 58.01.03.004.01 
and 58.01.03.004.03 stating "a facility cannot discharge 
industrial wastes such as saltwater brine into 'individual and 
subsurface sewage systems,' unless that discharge is approved by 
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the director." See Letter of Courtney Beebee, Office of the 
Attorney General, dated April 11, 2008, attached as Exhibit E, the 
Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, dated May 1, 2008. The letter also 
stated: " ... please note that should Printcraft install a subsurface 
sewage system, Printcraft will become subject to the individual 
and Subsurface Disposal Rules, and cannot discharge saltwater 
brine, or other industrial wastes ... " rd. (Emphasis Added) 
Based on the foregoing, the Court f after considering the 
evidence submitted by Printcraft, should uphold the April 23, 2008 
decision to grant Summary Judgment to Sunnyside Park Utilities on 
its cause of action for Breach of Contract. 
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD 
Because Printcraft has requested reconsideration of the 
August 31! 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court should 
also reconsider whether additional evidence disclosed by 
Printcraft through discovery after the August 31, 2008 Memorandum 
Decision and Order was entered, resolves the disputed issues of 
fact which prevented summary judgment in Sunnyside's favor on 
Printcraft's causes of action for Constructive Fraud. 
Based on the new evidence, Sunnyside is entitled to summary 
judgment on Printcraft's constructive fraud causes of action 
because Printcraft has not established a duty to disclose. The 
Court previously adopted the ruling from Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 
Idaho 702, 707, 8 P. 3d 1245, 1250 (2000) I regarding a duty to 
disclose. See Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31, 
2007. The Court in Sowards held: 
A party may be under a duty to disclose: (1) if there is a 
"\' ""' . ("\ 
t .. ~ {) 
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fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence 
between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial 
statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if a 
fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if 
the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and 
the party knowing the fact also knows that the other does not 
know it. 
Sowards, 134 Idaho at 707, 8 P.3d at 1250. The Court determined 
that Printcraft had not established the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. See Memorandum Decision and Order, dated August 31, 
2007, pg. 14. There are no additional facts which would alter that 
determination. The Court also determined that Printcraft did not 
establish a partial statement which was misleading. Id. There are 
no additional facts which would alter that determination. The 
Court did conclude that there were material issues of fact 
regarding the third prong of Sowards. Id. However, since the 
Court's decision, Printcraft has admitted additional facts which 
resolve the factual issues in the third prong of Sowards. 
The third prong of Sowards, requires a contract between two 
parties, and then creates a duty to disclose if one party to the 
transaction has information that the other party does not have. 
Sowards, supra. First the court must identify a contract between 
Printcraft and Sunnyside, then the Court must determine whether 
there is a material dispute as to what information was possessed 
by the respective parties at the time the contract was formed. 
Printcraft has alleged a variety of contracts in this 
litigation, however, only the contract between SPU and Printcraft 
entered into in September of 2006 includes both Sunnyside and 
Printcraft as parties. The following contracts have been alleged 
by Printcraft: 
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1. A contract between SIPP and Miskin Scraper Works for 
sale of the property. See Second Amended Complaint, para. 
24 (A) . 
2. A contract between Miskin Scraper Works and Waters Land 
and Cattle for sale of the property. Id. para. 24 (B) 
3. A contract between Waters Land and 





4. A contract between Printcraft and either Waters Land 
and Cattle or CTR Development for Printcraft to occupy the 
building. See Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 87, In. 21 
through pg. 88, In. 5. 
5. A contract between SPOA and SPU, to which Printcraft 
was an intended beneficiary, but not a contracting party. 
See Second Amended Complaint, para. 18. 
6. A contract between CTR Development and Sunnyside, to 
which Printcraft was an intended beneficiary, but clearly 
not a contracting party. Id. para. 26. 
7. A contract between J&LB Properties and CTR Management 
for lease of the building. Id. para. 27. 
8. A contract between CTR Management and Printcraft for 
Printcraft to sub-lease part of the building. Id. para. 
27. 
9. A contract between Sunnyside and Printcraft to resolve 
discharge issues between the parties, formed in September, 
2006 and memorialized by the Lane Erickson letter dated 
September 26, 2006. See Affidavit of Travis Waters, dated 
August 2, 2007, para. 40, and Exhibit T. 
The only instance alleged by Printcraft where Sunnyside contracted 
directly with Printcraft occurred in September of 2006. This 
September, 2006 contract was the basis of the Court's denial of 
Sunnyside's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Memorandum Decision 
and Order on August 31, 2007. In the Disputed Material Facts 
section the Court assumed several facts for purposes of summary 
judgment: 
Waters and Woolf met on September 25, 2006 to discuss issues 
relating to the system's failure. During the meeting, 
Printcraft showed Woolf the premises, specifically indicating 
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the substances it discharged into the system and the sources 
of the discharges. Woolf and Beck knew the nature of 
Printcraft's business and types of substances it would 
discharge into the system as a result of the blueprints 
Sunnyside utilities had received previously. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, pg. 5-6. 2 
The relevant question for the Court, under Sowards f after 
identifying a contract, is whether there is a disputed issue of 
fact regarding what information the parties possessed when the 
contract was formed. Based upon the record in August 31, 2007, the 
Court determined that "Woolf and/or Beck understood the nature of 
the business and its need for a septic connection, but failed to 
disclose several deficiencies." See Memorandum Decision and Order, 
pg. 14. While Sunnyside disputes that Woolf and Beck understood 
the nature of the business and the types of substances it would 
discharge, Sunnyside concedes that there is an issue of material 
fact regarding what Woolf and Beck knew, based on the affidavit 
testimony of Travis Waters. 
However, based upon the newly disclosed evidence there is no 
longer an issue of fact regarding what Printcraft knew. The Court 
found based on the record in August 31, 2007: "Waters further 
testified that he did not know the limitations of the septic 
system. /I Id. pg. 15. The Court does not identify specific 
paragraphs from Water's affidavit, however, there are several 
paragraphs, wherein Mr. Waters testified that Sunnyside did not 
disclose certain information prior to Printcraft' s occupancy of 
the building. See Affidavit of Travis Waters, dated August 2, 
2 According to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint the September 25, 2006 
meeting was between "the Defendants and the Plaintiff." See Second Amended 
Complaint, para. 45. 
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2007. Since the August 31, 2007 decision was entered, new 
admissions by Printcraft, establish that in September, 2006 
Printcraft knew the limitations of the septic system. 
On October 26, 2007 Printcraft served Sunnyside with 
Plaintiff's Responses to Defendants First and Second Sets of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production and Requests for 
Admission. Printcraft's response to Request for Admission No. 59 
states: "In June of 2006 Doyle Beck told Travis Waters what kind 
of system was being operated by the defendants." See Plaintiff's 
Admission, No. 59, attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Mark 
R. Fuller, dated May I, 2008. Printcraft's response to Request for 
Admission No. 60 states: "In June of 2006 Doyle Beck told Travis 
Waters the capacity of the sewer system." Furthermore, Printcraft 
acknowledges that on or about September 6, 2006 Sunnyside "put the 
Plaintiff on notice that their intention was only to accept human 
waste and not handle any other types of discharges into the sewer 
system." See Second Amended Complaint, para. 42. Printcraft also 
acknowledges that on or about September 20, 2006 Sunnyside 
provided Printcraft with a copy of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Agreement and the Sunnyside Utilities' Rules and Regulations. Id. 
para. 44. Travis Waters also acknowledged that he was aware that 
District Seven Health Department had concerns regarding the 
Sunnyside Utilities' system in July or August of 2006. See 
Deposition of Travis Waters, pg. 204, In. 14 through pg. 205, In. 
2. Printcraft' s attorney also acknowledged that Printcraft was 
aware of ongoing negotiations between DEQ and Sunnyside in his 
acceptance letter dated September 26, 2006. See Lane Erickson 
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letter, dated September 26, 2006, attached as Exhibit u to the 
Second Amended Complaint. There is simply no dispute that by 
September, 2006, when the contract was formed, Printcraft had at 
its disposal all of the evidence it claims Sunnyside should have 
disclosed. Sunnyside had no duty to disclose facts which 
Printcraft already knew. 
Based on this new evidence, the Court should grant summary 
judgment in accordance with the case law set forth in the Court's 
August 31, 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order. Because it is 
undisputed that Printcraft had the same information that Sunnyside 
had, when the transaction was entered into, the third prong of 
Sowards, no longer creates a duty to disclose by Sunnyside. 
Because there are no disputed issues of fact regarding any of the 
three prongs of Sowards, and Sunnyside did not have a duty to 
disclose, Sunnyside is entitled to Summary Judgment on 
Printcraft's causes of action for constructive fraud. Sunnyside 
respectfully requests that the court reconsider its August 31, 
2007 ruling and grant Summary Judgment in Sunnyside's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Printcraft has requested that the Court reconsider the 
Memorandum Decisions and Orders entered on August 31, 2007 and 
April 23, 2008 pursuant to IRCP 11(a) (2) (B). The Court should re-
evaluate those orders and determine if the decisions contained 
therein should be modified either as a result of (1) new evidence, 
or (2) errors of fact or law. Printcraft asserts that the Court 
should modify its rulings regarding Breaches of Contracts because 
"materiality" is a question of fact. However, Printcraft has 
1121 
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failed to establish any error, factually or legally, in the prior 
two decisions. Therefore/ the Court should affirm the grants of 
summary judgment to Sunnyside on the Breach of Contract causes of 
action. 
Sunnyside has presented new evidence, some of which was not 
available at the time the Court entered the August 31, 2007 
Memorandum Decision and Order. The Court should consider that new 
evidence and revise its finding of fact that Printcraft "did not 
know the limitations of the septic system." The undisputed facts 
clearly show that Printcraft did know the limitations of the 
septic system prior to entering into the September, 2006 contract. 
There were no other contracts entered into between Sunnyside and 
Printcraft prior to that agreement, and therefore a duty to 
disclose, by Sunnyside, could not have arisen until September, 
2006. Based on the new evidence, the Court should grant summary 
judgment to Sunnyside on Printcraft's remaining causes of action 
for Constructive Fraud. 
DATED this day of May, 2008. 
11?2 
Attorney for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed 
below on this 
Document Served: 
Attorneys Served: 
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SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
[NDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DISCOVERY 
SANCTIONS 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft) submits the following 
memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for discovery sanctions. This 
memorandum is supported by the affidavits of Lance J. Schuster and Robert Starr. 
INTRODUCTION 
Printcraft has not violated a discovery order or trespassed on anyone's property. 
There is no legal or factual basis supporting sanctions against Printcraft. The present 
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motion is nothing more than a procedural ploy to prevent Printcraft from putting on its 
case and should not be entertained by this Court. 
Sunnyside did not bring the present motion until after Kirk Woolf signed two 
criminal misdemeanor citations against Lance Schuster.! Counsel for Sunnyside is 
attempting to obtain advantage in a civil matter based on those criminal charges. Such 
conduct is expressly prohibited by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct which 
provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not: 
(3) present or participate in presenting criminal charges solely to obtain advantage 
in a civil matter; or 
(4) threaten to present criminal charges in order to obtain advantage in a ci viI 
matter. 
lRPC 4.4(a),2 It would be a manifest abuse of discretion to suppori Sunnyside's 
machinations and exclude experts vital to Plintcraft's case. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The imposition of sanctions for discovery violations is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 666, 931 P.2d 657,660 (Ct. App. 
1996). Courts should make the punishment fit the Clime and should not impose a drastic 
sanction that will prevent adjudication of a case on its merits except on the clearest 
showing that the course is required. S. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 
526, 532, 746 P,2d 985, 991 (1987) (Donaldson, J., concurring). Trial judges should 
I No such charges were brought against Robert Starr. 
2 Predictably, counsel for Sunnyside will argue that they had nothing to do with the criminal charges. 
Notwithstanding, counsel is attempting to obtain advantage in a civil matter based on those charges. The 
personal attack on Lance Schuster is unwarranted, violates the ethics rules, and amounts to nothing more 
than an attempt to smear a highly respected member of the local bar. This Court should wisely usc its 
discretion and not endorse sllch a ploy. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Discovery Sanctions Page 2 
# 
" 
~ 1-C ; 4:43PM;Beard St.Cl3tr ;208 529 9732 ;::;;:. 4/ 1 ( 
balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the disobedient party with the 
resulting prejudice to the innocent party in light of the twin aims of the sanction power. 
ld. Only after applying this balancing test, the Court should impose a sanction which will 
most substantially lead to the efficient administration of justice. ld. 
Sanctions under Rule 37 are only appropriate when there is a standing discovery 
order. See IDAHO R. CIY. P. 37(b) (2007). The exclusion of witnesses is a severe 
sanction. Roe, 129 Idaho at 667, 931 P .2d at 661. 
FACTS 
1. On April 2, 2008, Lance Schuster met with Bob Starr in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Schuster and StarT decided to drive around Sunnyside Industrial Park and review the 
respective location of Printcraft Press, the septic field, and the sewer lines. Schuster Aff. 
,r 2; Starr Aff. '1]5. 
2. Schuster parked his vehicle next to a vacant lot. Starr indicated he was 
interested in looking at the soils to corroborate what he knew about the soils from the 
documentation provided to him and the pictures he had seen. Schuster and Starr exited 
the vehicle and walked onto the vacant lot. Schuster Aff. '1]3; Starr Aff. '1]'1]5-6. 
3. Tbere were no signs and no indication as to who owned the property. There 
were no "No Trespassing" signs located anywhere on the property or where Schuster and 
Starr entered the propeliy. Schuster Aff. ~ 4; Starr Aff. '1]6. 
4. Schuster and Starr walked toward a gravel pit and Starr used his binoculars to 
look down into the gravel pit. Schuster Aff. '15; Starr Aff. '17. 
5. While Schuster and Starr were standing at the edge of the gravel pit a man 
approached them from near where they parked. He asked who they were and Schuster so 
indicated. He identified himself as Russ. Schuster Aff. '1] 6; Starr Aff. '1 8. 
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6. Russ asked what they were doing and Schuster told him that they were 
looking at the soils. He asked why they were looking at the soils ansi Schuster tOld him 
that Starr was a hydrologist and they were interested in the soils. Schust{':r then a:.;ked 
him ifhe was the owner of the property. Russ said that he worked for the o\\-'ner. 
Schuster asked him ifhe would like them to leave. He said that he would like the'm to 
leave. They had been on the propeliy less than five minutes. Schuster Afr ~ 7; Stc-IIT Afr 
7. The entire time Russ was with them he was using a cell phone. Starr Aff. ~ 8. 
8. At no time did they see any "No Trespassing" signs, nor did Russ ask ifthey 
saw any signs. Schuster Aff. ~ 4; Starr Aff. ,r 9. 
9. The following week, Schuster was served with two criminal misdemeanor 
citations for trespassing, a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7008. The Bonneville County 
Sheriff served the citations at Schuster's law office and indicated that the citations had 
been signed by Kirk Woolf. One citation is for trespassing on property owned by 
Sunnyside Industrial Park and the other is for property owned by Ideal Construction. 
Schuster Afr '1 8. 
10. After receiving the citations Schuster drove out to the Surmyside Industrial 
Park to look for a "No Trespassing" sign. Schuster discovered that someone had posted a 
"No Trespassing" sign on the vacant lot just off of the road where Schuster had 
previously parked. The sign was not there on April 2, 2008 when Schuster and Starr had 
been on the property. There were no other signs indicating who owned the property or 
that entering upon the property was prohibited. Schuster Aff. ~ 9. 
11. Starr also returned to the public roadways in Sunnyside Industrial Park since 
April 2, 2008. Stan observed there is now a "No Trespassing" sign located next to where 
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Schuster's vehicle was parked. If the sign had been there on April 2, Schuster and Stan 
would have seen it and not entered the propeliy. The signpost was not driven into the 
ground but propped up. Starr Aff '1 10. 
12. Whoever posted the property with the "No Trespassing" sign put it up after 
Starr and Schuster had been on the vacant lot. Schuster Aff ~ 10. 
13. Schuster has practiced law in Idaho for twelve years and has served as a 
prosecutor for the City of Ririe for several years. Schuster is well aware of the law 
prohibiting entry upon land that is posted "No Trespassing." Schuster would not have 
entered upon this property if it was posted. Schuster Aff. ~ 11. 
14. There was no intent to trespass, to violate any laws of the State of Idaho or to 
violate the rules of discovery by driving around Sunnyside Industrial Park and walking 
onto a vacant lot. Schuster AfT. ,J 12. 
15. St3JT'S observations on APIil 2, 2008 did not change his opinions. Starr's 
opimons were already fonned before April 2, 2008, and were based upon all the 
documentation, photographs, maps he examined, and observations he made of Printeraft 
Press before that date. 
ARGUMENT 
l. THERE WAS NO TRESPASS. 
Printeraft, or its representatives, did not trespass. A fundamental problem with 
Sunnyside's motion is that it presupposes a trespass occulTed. Sunnyside cites no legal 
authority whatsoever supporting its conclusory statement that a trespass occurred. Before 
this Court could even entertain granting Sunnyside's motion, Sunnyside bears the burden 
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of establishing that a trespass occurred.} Idaho law plainly prevents a showing of 
trespass here. Idaho Codes § 18-7008 provides: 
Every person who willfully commits any trespass, by , , , 
9. Entering without permission of the owner or the owner's agent, upon the real 
properiy of another person which real property is posted with "No Trespassing" 
signs, is posted with a minimum of one hundred (100) square inches of 
fluorescent orange paint except that when metal fence posts are used, the entire 
post must be painted fluorescent orange, or other notices of like meaning, spaced 
at intervals of not less than one (1) sign, paint area or notice per six hundred sixty 
(660) feet along such real property; provided that where the geographical 
configuration of the real property is such that entry can reasonably be made at 
certain points of access, such property is posted sufficiently for all purposes of 
this section if said signs, paint or notices are posted at such points of access 
Is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
idaho Code Ann. § 18-7008.4 
The elements of trespass are not met here. Lance Schuster and Robert Starr both 
testified that there was not a posted "No Trespassing" sign during the brief time they 
entered the property.5 Schuster Aff. ~'19-12; Starr Aff. ~~ 6-10. Instead, someone from 
Sunnyside likely propped the sign up after Schuster and StalT departed on the guise that it 
was there all along. Further, even if the sign was correctly posted, there is no evidence to 
suggest that it meets the specific requirements of Idaho Code § 18-7008 as to lettering 
and color. There is no evidence that Schuster and Starr willfully committed any trespass. 
, There's a question if Sunnyside even has standing to assert a trespass occurred since the alleged trespass 
did not even occur on its property. 
-l See Idaho Code § 6-202 containing similar language for acts of civil trespass. 
j The Christensen Affidavit docs not contradict this as it provides no detail on the sign and fails to indicate 
if the sign \NaS visible and posted at the time Schuster and Starr were present. See Christensen Aff '111. 
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Sunnyside has not met its burden establishing that a trespass occurred and its motion 
should be denied as a matter of course. 
II. PRINTCRAFT DID NOT VIOLATE A DISCOVERY ORDER. 
The defendants' motion should be denied because Printcraft has not violated any 
discovery orders from the Court. The absence of an order that has been violated or 
disobeyed is fatal to the defendants' motion for sanctions. See In re: Williams, 156 F.3d 
86, 89 n.l (l st Cir. 1998).6 In general, obtaining sanctions is a two-step process in which 
a paIiy must first obtain an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(a) and then move 
for sanctions under Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with the order. Rule 37(b) does not 
provide a mechanism for the Court to sanction a party in the absence of an order 
governing discovery. The defendants' motion should be denied. 
Sanctions under Rule 3 7(b) only apply to cases where there is a standing 
discovery order. See IDAHO R. ClY. P. 37(b) (2007). Rule 37(b)(2) provides in part: 
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b )(6) or 31 (a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under 
subdivision (a) ofth1s rule or Rule 35, the court in which the action is pending 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just. ... 
Id. Some balancing of the equities and some consideration of the efficacy oflesser 
sanctions must precede a trial court's imposition of a sanction which will significantly 
impair a party's ability to present its case on the merits at trial. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 
663,667-68,931 P.2d 657, 661-62 (Ct. App. 1996). The rule should be dispositive in 
this case. 
(, For all intents and purposes the federal rule is ncarly identical in purpose and languagc. 
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Here, the defendants have not filed a motion to compel the production of any 
information acquired by Printcraft as a result of the alleged trespass. 7 The Court has not 
ordered Printcraft to produce any infonnation obtained by the alleged trespass. Printcraft 
has not violated any discovery orders from the Court. Thus, the Court would 
significantly abuse its discretion ifit excluded any let alone all of Print craft's expert 
witnesses because it would not properly be applying the law. See Robertson v. Richards, 
115 Idaho 628, 655, 769 P.2d 505,532 (1989) (stating that a misconception of the law 
constitutes an abuse of discretion). Since Plintcraft has not violated or disobeyed any 
orders of this Court, the defendants' motion must be denied. 
III. THERE IS NO PREJUDICE TO SUNNYSIDE. 
The underlying purpose for the rules of discovery is to prevent prejudice to the 
parties involved in the litigation. Here, there is no prejudice to Sunnyside and Sunnyside 
never explains to the Court how it is prejudiced by the alleged trespass. This omission 
fI-om Sunnyside belies its true intent to resolve this case on a procedural technicality 
rather than on its merits. 
Idaho law is clear that absent prejudice sanctions are not justified. In Devault v. 
Stephen L. Herndon, 107 Idaho 1, 684 P .2d 978 (1984), the trial court had issued an order 
compelling the production of documents by a specific deadline. !d. at 2, 684 P.2d at 979. 
The party ordered to produce the documents failed to comply with the Court's order. ld. 
In Devault, the Court noted that the sanctions under Rule 37 were intended to punish 
misconduct and deter others involved in litigation to prevent abuse in connection with 
discovery, and that a determination of whether a party's actions were of sufficient bad 
7 This is likely because the defendants recognize that any such information would have been nominal and 
superfluous to Mr. Starr's ultimate opinions. In fact, the defendants arc fully aware that their motion is 
merely a hyper-technical pretext to avoid trying their case on the merits of the action. 
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faith to justify dismissal is within the discretion of the trial court. Id. (citing Nat '/ Hockey 
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976». The trial court dismissed 
Devault's action with prejudice as a sanction for his noncompliance with the trial comi's 
discovery order. This was within the trial cOlili's discretion because it would have been 
patently unfair for the other party to litigate without ever seeing the documents Devault 
refused to produce. 
Idaho law also provides that the trial judge should balance the equities by 
comparing the culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the 
innocent party in light of the twin aims of the sanction power. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 
663,667,931 P.2d 657, 661 (et. App_ 1996).8 The trial court should only seek to impose 
a sanction that will lead to the efficient administration of justice. Id. Excluding 
witnesses and evidence is a severe sanction. Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the incident occurred on April 2, 2008. Starr Aff. " 5. However, the 
parties disclosed their respective experts on April 11, 2008. Thus, any information 
gleaned from the brief, five minute walk onto a third-party's unmarked propeliy would 
have been disclosed to the defendants at the time the expert disclosures were made. 
Additionally, Starr has testified that the observations he made on April 2, 2008 do not 
form the basis for his opinions. Starr AfT. ~ 11. Stan's opinions were already fonned 
prior to April 2, 2008 and are based on the specific sources of information detailed in 
paragraph 4 of Starr's affidavit. 
S It is important to note that the defendants have not cited any Idaho law SuppOliing the underlying rationale 
in their requests for sanctions. A recent Texas case noted that in the event a ruling prevented a litigant from 
properly presenting its case would constitute grounds for reversal. Richmond Condominiums v. Skipworth 
Comm. Plumbing. fnc., 245 S.W.3d 646, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 963, *31 (February 7, 2008). The 
Richmond Condominiums Court found that sanctions must be just, directly related to the offensive conduct, 
and not excessive. Id. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Discovery Sanctions Page 9 
10/ 
, as: 4:43PM:Beard S~.Clalr ; 20·3 529 9732 
Any trespass would have been unintentional. There were no signs. Schuster Aff. 
'1 4. There was no intent to trespass. !d. ~ 12.Thus, the trial court should balance the 
culpabilities and equities given the specific facts in this case. On one hand, there is no 
prejudice to the defendants. On the other, the alleged trespassers did not trespass. Thus. 
the defendants' motion must be denied. 
IV. THE SANCTIONS REQUESTED ARE INAPPROPRIATE. 
The defendants request that all of Print craft's experts be excluded from testifying 
at trial. The requested sanctions are inappropriate under Idaho law and should be denied 
by this Court. 
Sanctions serve dual purposes of encouraging compliance with discovery and 
punishing misconduct. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663,667,931 P.2d 657,661. Trial courts 
should generally attempt to satisfy the aim of encouragement before applying the more 
drastic punishment sanction. [d. The punishment should fit the crime and a trial court 
should not impose a drastic sanction that will prevent adjudication of a case on its merits 
except on the clearest showing that this course is required. S. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass '11 V. 
Astorquia. 113 Idaho 526, 532, 746 P.2d 985, 991 (Donaldson, J., concurring). Justice 
Donaldson commented: 
The trial judge must balance the equities by comparing the culpability of the 
disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent pariy in light of the 
twin aims of the sanction power. Only after applying this balancing test, the court 
should impose a sanction which will most substantially lead to the efficient 
administration of justice. 
Id. The exclusion of witnesses and evidence is a severe sanction. Roe, 129 Idaho at 667, 
931 P.2d at 661. 
Here, Schuster and Starr did not trespass. See discussion supra. Schuster testified 
that there are no signs indicating who the owner of the property is. Schuster AfT. ~ 4. 
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Schuster had no intention to trespass or violate the laws of the State ofIdaho. [d.'1 12. 
Thus, there was no culpability or bad intent on the part of Printcraft that would justify the 
requested sanction of excluding some or all of Printcraft's expelis from testifying at trial. 
Such a sanction would prevent Printcraft from being able to present the merits of its case 
and would only encourage resolution ofth1s matter on the bases of technicalities and 
procedural zealotry. The defendants have not been prejudiced and the Comt should deny 
their motion. 
V. THE DEFENDANTS MISAPPLY RULE 45. 
The defendants attempt to misconstrue Rule 45 to mean that any time an expert 
perfonns some sort of inspection that Rule 45 must be utilized. This is simply an 
incorrect understanding of the Rule. Rule 4S(b) allows a party to subpoena a third party 
to allow the inspection and copying of documents, electronically stored infonnation, or 
tangible things, or to permit inspection of premises. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 45(b )(2). Nothing 
in the rule requires that every time an expert witnesses reviews documents or infoDTlation 
produced by a third party that it must be obtained by subpoena. The subpoena only 
requires that the third party either produce the information or present the Court with good 
cause for quashing the subpoena. If a third party is willing to cooperate and voluntmily 
produce information to litigants, then a subpoena is unnecessary. All that would be 
required of the parties is the production of the infol111ation upon which the expelt witness 
relied through discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based 011 the foregoing, Printcraft respectfully requests that Sunnyside's motion 
for summary judgment be denied. 
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 




SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
O\VNERS ASSOCLA. TION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Defendants/CounterclaimaIlts. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO 
RECONSIDER 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft) submits the following reply brief in 
support of its motions to reconsider. 
INTRODUCTION 
The jury is the proper body to decide whether a material breach of contract has 
occurred. It is not the role of a district judge to take this important decision away from 
the jury. There are numerous issues of fact as to whether the alleged discharges by 
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Printcraft constitute a material breach. The undisputed testimony of Printer aft's experts 
is more than enough to get past summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT AS TO MATERIAL BREACH 
Both decisions of the Court are silent as to material breach. Such an important 
element of contract law should not be disregarded by the Court. In its response to the 
motions to reconsider, Sunnyside argues that Printcraft has based its cause of action on an 
illegal act and that the COUli should not uphold the transaction in any way. Sunnyside 
confuses formation issues with breach issues. Printcraft is not arguing that it contracted 
to discharge soft water brine into the septic system as suggested by Sunnyside. Rather, 
Printcraft argues that it is an intended beneficiary of the third party beneficiary agreement 
and that Sunnyside materially breached the third party beneficiary agreement by 
disconnecting Plintcraft. The third party beneficiary agreement is not an illegal contract. 
In response to Printcraft's argument, Sunnyside argues that the disconnection was 
not a material breach since Printcraft was discharging soft water bline in violation of the 
law. Even if the discharge of soft water brine was a breach of the third party beneficiary 
agreement, such a breach is not material and, therefore, termination of the contract (i.e. 
disconnection) was not justified or is at least an issue of fact for a jury. The following 
outline of the third party beneficiary agreement illustrates: 
• Fonnation 
o Parties/Intended Beneficiary 
• Sunnyside - Third Party Beneficiary Agreement (Amended 
Compl. Ex. G) 
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• Printcraft - "This Agreement is made not only with the 
Representative in its individual capacity but also as the 
representative of and for the benefit of the present and 
future owners of or occupants of all and each of the 
properties, buildings, and other improvements which are 
now or may hereafter be served by the water supply 
systems and/or sewages systems of[Sunnyside] .. ," 
(Amended CompI. Ex. G, § l(a» 
• Terms 
o "[Sunnyside] shall provide at all times for each of the buildings, 
and other improvements constructed in the areas and subdivisions 
served by the sewage systems of [Sunnyside] sewage services 
adequate for the safe and sanitary collection and disposal of all 
sewage from said buildings ... " (Amended Compi. Ex. G, § 2(b» 
• Material Breach by Sunnyside 
o Disconnection of Printcraft from the septic system December 15, 
2006 
• Affirmative Defense of SUlmyside 
o Breach by Printcraft due to alleged violation of law by Printcraft 
o Was the alleged breach material? 
• Question of fact for the jury to decide 
• Improperly decided as a matter of law by Judge st. Clair 
and incorporated into the Court's recent summary judgment 
decision 
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Smmyside concedes that the discharge of soft water brine was not within the 
realm of the parties' thinking. Response Br. at 5. Undisputedly, the formation of the 
third party beneficiary agreement did not hinge on the discharge of soft "vater brine. 
Printcraft's alleged discharge is a breach issue; not a formation issue. The illegality cases 
cited by Sunnyside are completely irrelevant to the analysis. J Printcraft does not attempt 
to benefit from it own wrong; rather, Printcraft seeks to recover for Sunnyside's 
egregious breach of contract. 
Surmyside argues that there is no dispute that Printcraft discharged water softener 
brine, hazardous wastes, processed water and excessive flows of wastewater in violation 
ofIDAPA. Such an argument is false. There is no support in the record for Judge St. 
Clair's factual finding especially when every factual inference must be given to 
Printcraft. There has been no showing that hazardous materials or excessive flows were 
discharged. This Court recently acknowledged that "processed waste" does not have a 
clear meaning. Mem. Decision and Order, April 23, 2008 at 6. Printcraft could not have 
discharged excessive flows because SUilllyside failed to disclose the system limitations. 
Prilltcraft could not have exceeded the design flows because the design flows were not 
disclosed. Judge St. Clair's conclusory statements should not be ratified by this Court. 
The only discharge that is arguably supported by the factual record is the 
discharge of soft water brine. However, such a discharge did not materially breach the 
contract. Sunnyside cites no law establishing that a violation of law constitutes a material 
breach. This COUli should apply the black letter law which provides that before there can 
be a temlination or rescission there must be a material breach of contract. Material breach 
I Even jfthe Court were to buy into Sunnyside's illegality theory, the Trees case cited by Sunnyside 
actually supports Printcraft. The Trees case expressly recognized an exception to the illegality doctrine 
based on fraud. Trees v. Kersey, ] 38 Idaho 3, 9-\ 0,56 P.3d 765, 771-72 (2002). 
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is a question for the jury. The Court should not unilaterally determine that a violation 
law equals a material breach of contract. 
Sunnyside did not bother addressing the t\VO expert affidavits submitted by 
Printcraft estqblishing that the alleged discharges by Printcraft did not cause the system 
failure. Those affidavits, which were not in the record for the August 2007 decision, 
generate an issue of fact as to whether the alleged breach by Printcraft was material. 
Sunnyside argues that the discharge is matelial since it canies with it criminal 
penalties.2 However, District Seven's representative in charge of enforcement actions, 
testified that she had never been privy to an enforcement action for discharge of soft 
water brine and that it is only a concem if there is a clay soil t)lJe. See Eager Dep. (1n 
preparation). Eager testified that District Seven was not concemed whatsoever with the 
content of the discharge but rather was concemed about the amount of buildings hooked 
up to the system. See Eager Dep. (In preparation). Further, review of the climinal 
statute provides that a violation must be willful or negligent. See Idaho Code § 39-
117( 1). Sunnyside was not at risk to be prosecuted for discharge of soft water bIine. 
Clearly, the soft water brine allegation was nothing more than pretext to 
disconnect Printcraft because Sunnyside had hooked up too many industrial buildings to a 
system more adequately designed to handle the flows of a three bedroom residence. The 
first time Sunnyside specifically mentioned soft water brine was in a letter received 
December 15,2006, the same day Sunnyside severed Printcraft's sewer connection. 
Waters Aff. Ex Z. 3 It would be a gross miscaniage of justice to allow Sunnyside to get 
away with such conduct. Printcraft is not asking for this Court to make a legal 
1 When one really steps back and considers this argument it becomes absolutely ridiculous. To suggest that 
residents of Bonneville County with water softeners are criminals is laughable . 
.1 This afildavit was submitted to the Court 011 August 2,2007. 
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determination that Sunnyside was not justified in disconnecting Printcraft as a matter of 
law. Printcraft simply asks that Court let the jury perforlll its job without unjustified 
interference. Thus, the Court should reconsider its previous rulings. 
II. THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT AS \VHETHER IDAPA WAS VIOLATED. 
In order to discharge water softener brine into a septic system it is the 
responsibility of the system's designer to acquire director approval from the Idaho 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). The relevant portion of the Idaho 
Administrative Code governing Individual/Subsurface Sewage Disposal governs the 
design, construction, siting and abandonment of individual and subsurface sewage 
disposal systems. IDAPA 58.01.03.004.01. IDAPA provides that water softener brine, 
"cannot be discharged into any system unless that discharge is approved by the Director." 
Id. 58.01.03.004.03. By discharging into someone else's system, Printcraft violated none 
of these subsections by discharging water softener bline into the septic system. 
Sunnyside's citation to a recent letter from State Attorney's Office does not 
change the applicability of this section. The letter expressly addresses Printcraft's current 
system and states that it is not violating IDAP A Fuller Aff. Ex. E. Further, Sunnyside 
bas never established that there was not director approval to discharge soft water brine 
into the system. Eager testified there was no concern if it was a gravelly soil type. See 
Eager Dep. (In Preparation). Thus, there was no violation ofIDAP A by Printcraft. At a 
minimum there are issues of fact and this Court should reconsider its previous decisions. 
III. THE ISSUE 01" CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT. 
Printcraft did not move to reconsider its constructive fraud claims. Sunnyside 
devotes half of its brief to an attempt to have the cOUli sua sponte dismiss Printcraft's 
constructive fraud claims. Such an attempt to hijack Printcraft's motion should not be 
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allowed. Printcraft objects to Sunnyside's attempt and requests that the Couti strike this 
portion of Sunnyside's brief. Sunnyside filed no motions and did not give Printcraft 
sufficient 110tice ullder the Rules of Civil Procedure~ The rules of procedure vvere not 
followed and Printcraft was not given adequate time to respond to arguments. 4 
Sunnyside has moved for summary judgment on Printcraft's constructive fraud claims on 
at least two previous occasions, most recently on November 21, 2007. The "new 
evidence" Sunnyside refers to was certainly available at that time.s 
lfthe Court is inclined to consider Sunnyside's third attempt at summary judgment 
on the construct fraud issue, Printcraft should be given adequate time to respond. Thus, 
the COLIrt should not entertain SUllilyside's arguments until they are properly brought 
before the Court and Printcraft is given a fair 0ppoliunity to respond. 6 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Printcraft respectfully requests this Court to grant is 
Motions to Reconsider and vacate the August 31,2007 ruling and reinstate Printcraft's 
Breach of Contract claim, vacate its April 23, 2008 ruling and allow a jury to decide 
Sunnyside's breach of contract claim, and strike the portion of Sunnyside's brief 
addressing constructive fraud. 
~ Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires Sunnyside to give 14 days notice on motionlo 
reconsider. 
5 Sunnyside cites to facts occurring in 2006 as its "new evidence." 
6 A cursory review of the argument establishes that Printcraft was an intended beneficiary of the third party 
beneficiary agreement and therefore the third prong of Soward applies to it. 
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SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE 
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual, 
KIRK WOOLF, an individual, 
Dcfendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-06-7097 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDGM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND 
TO ALLEGE PtJNITIVE DAMAGES 
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft) submits the following reply 
memorandum in support of its Motion to Amend to Allege Punitive Damages. 
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FACTS 
1. Travis Waters (Waters), Printeraft's president, started looking for a new 
building for Printcraft in early 2005. (Waters Aff. 4] 3.) 1 
2. Waters saw a sign at the entrance to Sunnyside Industrial and Professional 
Park (SIPP) advertising the name of the park as Sunnyside Industrial and Professional 
Park. (ld.,r 4.) The sign adveItised water and sewer. (Id.) 
3. The existence of electricity, water, sewer, parking, road access, and space 
for construction was of importance to Waters. (See id. ,r'l 5-6.) 
4. Waters personally reviewed the plat map and noted that the plat was titled 
"Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Parle" (ld. '17.) 
5. Waters met with Doyle Beck (Beck) and Kirk Woolf (Woolt) prior to the 
construction or occupancy of the building presently occupied by Printcraft. (ld. ~ 9.) 
6. Both Beck and Woolf represented to Printcraft that a sewer connection 
existed on the lot where Printcraft's building would be constnlcted. (ld.) 
7. Blueprints were provided to Beck and Woolf by Printcraft. (ld.) 
8. Beck and Woolf never disclosed prior to the construction of Print craft's 
building that the septic system operating and serving the occupants of SIPP was 
permitted to have only two commercial buildings connected to the septic system. (ld. ~ 
10.) The defendants also failed to disclose that seven or eight buildings were connected 
to the SIPP septic system in violation of the defendants' septic permit. (ld.4110.) 
9. The defendants never disclosed that the septic system only had one 1000 
gallon tank or that the daily capacity was 500 gallons per day. (ld.4111.) 
! This affidavit was submitted to the Comi on December 5,2007 in response to the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment re: Constructive Fraud. The defendants' motion was subsequently dcnied by this 
Court. 
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10. The defendants never disclosed to Printcraft that District Seven had issued 
a letter to Beck and Woolf prohibiting any new connections to the septic system as of 
April 15, 2002. CId. '112.) 
11. The defendants never disclosed to Printeraft that the Third Party 
Beneficiary Utility Agreement or the Rules and Regulations (collectively the Agreement) 
existed or that the defendants relied upon them for administering the use of the septic 
system. (ld. ~ 13.) 
12. Waters testified that Printcraft relied upon the promise, representations, 
and actions undertaken by the defendants when it closed its then existing operations and 
move into SIPP. (ld. '116.) Printcraft sold equipment and incurred substantial expense in 
moving its business into SIPP. (ld.) Printcraft also ceased all other real estate purchasing 
opportunities with the goal of acquiring a new location for Printcraft. (ld.) 
13. Printeraft understood that the septic system would be adequate for 
Printcraft's needs. (ld.) None of the defendants ever placed Printcraft on notice prior to 
Prinlcraft's move into SIPP ofSIPP's grossly undersized and inadequate sewer system. 
14. Had Printcraft learned at any time that defendants' septic system was 
severely restricted, grossly under capacity or simply poorly designed, Printeraft would 
not have moved from its original building into SIPP. (ld.'1 21.) Similarly, Printcraft 
would not have given up on other opportunities to purchase and lease real estate for its 
operations. (lei.) 
15. The Court established as a matter of law that Printcraft is a third party 
beneficiary of the Agreement. (Mem Dec. Order, August 31,2007.) 
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ARGUMENT 
It is of paramount importance for the Court to bear in mind that this is merely the 
amendment stage about punitive damages. The evidentiary threshold for amending a 
complaint to include a claim for punitive damages is lower than the ultimate burden that a 
party must satisfy at trial. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2). This burden is a 
preponderance and not the clear and convincing evidence standard enunciated in the 
statute. Myers v. Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495,501,95 P.3d 977 (2004). 
The defendants give mere lip service to this guidance and frequently ignore it in an effort 
to dissuade the Court from granting Printcraft's motion. The Court should not be swayed 
by the defendants' arguments and should narrow its focus solely on whether Printcraft 
has a reasonable likelihood of proving fraud at trial. 
The bulk of the defendants' arguments can be boiled down to a simple defense: 
there is no contractual privity between Printcraft and any ofthe defendants. The 
defendants' argument is misleading and absurd. The Agreement states that "this 
Agreement is made not only with the Representative in its individual capacity but also as 
the representative of and for the benefit of the present and future owners of or occupants 
of all and each ofthe properties, buildings, and other improvements which are now or 
may hereafter be served by the water supply systems and/or sewages systems of 
[SunnysideJ ... " (Amended CompI. Ex. G, § l(a). The defendants, however, fail to 
recognize also that a duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on 
equal terms or where information to be conveyed is not already in possession ofthe other 
party. Jones v. Jvfaestas, 108 Idaho 69, 696 P.2d 920 (Ct. App. 1985). Further, silence in 
circumstances where a prospective purchaser might be led to harmful conclusion is a 
form of representation. Sorensen v. Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977). 
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The arguments raised by the defendants are old, tired, and wam1ed over. The 
defendants have argued the lack of contractual privity between Printcraft and the 
defendants on two separate and previous occasions. The defendants also attempt an 
oblique effort to resun-ect these "summary judgment" arguments for a third time in their 
response to Printcraft's motion for reconsideration.2 The Court has clearly found that the 
issue of "promises" made by the defendants "goes to the heart of the factual issues 
relating to a claim of constructive fraud. The evidence indicates that the Plaintiff 
assumed and believed that the "industrial park" would have adequate facilities for sewage 
and waste water. There is also a disputed issue whether Defendants were aware of 
Plaintiff's sewage and waste water requirements." (Order 4, December 26,2007.) 
Here, Printcraft has evidence that the defendants were under intense pressure from 
District Seven conceming the defendants' failure to comply with the parameters of the 
septic permit. (Eager Dep. 142:19-143:4, December 7,2007.) The pressure and 
limitations date back to April 15,2002, over six years ago. The septic system at 
Sunnyside violates IDAPA because it is located in a pit. It could be flooded in the event 
of a major snow melt. The tanks in series requirements do not meet the IDAP A 
requirements for the said volume of the tanks as placed in selies. The tanks were 
installed without inspection and there were other deficiencies to what was installed to the 
temporary system. (Id. 143: 15-22.) Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft 
will be able to prove that at the time Waters met with the defendants, the defendants 
knew and understood that District Seven had imposed severe limitations on the septic 
system and that connecting another building to the septic system would violate District 
Seven's limitations. Even if the nature of Printer aft's business is set aside, the defendants 
2 lrresrectivc of the procedural defects in their attempts to do so. 
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should have informed Printcraft that they were not authorized to connect any other 
buildings within the industrial park to the septic system until an LSAS or other upgrade 
had been put in. There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to show that 
had it known that no new connections were pennitted, that it would have looked 
elsewhere for a new location. (Waters Aff. ~~ 21-22.) 
The defendants also seek to interpose a red herring into the litigation. Their entire 
argument about the September 2006 contract misleads the Court. The operative time 
frame where the fraud took place preceded Printcraft's occupancy of the building in 
S [PP. The defendants knew that the septic system was undersized at the time they met 
with Printcraft. (Waters Aff. '111.) The defendants knew that the septic system had too 
many connections at the time they initially met with PrintcrafL (Id. ~ 12.) It was the 
failure of the defendants to disclose the septic system's limitation before Printcraft 
decided to moves its business that the Court must consider whether Printcraft has a 
reasonable likelihood of proving at trial. Any deleterious or negative effects suffered by 
Printcraft as a result of occupying a lot within SIPP runs directly back to the defendants' 
initial failure to disclose mateIial infonnation about the septic system. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to prove at trial that 
the defendants knew the nature of Printcraft's business. The defendants undisputedly 
knew that Printcraft engaged in the printing business. The detendants were able to 
inspect the blueprints and designs for the building prior to Printcraft constructing its 
building. (Waters Aff. ~ 9.) The defendants expressly represented that there was a sewer 
connection for Printcraft despite the fact that there were already too many connections to 
the septic system. (ld.) Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able 
to prove at trial that the defendants knew and understood the nature of Printcraft's 
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business and that the limitations about the septic system should have been provided to 
Printcraft long before Printcraft ever moved into the industrial park. 
This is bolstered by the fact that at the time the defendants learned that Printcraft 
would occupy the premises within the industrial park the defendants knew that Printcraft 
would be an intended beneficiary of the Agreement and thereby entitled to the sewer and 
water services provided in that Agreement. The COUli has previously ruled that as a 
matter of law Printcraft is an intended beneficiary of the Agreement. (Mem. Dee.& 
Order 11.) As an intended beneficiary Printeraft's rights are contractual lights as ifit 
were a paIiy to the Agreement. 9-41 Corbin on Contracts § 41.4 (2007). An intended 
beneficiary has the same lights as if the beneficiary were the promisee of an a&,rreement. 
ld. As a beneficiary of the Agreement, Pllntcrafi should have been placed on notice of 
the severe limitations on the septic system. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to establish that it 
relied on the infonnatitm relayed to it in deciding to move its business to SIPP. Waters 
has testified that Plintcraft believed that SIPP had all of the elements Printcraft deemed 
important for its business. (Waters AfT. 'I~ 5, 16.) Of course, Printcraft's claims for fraud 
are based on omissions by the defendants concerning the limitations on the septic system. 
Waters has testified, and will testify at trial, that had the defendants been fOlihcoming and 
disclosed all of the limitations on the system that Printcrafi would not have moved into 
the industrial park. (Id. r:'121-22.) The defendants have presented no evidence to dispute 
this testimony; indeed, the defendants cannot conjure up evidence to the contrary because 
none exists. As an intended beneficiary of the Agreement, PIintcraft should have been 
told the limitations of the system. The defendants' failure to disclose the information led 
to Printcraft's reliance on the representations that there was a sufficient and adequate 
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septic system for Printcraft's needs. There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will 
prevail at trial on this issue. 
Similarly, the defendants' arguments concerning "justifiable reliance" have 
previously been rejected by this Court. (Order 3.) The Court clearly held that this is 
merely an issue that the jury will have to sort out and that it goes to the weight of the 
evidence on reliance. There is an equally reasonable probability that Printeraft will 
prevail on this issue at trial and the defendants have not presented the Court with any 
evidence that suggests that as an intended beneficiary, Printeraft was unreasonable in 
relying on the defendants' express representations that the septic system was sufficient 
for its business. 
The defendants' ar.bruments concerning damages are equally absurd. There is a 
reasonable probability that Printcraft will be able to show that it was damaged as a result 
of the defendants' fraudulent conduct. Waters, as president of the company, is qualified 
to testify what Printcraft's damages are as a result of the defendants' fraud. Printcraft has 
also retained David Smith and he has provided a detailed report listing the damages 
suffered by Printcraft as a result of the fraudulent scheme engaged in by the defendants. 
(Fuller Afl Ex. F.)3 Smith's opinions have not been excluded by the Court. Thus, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to prove damages under its fraud 
theories. As a result, Printcraft's motion should be granted. 
There is a reasonable likelihood that Printcraft will be able to prove at trial that 
the defendants' engaged in a deceptive business practice dangerous to the public. The 
defendants mistakenly argue, and it is grossly misleading, that the only profit it would 
1 The Court should note that the Exhibit attached to Mr. Fuller's affidavit are mere excerpts from the full 
report from David Smith. Printcraft has produced voluminous financial documents during the course of 
discovery that would lay the foundation for Printcraft's damages testimony at trial. 
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derive from its sales practices is the $15!month from Printcraft. (Def. Mem. 23.) The 
deiendants ignore the fundamental mechanism for deriving profits from the industrial 
park: the sale of lots to buyers. However, the deceptive business scheme is much greater 
than just the transaction with Printcraft. The scheme goes to the marketing oflots within 
SIPP. At the time Printeraft moved into SIPP neither the Third Pmiy Beneficiary Utility 
Agreement nor the Rules and Regulations were recorded in Bonneville County. At the 
time the lots were marketed as industrial lots for industrial or commercial enterprises, 
there were seven or eight buildings connected to the septic system pennitted only for one 
or two commercial buildings. (Waters Aff. '\110.) At the time Printcraft moved into SIPP 
the septic system was under-capacity and only had a 1000 gallon tank with a daily 
capacity of 500 gallons. (lei. '111.) The facts are similar to Umphrey and the Court 
should grant Printcraft's motion. 
As to KeUye Eager, the Court is respectfully refened to footnote 8 in Printcraft's 
Memorandum in SuppOli of Motion for Reconsideration for specific IDAPA sections the 
defendants violated when they allowed more cOlmeetions to the septic system than they 
were permitted. The flows into the septic system are also calculated in Bob Starr's 
affidavit that was previously submitted to the CourL4 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' arguments are without merit. The Court should grant Printcraft's 
Motion to Amend to Alleged Punitive Damages. 
4 Additionally. and importantly, the Court is referred to Eric Nuttall's affidavit. In that affidavit Nuttall 
testifies that the salt water brine and the other alleged "hazardous materials" had no negative or deleterious 
effects on the septic system. Therefore, if the defendants wish to play the game of whose alleged violations 
were worse, the Court should note that the defendants' allowance of several additional connections to the 
septic system, and the corresponding increased flows. in violation of IDAPA, actually caused the failure of 
the system in June 2006. Clearly the more egregious violation of IDAPA lies with the defendants. 
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